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But that science is so fer us biforn,
We mowen nat, although we hadden it sworn,
It overtake, it slit awey so faste.
It wole us maken beggers atte laste!
Chaucer, The Canon’s Yeoman Tale
Abstract
Evolution is notorious for its creative power, but also for giving rise to complex, unpre-
dictable dynamics. As a result, practitioners of artificial evolution have encountered difficulties
in predicting, analysing, or even understanding the outcome of their experiments. In partic-
ular, the concept of evolutionary “progress” (whether in the sense of performance increase or
complexity growth) has given rise to much debate and confusion. After a careful description of
the mechanisms of evolution and natural selection, we provide usable concepts of performance
and progress in coevolution. In particular, we introduce a distinction between three types of
progress: local, historical, and global, which we suggest underlies much of the confusion that
surrounds coevolutionary dynamics. Similarly, we provide a comprehensive answer to the ques-
tion of whether an “arrow of complexity” exists in evolution. We introduce several methods to
detect and analyse performance and progress in coevolutionary experiments. We propose a sta-
tistical measure (Fitness Transmission) to detect the presence of adaptive Darwinian evolution
in a reproducing population, based solely on genealogic records; we also point out the limitations
of a popular method (the Bedau-Packard statistics of evolutionary activity) for this purpose. To
test and illustrate our results, we implement a rich experimental system, inspired by the seminal
work of Karl Sims, in which virtual creatures can evolve and interact under various conditions
in a physically realistic three-dimensional (3D) environment. To our knowledge, this is the first
complete reimplementation and extension of Sims’ results. We later extend this system with the
introduction of physical combat between creatures, also a first. Finally, we introduce Evosphere,
an open, planet-like environment in which 3D artificial creatures interact, reproduce and evolve
freely. We conclude our discussion by using Fitness Transmission to detect the onset of adaptive
evolution in this system.
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1.1.1 The advent of artificial evolution
Evolution shapes the biological world. Ever since the beginning of life, what started as a
peculiar chemical reaction between organic compounds has given rise to an astronomical diversity
of entities, exhibiting features and behaviours of a complexity that baﬄe human engineers.
Through evolutionary adaptation, life has invaded the world, colonising even the most hostile
environments it had to offer. From the inner crust of the Earth to the top of mountains, life
flourishes wherever it can, and even where we might think it can not.
The power of evolution is most visible in elaborate structures sported by living organisms,
both at the microscopic and the macroscopic level. The bacterial flagellum, the acid guns of
beetles, the vertebrate eye, the human brain, are testaments to the creativity of the evolutionary
process. Explaining how these structures could have come into being without external design
was precisely one of the great achievements of evolutionary theory.
Artificial evolution is an attempt to harness some of this power for the production of artificial
entities. The idea of using computers to study concepts related to life and evolution is almost
as old as computers themselves. John Von Neumann showed how Turing’s universal computing
automaton could be applied to the creation of self-replicating entities. His considerations on
evolutionary processes led him to formalise the mechanisms of heredity and self-replication, and
to investigate the question of evolutionary complexity (see McMullin’s account [114]). Soon
afterwards, in an apparently unrelated effort, engineers made use of evolutionary techniques
to perform practical tasks such as optimisation and design. These two approaches to artificial
evolution (theoretical and conceptual on one hand, and practical, engineering-oriented on the
other hand) have grown into closely related lines of research in artificial life and evolutionary
computation.
1.1.2 Discrepancies between natural and artificial evolution
Unfortunately, there seems to have been a lack of connection between students of evolution in
Nature and in computers, which may be the cause for what has been described as a lack of
theoretical grounding in artificial evolution. A notable result of this lack of connection is a
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discrepancy between what is expected from evolution, and what is actually obtained from it.
The feeling that artificial evolution and artificial life systems often rely on implicit assumptions
and ad hoc rules and machineries has been emphasised by Taylor [173]:
The results of [our] work, and consideration of the existing literature on artificial
evolutionary systems, leads to the conclusion that artificial life models (. . . ) are
lacking on a number of theoretical and methodological grounds. It is emphasised
that explicit theoretical considerations should guide the design of such models, if
they are to be of scientific value.
And further (citing Pattee [139]):
I am certainly not the first person to criticise artificial life models on these grounds[. . . ]
For example, Howard Pattee warns that “simulations that are dependent on ad hoc
and special-purpose rules and constraints for their mimicry cannot be used to support
theories of life” [139][. . . ] The ad hoc feel of [such] systems is a direct consequence
of this lack of theoretical grounding. The unmanageable parameter space of many of
them can also be attributed to this lack of direction. As a result of these weaknesses,
even if interesting behaviours are observed in these systems, we are unlikely to be
able to explain why.
This problem is particularly prevalent in coevolution, that is, when the reproductive success
of individuals is determined at least in part by the outcome of their interactions, rather than by
a fixed, external fitness function. Ficici [53, Chap. 1] writes:
[The] gap between the hypothesized potential of coevolutionary algorithms and re-
alized practice remains substantial - the successes of coevolution (of which there
are now many) are balanced by frequently encountered and irksome pathologies (of
which there are also many). These pathologies do not merely deprive us of a satisfy-
ing result (as might a local optimum), but more importantly they appear to violate
our intuitions of how selection pressure in coevolution is supposed to operate [. . . ]
To grapple with this incongruity between expectation and reality, coevolution re-
searchers have appropriated or invented a myriad of terms, such as cyclic dynamic,
mediocre stable-state, collusion, forgetting, disengagement, and focusing.
1.1.3 The vagaries of progress
A notable example of this lack of grounding is related to the notion of progress in evolution.
The idea that evolution by natural selection is fundamentally a progressive force, and that this
progress is somehow linked to a general increase in complexity, pervades much of the literature.
Let us cite a few examples:
Intuitively, the distinctive mark or evolution is the spontaneous generation of inno-
vative functional structures [. . . ] The growth of adaptations causes the biosphere to
increase in complexity, thus providing an arrow of time not implied by mere complex
change, even if sustained through many generations (Bedau and Packard [10]).
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. . . the co-evolution of competing populations may produce increasingly complex
evolving challenges. As discussed by Dawkins and Krebs [41], competing populations
may reciprocally drive one another to increasing level of complexity by producing an
evolutionary “arms race”. . . (Nolfi and Floreano [133]).
Since the parasites are also evolving with a fitness based on a competition’s outcome,
the success of a host implies failure for its parasites. When the parasites evolve to
overcome this failure, they create new challenges for the hosts; the continuation of
this may lead to an evolutionary “arms race” [39]. New genotypes arise to defeat old
ones. New parasite types should serve as a drive towards further innovation, creating
ever-greater levels of complexity and performance by forcing hosts to respond to a
wider range of more challenging parasite test cases (Rosin and Belew [151]).
These passages express an implicit intuition that seems to be deeply entrenched within the
general public, as emphasised by Gould [71]. In the (ironic) words of McShea [115], they state
“what everybody knows”.
However, as many of these same authors have pointed out, this expectation is not always
borne out by experiment. Quite the contrary, as emphasised by Ficici above, a whole pande-
monium of contrarian effects have been identified, studied and classified, leaving experimenters
baﬄed with the apparently capricious dynamics of coevolution (these effects are described in
more detail in Chapter 3).
This initial trust in the progressive nature of evolution can be put in contrast with the
following quote by two leading biologists:
The notion of progress has a bad name among evolutionary biologists (. . . ) On the
theoretical side, there is no reason why evolution by natural selection should lead to
an increase in complexity, if that is what we mean by progress. At most, the theory
suggests that organisms should get better, or at least no worse, at doing what they are
doing right now. But an increase in immediate ’fitness’ - that is, expected number
of offspring - may be achieved by losing eyes or legs as well as by gaining them.
Even if an increase in fitness cannot be equated with an increase in complexity, or
with progress, it might seem at first sight that R. A. Fisher’s ’fundamental theorem
of natural selection’ at least guarantees an increase in fitness. The theorem states
that the rate of increase in the mean fitness of a population is equal to the genetic
variance in fitness: since variances cannot be negative, the theorem states that fitness
can only increase. (...) Unfortunately, the theorem holds only if the relative fitnesses
of genotypes are constant, and independent of their frequencies in the population: for
many traits, such constancy does not hold (Maynard-Smith and Szathma´ry [165]).
Notice that there are really two concepts of progress in the above passages: one relates to an
increase in quality and performance, regarding certain attributes. Another refers to the more
open concept of increase in complexity, independently of any particular ability. Both concepts
are a source of contention and controversy in biology [165, 71, 72, 40, 117, 153] and in artificial
evolution [2, 12].
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The concept of progress in evolution faces a basic difficulty: it is not immediately obvious
how exactly the mechanism of evolution, based on differential reproductive success within a
given local environment (local both in space and in time) might lead to global overall progress.
Even less clear is the necessity for any such global improvement to be related to an overall drive
towards complexification.
The problem is even more acute in coevolution. When an explicit fitness function is given,
progress can at least be defined unambiguously - just compare the fitness of older and newer
individuals. But in coevolution, the performance of an individual is necessarily relative to
that of the individuals it interacts with. An individual is only “good” or “bad” in a certain
context, defined by certain other individuals. But then how can we objectively compare any
two individuals? How can we give an objective measure of performance and superiority that
we might consistently apply across generations? And, more pressingly, if evolution is guided by
current opponents that also change through evolution, what kind of long-term term trend (if
any) can we expect to observe?
1.1.4 Lack of structural freedom in artificial evolution
Another restriction of most artificial evolution experiments is the severe limitations imposed on
how much of the individuals’ capacity to interact with their environment is under evolutionary
control. Even when agents are embodied, i.e. when they are not represented as purely abstract
entities, but as situated actors that can act upon (and react to) their environments, this body
is often defined in such a way that the range of possible actions is strongly limited, usually
within a pre-defined repertoire. Quite often, the only action an agent can perform is to move
(e.g. predator-prey simulations). In artificial ecologies, an agent may perform a few pre-defined
actions, such as exchange of resources (as in Echo [84]) , reproduction or combat (as in Polyworld
[197]).
Ideally, a rich evolutionary system should not be limited to the adjustment of parameters for
a limited repertoire of pre-defined behaviours (weights in a neural network, action rules, etc.)
Rather, it should allow agents to evolve their own actions as well as the behaviours that regulate
these actions: agents should be able to construct their own behaviours, rather than choosing
between pre-defined behaviours. This is only possible if both control and morphology are under
evolutionary control, in such a way that the morphology offers sufficient flexibility to permit the
appearance of new behaviours.
Few experiments allow individual to construct their own actions through evolution, which
requires that both morphology and control architecture be under evolutionary control. The
most influential experiments in that domain are undoubtedly Karl Sims’ virtual creatures [163],
which despite ad hoc features in their machinery allowed for an unprecedented freedom in the
evolutionary control over both morphology and behaviours of agents. It is notable that, at the
time we started this work (a full decade after Sims), attempts at reproducing Sims’ results had




Our main objective is to obtain a better understanding of evolution and (especially) coevolution,
what we can expect from it, and how we can put it to use for our own interests. In particular, we
seek to address the troublesome concept of evolutionary “progress”, whether in the engineering
sense of increase in “performance” (relative to a certain task of interest), or in the more subjective
sense of growth in complexity. The questions we intend to tackle include the following:
• What is evolution?
• What is progress?
• What kind of progress occurs in (co-)evolution?
• What is the relationship between evolution and complexity?
• How can we detect, or measure, evolution and progress?
In other words, we want to understand what exactly evolution is supposed to do, but also how
to find out whether it’s actually doing it. This double objective of understanding and monitoring
will be a constant concern throughout this work.
To support and illustrate our investigations, we will build an experimental system inspired by
the seminal work of Karl Sims. In this system, physically realistic, three-dimensional (3D) agents
will interact physically with their environment and with each other. Both the morphologies and
controllers of these agents will be subject to evolution. We will use this system under various
conditions, including evolution based on fitness functions, coevolution, and ultimately in the
form of an open environment in which a population of free-living creatures interact (through
physical combat) and evolve freely.
Thus, we can summarise our objectives in three broad points:
1. To produce a comprehensive description of evolution, coevolution, and progress, based on
sound definitions, in order to minimise the potential for confusion and misunderstandings.
2. To devise tools and methods to detect and measure the activity of evolution.
3. To create a software platform in which artificial creatures evolve (and coevolve) in a phys-
ically realistic, three-dimensional environment, as an experimental system to apply and
test our concepts and methods.
1.3 Contributions of the thesis
The following is a brief summary of the main contributions of this thesis (these are presented
with more detail in the Conclusion).
1. We provide usable notions of superiority and progress in coevolution. This includes a
previously overlooked distinction between local, historical and global progress, which we
suggest lies at the root of much of the confusion that surrounds coevolution.
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2. We address the question of whether or not an “arrow of complexity” [12] exists in evolution.
After putting this question in a more usable form, we answer with a qualified positive,
characterising this “arrow” as a passive trend. We propose a set of abstract conditions
necessary for such a continuous trend to occur.
3. We describe several tools and methods to evaluate the performance of coevolutionary al-
gorithms over time: Coarse-grained Master Tournaments (expanding on work by Cliff &
Miller [32] and Nolfi & Floreano [133]), cross-validation of runs, and equal-effort compar-
isons between algorithms. We point out the distinction to be made between historical and
global methods, which respectively detect historical and global progress.
4. Using our equal-effort comparison method, we measure the benefit obtained by increasing
the number of competitions per evaluation. We show that the gain in performance peaks
between 3 and 4, an intriguingly low value. We also show that using a sliding archive
increases performance slightly, but significantly in the long term (though at the cost of a
performance hit in the short run).
5. We introduce Fitness Transmission, a statistical signature of Darwinian evolution that can
be computed from genealogical records. Perhaps equally importantly, we show that Bedau
& Packard’s evolutionary activity statistics [11] cannot be used for this particular purpose.
6. We provide the first complete reimplementation and extension of Sims’ ‘virtual creatures’
system [163, 162]. We also introduce the first example of the evolution of actual physical
(i.e. contact-based) combat between such virtual creatures.
7. We introduce Evosphere, an artificial world in which free-living creatures interact, fight,
and evolve freely, without any explicit fitness function.
1.4 Outline of the thesis
The thesis is organised as follows:
• Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the Darwinian mechanism of evolution by natural
selection. The terms “evolution” and “natural selection” are given definitions that will be
used in the following sections.
• Chapter 3 investigates the notions of performance, superiority and progress in coevolution.
We show that several notions of superiority and progress can be identified, depending on
which opponents are used as a reference to evaluate this superiority. We suggest that
much confusion about coevolution stems from a confusion between these various kinds of
progress. We compare our concepts with those recently proposed by Ficici. [53, 54]
• Chapter 4 describes our experimental system, inspired by Sims’ virtual creatures. To our
knowledge, this was the first complete replication (and extension) of Sims’ results.
• Chapter 5 describes an extension of our system, through which physical combat between
creatures is implemented. To our knowledge, this is the first example of the evolution of
actual physical (i.e. contact-based) combat between physically realistic 3D agents.
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• Chapter 6 describes several tools and methods to track the performance of coevolution-
ary algorithms over time, building upon previous work, and making use of our improved
understanding of coevolutionary progress.
• Chapter 7 illustrates some of the methods used in the previous chapter to tackle a simple
question: in a coevolutionary algorithm, how many interactions per evaluation are optimal,
and what is the advantage of using a sliding archive?
• Chapter 8 attempts to answer the question of whether or not an “arrow of complexity”
[12] exists in evolution. Drawing from recent evolutionary research, the relation between
evolution and complexity is examined in depth.
• Chapter 9 introduces Fitness Transmission, a statistical signature of adaptive evolution
that can be computed from genealogical records. We explain how this measure addresses
limitations of other statistics used for similar purpose, such as Bedau and Packard’s evo-
lutionary statistics. [11]
• Chapter 10 describes an open environment, called Evosphere, in which free-living creatures
interact, fight, and evolve freely, without any explicit fitness function. Fitness transmission
is used to demonstrate the onset of natural selection and adaptive evolution within this
virtual world.
• Finally, the conclusion recapitulates the main contributions of the thesis, and summarises




Another curious aspect of the theory of evolution is that everyone thinks he
understands it.
J. Monod, Chance and necessity.[129]
2.1 Introduction
Evolution is neither complicated not difficult to understand - at least, not in its basic principles.
As we will see, these principles can be summarised in a couple of straightforward sentences. In
fact, evolution is so simple that, as pointed out by Monod, we spontaneously tend to regard it
a self-evident, and not really requiring any particular explanation. This, in fact, is perhaps the
most important difficulty when discussing evolution. Although the basic principles are simple,
they are also subtle, and very easy to “get wrong”. One need only consider the persistence of
misguided (but vocal) “critics” and “debunkers” of evolution to realise how much confusion the
subject can generate.
Reasoning that such confusion is the necessary consequence of a lack of sound principles
and clear concepts, we would like to come up with a satisfying answer to the question: “what
is evolution?” In particular, we seek precise definitions that can be used as a basis for our
inquiries. After all, when discussing a certain subject, it is generally useful to know just what
one is talking about in the first place.
2.2 Evolution
2.2.1 Evolution is heritable change
Evolution denotes any change in the frequencies of heritable features within a population of
reproducing entities, over generations. In practice, it is useful to regard it as a shorthand for
“descent with modification”, Darwin’s own term.1 This change may consist in loss of existing
features, creation of new features, or alteration in the frequencies of existing features.
1It may be worth pointing out that the word “evolution” does not appear anywhere in the first editions of the
Origins of Species. The word “evolved” appears once, as the final word of the entire text.
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Importantly, the term “evolution” in itself does not carry any implication of adaptation,
improvement or fitness. Evolution in the general sense is simply heritable change, nothing more,
nothing less. The nature and direction of this change depend on the forces that drive it; these
forces may be adaptive (e.g. natural selection), but also unguided (random genetic drift), or
even potentially harmful (e.g. inbreeding through loss of diversity caused by genetic drift). It
is important to distinguish between evolution on the one hand, and the mechanisms that cause
or drive evolution on the other hand.
In a biological context, evolution is essentially the negation of the fixity of species: species
change over time, rather than remaining fixed for all eternity as was commonly held before
Lamarck and Darwin.
2.2.2 Conditions for evolution
In general, evolution occurs whenever three conditions are met, namely variation, multiplication
and heredity.2 To make these terms more precise, we may consider them in a different order,
putting multiplication first. Multiplication is self-explaining in a biological context, but it may
be useful to generalise the concept: it essentially means that new individuals are constantly
being created, in such a way that they can somehow be associated with certain already existing
individuals. New individuals are called “children” or “offspring”, while the existing individuals
with which they are associated are called “parents”. Multiplication, or reproduction, is simply
the creation of new individuals, each associated with a certain set of existing parents. An
individual’s parents, their own parents, their parents’ parents, and so on, are this individual’s
ancestors. All individuals that have a certain individual as one of their ancestors are this
individual’s descendents.
Variation implies that the offspring will not be exactly identical to their parents, or to
each other. Rather, they will occasionally differ from their parents and from each other in
various ways, exhibiting certain characteristics which their parents and siblings do not possess.
Heredity, the crucial factor which separates evolution from mere variation, means that some of
this variation will in turn be transmitted to the children’s own descendents, who will also exhibit
these specific, different characteristics. Taken together, these three conditions ensure that the
inherited characteristics of a population will change over time, and therefore, that evolution will
occur.
Note that this account includes all possible pathways of heredity: genetic, epigenetic, cul-
tural, etc. In practice, biological evolution is only concerned with biological features, transmitted
through biological reproduction. Other fields, such as cultural evolution, may have different re-
quirements.
Darwin did not invent the concept of evolution (as opposed to the fixity of species), though
his work was instrumental in making it the generally accepted viewpoint rather than the fringe
theory it had previously been. Darwin’s fundamental contribution is to have identified a workable
mechanism for evolution, that could explain the prodigious amount of adaptive complexity
observable in Nature without invoking supernatural forces. This mechanism, of course, is natural
selection.
2These three requirements have a long history: Wallace [182] already mentions them in this form.
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2.3 Natural selection
2.3.1 What is natural selection?
Evolution is a change in the heritable features of a population of reproducing individuals. New
features appear, some existing features are lost, and others become more or less common through-
out the population. These changes in frequency may be caused by various factors, including
random fluctuations. Natural selection is one of the forces that influence the direction of this
change.
The general mechanism of natural selection is easily formulated: due to their interactions
with the environment, certain heritable phenotypic characters have an impact upon the repro-
ductive success (the “fitness”) of their bearers, or of their bearer’s children, or of other entities
which also bear this character. But because these characters are heritable, they are themselves
replicated through reproduction. As a result, heritable phenotypic characters which, through
their interactions with the environment, favour the direct or indirect reproductive success of their
bearers, will mechanically become more and more common within the population. Conversely,
heritable phenotypic characters which impede the reproductive success of these entities tend to
decrease in frequency. Ultimately, such characters may become fixated (that is, be present in
every entity within the population), or on the contrary disappear entirely from the population.
Therefore, natural selection is the portion of the variance in fitness of entities, that is caused
by the interaction between heritable phenotypic characters and the environment. This can be
summarised (provided the accurate meaning for all terms is kept in mind, see next section)
as variance in fitness caused by heritable features. Alternatively, the term “natural selection”
may also refer to the set of forces in the environment which affect the replication of entities by
interacting with their heritable phenotypic characters. These two viewpoints are, in a sense,
mirror images of each other, and designate two perspectives on the same process.
Thus, to the three previous requirements of evolution, natural selection adds a further re-
quirement: heritable variation in reproductive success, caused by interaction between the envi-
ronment (in a very wide sense, see below) and heritable phenotypic characters. Whenever these
four requirements hold, the Darwinian mechanism of evolution by natural selection will arise.3
2.3.2 On the importance of terms
Having described natural selection as the variation in “fitness” caused by the interaction between
“heritable” “phenotypic” characteristics and “the environment” only takes us so far; several of
these terms are highly ambiguous, and we must make clear what meaning we ascribe to each of
them.
Importantly, the term “environment” here is understood in a very wide sense, covering
absolutely everything that can interact with the considered characteristics. This includes other
characteristics of the same individual or of others, or copies of the same characteristics in other
individuals. It is quite clear that a certain characteristic will only have predictable results in
3Lewontin[106] famously offered a slightly different formulation of evolution by natural selection. Lewontin’s
formulation concentrates the four requirements into three, essentially by making “multiplication” implicit in the
language. The formulation presented here seeks to emphasise the distinction between evolution, natural selection,
and evolution by natural selection.
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a certain background, both environmental and genetic: the exact same characteristic might
have entirely different results if it occurs in a different environment, or together with different
characteristics. The link between the characteristic itself, and the effect it produces on the
replication of its bearers, can be highly indirect. [35]
It is also important to include the term “heritable”. The requirement of heritability is of
course essential: natural selection is simply not concerned with characteristics that are not
heritable. Overlooking the requirement for heritability is the root cause of a misguided, but
persistent criticism of evolution by natural selection, namely the accusation that it amounts to
a tautology: “better survivors survive better” (see Appendix C.)
The term “phenotypic” also requires some precision. The phenotype of an entity includes
all its intrinsic observable characteristics, that is, the entire makeup of the entity - including
“morphologies, physiologies, and behaviors” [106]. Importantly, the term “phenotypic” here is
not in opposition to “genotypic”. Purely genic selection can certainly occur: genes, in their
physically embedded form as nucleic acid, certainly do have their own “phenotype” that can
interact with their environment (the cell) independently of their effects on the larger organism,
replicating as selfish DNA (gene-level selection is discussed in Appendix D). Rather, the term
“phenotypic” is used to exclude external, arbitrary labels that would somehow be heritable, but
utterly independent of the entity’s makeup.
A simple scenario will immediately explain the necessity of this distinction. Consider a popu-
lation of individuals, mating and reproducing in a completely random fashion. Now, within this
population, we arbitrarily choose a given individual A, and then we decide that all descendents
of A will be favoured, in that we will allow (through direct manipulation) these individuals to
survive longer and reproduce more than others - independently of their features. We may call
this process “aristocratic selection”, considering that individuals are favoured for no other reason
than their ancestry. Now the fact of being a descendent of A is clearly a heritable characteristic.
Moreover, this characteristic certainly does interact with a part of the environment - namely, the
experimenter. Finally, considering the favouring rule, it clearly affects the reproductive success
of those that possess it. However, we would not want to classify this scenario as a valid example
of natural selection, because the actual makeup and features of the individuals would not be the
source of their reproductive success. For example, in this scenario, no adaptation of any kind
would be taking place. The Darwinian mechanism of evolution by natural selection bears on the
intrinsic characteristics of entities. While the “aristocratic selection” process described above
will certainly increase the proportion of descendents of A, and therefore, may also increase the
frequency of some of A’s own heritable features, this increase would be entirely incidental and
not caused by the features themselves.4
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the terms “reproductive success” and “fitness” require particular
caution. In the above account, we have simply equated fitness with reproductive success, without
any further precision. However, this will not suffice: in particular, we must emphasise that
“fitness” here can not simply denote the number of children. Rather, fitness denotes the success
of an individual in transmitting its inherited characteristics, not just to the next generation,
4Importantly, note that this scenario is very different from artificial selection as it is practised by breeders and
cultivators. In the latter case, while successful individuals are chosen by external observers, this choice is indeed
based on the features of the individual, rather than on its parentage alone.
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but to all future generations as well - what Lewontin [106] calls “contribution [. . . ] to future
generations.”5
To see why this is necessary, we need only consider the case of characteristics that do not
affect the reproduction of their bearers, but do affect the reproduction of their children - inde-
pendently of whether these children themselves possess these characteristics or not. An often
cited example is the grandchildless mutant in Drosophila subobscura (mentioned in [106, p.
8]): homozygotes for this allele will have sterile children, independently of the children’s own
genotypes. Now it is clear that grandchildless-like genes are strongly disfavoured by natural se-
lection. However, if we limit natural selection to variance in the number of children, then these
effects would not fall within our definition, and thus we could not accept them as examples
of natural selection - which would be absurd. This illustrates the fact that natural selection
is not directly concerned about the reproduction of individuals, but more generally about the
differential propagation of heritable characteristics, of which individual reproductive success is
only a component. If natural selection optimises anything with regard to individuals, it is not
their immediate reproductive success, but their capacity to transmit heritable characteristics to
future generations. Contribution to future generations is thus the defining aspect of selective
fitness.
Finally, we must stress that the heritable features we are talking about should not be equated
with genes or alleles. This is for at least two reasons. First, evolution and natural selection can
occur at many levels, and heritable features can have many different forms at various levels.
Second, and most importantly, certain important biological traits do not have a genetic basis;
endosymbiosis (the insertion of one organism into another, resulting in a single reproducing
entity) is probably the most obvious example.6
2.3.3 Individual adaptation: a consequence of natural selection
One simple way in which a heritable feature can influence its own rate of propagation is by
affecting the capacity of its bearer to survive and reproduce. If a certain heritable feature
enhances the chances of its bearer to survive and reproduce, that is, its “individual fitness”, it
will mechanically increases its own chances of being propagated, precisely because it is heritable.
It follows that novel characteristics which enhance the chances of survival and reproduction of
their bearer (that is, their bearer’s “individual fitness”) will tend to become widespread, while
those which decrease their bearer’s fitness will tend to die off. As a result, evolution will be driven
in the direction of adaptation: over time, as fitness-increasing features propagate, individuals
will become increasingly “adapted” to their environment, in the sense that they will tend to
become better at surviving and reproducing within it.7
5The term “fitness” is notoriously ambiguous [35, Chap. 10]. As a fitting illustration of this ambiguity,
Lewontin [106] uses this same word to denote both “rates of survival and reproduction” and “contribution [. . . ]
to future generations” - in two successive sentences.
6See Appendix D for a closer look at the levels of selection and the gene’s eye view of evolution.
7See also chapter 9, section 9.3.1.
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2.3.4 Natural selection is not just individual adaptation
This aspect of evolution by natural selection (individual adaptation for survival and reproduc-
tion) is simple and intuitive, and corresponds to the everyday concept of Darwinian evolution:
the process by which well-adapted individuals survive and reproduce more than others, and
therefore, mechanically propagate the (heritable!) features that caused their success. However,
it is important to note that this process of individual adaptation is not the whole story of natural
selection - far from it. Heritable features can increase their overall rate of replication without
directly enhancing the reproduction of their individual bearers. In fact, it is perfectly possible
for natural selection to favour a certain characteristic which actually reduces, or even annihilates
altogether, the probability that its bearer will survive and reproduce - if in doing so it can favour
the production of other entities which also bear this feature, and the overall balance results in
a net increase in replication.
This is readily seen in the widespread occurrence of altruism in Nature. Altruism occurs
whenever certain entities perform a certain action which reduces their own individual fitness,
but increases that of others. Social insects offer many striking examples of altruism, such as
stinger bees that sacrifice themselves to defend the nest; but more generally, many eusocial
animals curtail their own reproduction to benefit their colony (including mammalians such as
naked mole rat). Sober and D.S. Wilson [167] use the lancet fluke (Dicrocoelium dendriticum)
as a model case of altruism: when these parasitic worms infect ants, one of the parasites will
migrate to the ant’s brain and create a structure that will alter the ant’s behaviour, causing it
to move to exposed positions (such as the tips of grass blades) during nighttime. This increases
the chance that the ant will be eaten by mammals, which is necessary for the next stage of the
worms’ life cycle. However, the migrating worm that created this behaviour by invading the
ant’s brain will not be able to infect the mammalian host: it effectively sacrifices itself for the
good of fellow parasites within the same ant host.
Despite the (individual) fitness penalty that they incur, altruistic features can be maintained
and propagated by natural selection. This occurs if, and only if, the sacrifice actually improves
the fitness of other bearers of the same feature, and the overall balance turns out to be positive.
Some of the ways in which this can occur are kin selection (the sacrifice is beneficial to close par-
ents of the altruist, which are more likely to possess copies of the same feature), group selection
(the sacrifice is beneficial to members of the group, so that groups which include altruists will
thrive) and reciprocal altruism (the sacrifice is only directed towards other individuals that will
also perform a similar sacrifice). All three mechanisms may result in a sacrificial feature being
positively selected, due to the overall balance of positive and negative impacts on the fitness of
the bearers.
At the other end of the spectrum, it must also be remembered that natural selection can
act on individual genes, independently of (or in some cases, despite) their effects on individual
organisms. Purely genic selection is readily seen in meiotic drive, whereby certain alleles manage
to “cheat” the machinery of meiotic division to ensure their own presence in the gamete, defeating
the fairness of meiosis. Such alleles can reach high frequency within a population, even if they
decrease the fitness of homozygous individuals (the t-allele in mice, mentioned by Lewontin [106]
is a well-known example).
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Another clash between actual natural selection and intuitive notions of individual “adapta-
tion” occurs in sexual selection, that is, the component of natural selection that is caused by
mate preferences among the opposite sex. Through sexual selection, a detrimental feature (a fea-
ture that, all other things being equal, would decrease the chances of survival and reproduction
of an individual) can still be selected for, because it increases the probability that its bearer will
be chosen as a mate by members of the other sex. Such a process can result in a runaway process
of self-reinforcing selection, as explained by Fisher [58, Chap. 6]: as soon as a given feature
elicits even mildly higher interest from the other sex, then bearer of this feature will have higher
reproductive success; this very fact, in turn, will create an incentive for other females to prefer
this feature, since this will lead them to have more successful sons. This positive feedback loop
proceeds until the feature grows to such extreme proportions that the handicap is too large for
any further increase to occur. What’s more, it has also been shown that in some cases, positive
sexual selection for a detrimental feature can emerge precisely because of the handicap it incurs
- the “handicap principle”, suggested by Zahavi and put in formal terms by Grafen [73]. In the
latter case, the detrimental feature is used as a necessarily honest marker of fitness. Miller [126]
ascribes an extremely far-ranging role to sexual selection, describing the most striking features
of human beings (large brains, complex language, art) as “courtship tools” (p.4) developed in
response to (and in pursuit of) mating preferences.
In short, we must remember that natural selection is the differential reproductive success of
entities caused by the effects of heritable features - no matter how indirect this effect (or the
reproduction process itself) can be. Individual adaptation, in the usual sense of optimising the
survival and reproduction of a particular individual, is just one of the ways in which this can
occur.
2.3.5 Evolution, natural selection, and evolution by natural selection
It is important to point out the distinction between evolution, natural selection, and evolution
by natural selection. The term “evolution” is commonly used as a shorthand for “evolution by
natural selection”,8 to the effect that these three concepts are often blurred in public discourse.
While shorthand expressions are of course useful, it is important to keep in mind that these
three terms denote different things.
Evolution is change in the heritable features of a population. This change (which is most
often caused by genetic mutations in nature) may occur in any direction and does not carry any
connotation of improvement, adaptation or progress. Natural selection is one of the forces that
operate on this change, and guide the trajectory of evolution. It is intrinsically an adaptive force,
and does tend towards individual adaptation. Evolution by natural selection is, obviously, the
component of evolution that occurs because of natural selection. This last concept is precisely
the mechanism proposed by Darwin, often designated by the single word “evolution”.
8For example, Taylor [173, Chap. 7.3.3] writes: “Evolution can explain how self-reproducers come to be
adapted to their environment...”
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2.4 The “Blind Watchmaker” effect: a pathway to the very im-
probable
In the preceding sections we saw how natural selection can guide evolution in the direction of
higher adaptation, for individuals or other entities at many levels. However we have not empha-
sised what is perhaps the most momentous consequence of the Darwinian mechanism, namely
the generation of features which are not only well-adapted, but also highly improbable. Evo-
lution by natural selection does not just explain design: it explain enormously, extraordinarily,
awe-inspiringly efficient design, relying on the the microscopic interactions of a multitude of
complex chemicals. Dawkins [36, 35, 39, 38] has famously devoted much of his writing to this
particular question, introducing the metaphor of a “Blind Watchmaker” to describe the activity
of (evolution by) natural selection. Common examples of evolutionary excellence are animal
organs, such as the vertebrate or molluscan eye, or the sonars of bats. Gould [68, Chap.3] dis-
cusses the remarkable adaptation of a certain anglerfish, which uses an appendage on its head
as lure to attract prey: the lure imitates the form of a small fish with eerie precision.
How can blind, random mutations produce such a concentration of efficiency, such vastly
improbable structures - precisely the very thing that would least be expected to occur out of
random exploration? The answer, of course, is that evolution by natural selection is emphatically
not random. Mutations and variation are random; natural selection is the very opposite of
randomness. The (originally random) novelty created by mutations is non-randomly filtered by
natural selection, which adds information to the process, and thereby turns this initially random
novelty into genuine, adaptive creativity.
What makes this process so powerful is the fact that it is cumulative. Mutations create
random heritable variations between entities. Those that are harmful are quickly discarded over
generations, while those that are beneficial are retained. Once these small improvements are
incorporated into the heritage of the population, they become the new starting point, and the
process starts again: many random variations occur, most are discarded, occasionally one is
retained and propagates, etc.
Thus, by slowly accumulating small, “believably lucky” jumps (and by non-randomly filtering
them through natural selection), Darwinian evolution may in time generate arbitrarily improb-
able adaptations, which could never arise all at once. This principle will feature prominently in
chapter 8, which discusses the relationship between evolution and complexity.
2.5 Conclusion
We have provided a usable answer to the question: “what is evolution?” In doing so, we
sought to identify (and dispel) certain ambiguities and misunderstandings that could arise from
basic evolutionary concepts. In particular, we have come up with the following definitions and
principles:
1. Evolution is a change in the heritable features of a reproducing population, over genera-
tions.
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2. Natural selection is the variance in reproductive success of entities that is caused by the
interaction of heritable features with the environment. “Reproductive success” must be
understood in the general sense of contribution to all future generations, rather than to
the next one alone; “the environment” includes anything the feature might interact with,
including other features of other individuals or of the same individual.
3. Alternatively, natural selection is the variance in replication (through biological repro-
duction) of features that is caused by the interaction between these features and the
environment.
4. Evolution is change; natural selection is one of the mechanisms that guide this change.
Evolution by natural selection, the portion of evolution that is caused by natural selection
(as opposed to, say, random drift) is the Darwinian mechanism that explains the profusion
of adaptive diversity in Nature.
These definitions provide a firmer basis for future inquiries. In the following chapters we will





3.1 Coevolution in nature and in computers
3.1.1 Coevolution: reciprocal evolutionary change and coupled fitness land-
scapes
Coevolution is a generic name covering all situations in which one or several species evolve
in response to each other’s evolution - that is, to situations of reciprocal evolutionary change.
This occurs when the reproductive success of each individual is determined, at least in part, by
evolvable characteristics of others, or in other words, when populations evolve on coupled fitness
landscapes.
Consider two evolving species A and B, such that the reproductive success of each individual
in one species is determined at least in part by the outcome of its interactions with individuals
of the other species. If species A undergoes an evolutionary change, this may affect the fitness
landscape of species B. This, in turn, may lead (through the agency of natural selection) to a
change in the heritable characteristics of species B; this will in turn alter the fitness landscape of
species A, possibly triggering another evolutionary change, etc. Thus coupled fitness landscapes
may lead to reciprocal, or “echoing” evolutionary change.
Biologists define coevolution as reciprocal evolutionary change. In artificial evolution, how-
ever, the term seems to have been slightly extended, to encompass any situations in which
lineages are evaluated after the outcome of their interactions.
3.1.2 Enter the Red Queen
In 1973 Leigh Van Valen tried to determine the distribution of survival times for different
taxa ([177], described in [150]). He found this distribution to be roughly inverse-exponential:
a constant proportion of taxa become extinct after any duration of existence. Thus, for Van
Valen, the probability of extinction is independent of the taxon’s age. Regardless of how long it
managed to survive, a taxon essentially has the same probability of going extinct over time.
To Van Valen, a plausible cause for this fact was coevolution. In Nature, species do not merely
evolve against a fixed or slowly changing environment: they coevolve with each other, because
their fitness is based in part on their interactions with other evolving species. In particular,
a consequence of coevolution is that, as a given species evolve and improves its fitness, other
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species evolve too, which may negate this improvement. Thus each species is pitted against a
constantly deteriorating environment, i.e. an environment that constantly changes so that the
current state is not as optimised as it was1. Thus, like the Red Queen in Lewis Caroll’s Through
the Looking Glass, species must constantly run (that is, adapt) just in order to survive; those
who fail, become extinct.
3.1.3 Arms races in coevolution
However, if constant mutual adaptation occurs, should this mean that lineages are becoming in
some way ‘better’ over time ? Does constant mutual adaptation between coevolving lineages
lead to ever-increasing levels of performance and efficiency in the long run ?
This assumption is indeed as old as evolutionary theory itself, and seems to have been
suggested by Darwin as a direct consequence of his theory of natural selection; for example,
in passages such as Chapter IV of the Origins of Species [34], Darwin described how species
indigenous to small, isolated environments such as islands, in which competition is limited, are
often displaced by new species originating from a larger piece of land in which they had been
exposed to more competition. This assumption of progress through mutual adaptation is the
basis for what Dawkins & Krebs have called the arms race hypothesis [41]:
As the arms race progresses and predators “improve”, this does not necessarily mean
that they catch more prey. The prey lineage, after all, is improving too. There seems
to be no general reason to expect the average success of animals at out-running or
out-witting contemporary enemies, victims, prey or competitors, to improve over
evolutionary time. Van Valen has put this point more generally in his “Red Queen
Hypothesis”. But if modern predators are in general no better at catching modern
prey than Eocene predators were at catching Eocene prey, it does at first sight seem
to be an expectation of the arms race idea that modern predators might massacre
Eocene prey. And Eocene predators chasing modern prey might be in the same
position as a Spitfire chasing a jet.
In summary, while coevolution implies constant mutual adaptation and ever-changing en-
vironments to which lineages must constantly adapt, the ‘arms race’ concept posits that this
constant mutual adaptation may at times result in some form of cumulative improvement over
time.
This apparently simple proposition actually expresses a rather bold hypothesis. Natural
selection is fundamentally a local process, both in space and time: it is based on differential
success in the propagation of genes within a certain environment. When the environment changes
(and the basis of coevolution is precisely that it changes constantly), so does the direction of
the selection pressure: through natural selection, organisms become increasingly well-adapted
to their current conditions, regardless of previous or future conditions. These adaptations, in
turn, represent a change in the environment of co-evolving entities: the task for which they
must be optimised has changed. It is not immediately obvious that this succession of local
1This description of the Red Queen effect owes much to the online lecture notes of David Rand at Brown
University.
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optimisations should mechanically lead to long-term, overall progress. At the very least, a more
precise description of the concepts of “progress” and “performance” would help clarify the issue.
3.2 Coevolution in computers
3.2.1 Sorting networks and chasing robots
Coevolution has been introduced in artificial evolution as an alternative to traditional evolution-
ary methods based on fixed, explicitly defined fitness functions such as the genetic algorithm.
The application of coevolutionary methods to optimisation problems was bolstered by initial
successes such as those reported by Axelrod [8] (on the coevolution of strategies for the Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma), and Hillis [80] (on the coevolutionary optimisation of sorting networks).
Hillis’ experiments on sorting networks, in particular, drew much attention, because they took
on a well-known problem in computer science (optimising sorting networks) and showed how
coevolution brought a clear improvement over a straightforward genetic algorithm based on a
hand-designed fitness function.
It is worth pointing out several aspects of Hillis’ work. Firstly, we note that in this situation,
coevolution is not imposed by the nature of the problem, but is used as an alternative to an
existing ‘naked’ evolutionary method: it is possible to construct a simple hand-designed fitness
function, but coevolution is used instead for efficiency reasons. This stands in contrast to much
work in coevolution (e.g. predator-prey competition or games) in which there is no obvious way
to build an external fitness function by hand, and the nature of the problem naturally suggests a
competitive evolutionary mechanism. In particular, it implies that the fitness landscape of this
particular problem does possess a simple underlying scale of performance (captured by the fixed
fitness function), upon which individuals can be meaningfully and linearly ranked (according to
their score under this fitness function). As we will see, the existence of such a unidimensional
scale of performance to be optimised is not obvious a priori in coevolutionary situations - at
least not until the concept of superiority has been cleared up.
Another aspect of this work is that the experimental settings reported by Hillis were not
identical between evolutionary and coevolutionary experiments. In particular, the coevolution-
ary experiment made use of topological information in the selection of opponents, laying both
populations on one single grid and matching individuals at the same location on the grid only.
3.2.2 Arms race in artificial coevolution
These considerations did not temper the enthusiasm of the artificial evolution community. Co-
evolution was adopted as an optimisation method offering specific advantages upon standard
evolution based on externally defined fitness. This view of coevolution as an optimising mech-
anism was based mostly on a widespread application of the “arms race” hypothesis. Rosin &
Belew [152] summarise the transposition of the arms race concept to artificial evolution:
Since the parasites are also evolving with a fitness based on a competition’s outcome,
the success of a host implies failure for its parasites. When the parasites evolve to
overcome this failure, they create new challenges for the hosts; the continuation of
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this may lead to an evolutionary “arms race” (. . . ) New genotypes arise to defeat old
ones. New parasite types should serve as a drive toward further innovation, creating
ever-greater levels of complexity and performance by forcing hosts to respond to a
wider range of more challenging parasite test cases.
Ficici & Pollack [55] posit that “the key to successful coevolutionary learning is a com-
petitive arms race between opposed participants.” Nolfi & Floreano [133] use an even bolder
interpretation, by mentioning that “competing populations may reciprocally drive one another
to increasing levels of complexity by producing an evolutionary arms race.2” They also attempt
to describe explicitly some of the advantages brought by coevolution:
First, the co-evolution of competing populations may produce increasingly complex
evolving challenges. As discussed by Dawkins and Krebs, competing populations
may reciprocally drive one another to increasing level of complexity by producing an
evolutionary “arms race”(. . . ) As Rosin and Belew point out, it is like producing a
pedagogical series of challenges that gradually increase the complexity of correspond-
ing solutions (. . . ) This nice property overcomes the problem that if we ask evolution
to find a solution to a complex task we have a high probability of failure while if we
ask evolution to find a solution first to a simple task and then for progressively more
complex cases, we are more likely to succeed (. . . )
Secondly, because the performance of the individual in a population depends also on
the individual strategies of the other population which vary during the evolutionary
process, the ability for which individuals are selected is more general (i.e. it has to
cope with a variety of different cases) than in the case of an evolutionary process in
which co-evolution is not involved (. . . )
Finally, competing co-evolutionary systems are appealing because the ever-changing
fitness landscape, due to changes in the co-evolving species, is potentially useful
in preventing stagnation in local minima. From this point of view, co-evolution
may have consequences similar to evolving a single population in an ever-changing
environment.
Let us try to clarify each of these points. Firstly, coevolution is expected to create a gradual
selective environment, in which evaluation is initially mild and increases in difficulty over time as
coevolving populations improve. The rate of increase in difficulty is guided by evolution alone.
This stands in contrast with fixed hand-designed fitness function, or adaptive fitness functions
in which a specific parameter is modified over time according to a pre-defined mechanism. This
argument, however, disregards the possibility that one of the populations could out-evolve the
other in such a way that any of its member would be able to utterly defeat any opponent, which
would lead to a disengagement, or loss of gradient (a term used by Watson & Pollack [183]) and
negate the ’adaptive evaluation’ argument. In Nature, this would correspond to an extinction
2The concept of arms race does not imply any increase in complexity, merely in overall mutual efficiency between
two or more lineages. For the relationship (or lack thereof) between evolution and increases in complexity, see
chapter 8.
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event; we note that the basis of Van Valen’s argument is precisely that such extinctions occur
routinely throughout evolutionary history, by the very effect of coevolution.
The second argument states that exposure to many different opponents will produce a se-
lective pressure towards more general behaviours, that is, strategies that are able to perform
well against a wide array of opponents. We note, however, that in experiments ‘in which co-
evolution is not involved’, such generality is often irrelevant for the simple reason that there
is only one problem to solve. The very concept of ‘generality’ implies the existence of many
possible adversaries, which naturally suggests a competitive evaluation mechanism.
The third argument is that constant evolutionary activity may help escape local optima:
since the fitness landscape is constantly changing, it is expected that coevolving species will
not be stuck in local optima because such optima will dissolve under the constant action of
the Red Queen effect. While this is a direct consequence of the Red Queen hypothesis, it is
not clear how this translate in terms of global, overall progress: coevolution certainly helps
maintain movement, but movement to where? It is quite possible for a population of coevolving
individuals, or a group of coevolving populations, to get stuck into a small region of the search
space, corresponding to a local optimum of the coevolutionary process (a phenomenon which
some authors have called “collusion” or “mediocre stable states” [142]).
3.2.3 Finding opponents
A recurrent question in coevolutionary algorithms is to determine which individuals should be
matched for each run. It is clear that if an individual is to be evaluated after the result of its
competition with another one, individuals competing against weak (resp. strong) opponents will
be unduly overrated (resp. underrated).
The most reliable evaluation method would be to evaluate each agent against each other, but
in a single population of size N, this would require (N2 −N)/2 evaluations, which may quickly
become intractable for larger populations. Inversely, pitting each individual against only one
opponent would just require N/2 evaluations, but would only give a very unreliable estimation
of each individual’s capacities.
A solution to this problem is to match each individual with only a few opponents chosen
at random (e.g. the players for the game of tag evolved by Reynolds, [149], or Gomez and
Miikkulainen’s ESP method for the cooperative coevolution of neurons in a neural network
[66]). In cases where only one species is considered, i.e. when all individuals are functionally
equivalent, a direct elimination tournament can also be held. [6]
A more popular method is to pit all individuals from a group against the best individual
found at previous generation, which implies only N matches. This is the method chosen by Sims
[162], which has since been called the Last Elite Opponent (LEO) algorithm by Cliff and Miller
[32] (see also Appendix B). In this algorithm, each creature from each species is evaluated by
competing against the current champion from the other species. The resulting score is used as
a fitness value for selection and reproduction among individuals from this species, as well as to
choose the new champions of this species. The same process is then applied to the other species,
and starts again. This algorithm has proven very successful and has been used in several other
studies, as we will see.
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These methods offer various trade-offs between fairness (offering the same level of difficulty
to each individual), generality (the competitive environment should be as diverse as possible)
and computational cost. While the number of matches is important, the average number of
evaluations undergone by each individual is also significant. For example, in a direct tournament,
while N − 1 matches are needed, each individual undergoes between 1 and log2(N) evaluations.
In the “all-versus-previous-best” cycle, N matches are needed, and each individual is evaluated
only once; however, the evaluation process is much fairer than a direct elimination tournament,
in which competing against a very good individual in the first round will lead to an unfairly low
score. See Reynolds [149] for an overview of these differences between matching choices.
In order to maintain as much diversity as possible in the competitive landscape, one might
want to select opponents that defeated particularly efficient individuals, even though they may
not have defeated as many individuals as others. This principle of “competitive fitness sharing”
is described by Rosin & Belew [152]. Note that this process can be applied to all competing
populations simultaneously.
3.2.4 Cooperative coevolution
Note that coevolution needs not be competitive. A cooperative coevolution method was in-
troduced by Potter and De Jong [143] under the name of Cooperative Coevolutionary Genetic
Algorithm (CCGA). The CCGA and its derivatives try to optimise a system by coevolving its
components. They share many problems of usual coevolutionary algorithms, such as the choice
of partners: Wiegand and colleagues [187] point out that the choice of partners for evaluation
can affect the outcome of the process in unpredictable ways, illustrating this with simple experi-
ments. However, in these methods, the centre of attention has changed: we do not simply expect
to see “improvement” from each individual, we want to optimise a whole system, according to
an existing global fitness function. This difference is important, because it may simply be more
efficient to directly evolve entire teams (with suitable genetic operators), rather than coevolve
individuals. We discuss this point, with an experimental illustration, in a previous paper [121].
An authoritative discussion of cooperative coevolution is provided in Wiegand’s Ph.D. thesis.
[186]
3.3 Pitfalls in coevolution
3.3.1 Roadblocks on the march to progress
While the arms race concept provided a justification for the use of coevolution in optimisation,
it soon became clear that the expected march to progress was not guaranteed. The most obvious
threat to the buildup of cumulative evolutionary adaptation is the problem of intransitivity in
the global fitness landscape: : if an organism A can be said to be superior to B, and B is superior
to C, it is not necessarily the case that A should always be superior to C. If B evolved against
C, then A evolved against B, it does not mechanically follow that the adaptations that allowed
A to defeat B would allow it to defeat C.
It has been pointed out by several authors that such intransitivities could lead to “cycles”
[133] or “circularities” [170] in which three or more strategies exhibit a circular superiority
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relationship (A1 > A2, A2 > A3, A3 > A1; or in the case of two competing species, A1 >
B1, B2 > A1, A2 > B2, B1 > A2), leading to cycles in the trajectory of evolution To quote
Nolfi & Floreano, “co-evolving populations may cycle between alternative class of strategies
that, although they do not produce advantages in the long run, may produce a temporary
improvement over the co-evolving population.” [133]
While such cycles may appear (and may even have been identified in Nature, e.g. in the case
of Californian lizards with orange, blue and yellow throats [164]), the problem of intransitivity
is more general. In coevolution, the reproductive success of individuals is determined by their
interactions with their current opponents. The particular features of these opponents may elicit
certain specific adaptations from the population. However, there is no guarantee that these
adaptations, developed against current opponents, will prove helpful against future opponents.
It is perfectly possible that coevolving populations keep mutually adapting to their current
competitors alone, without any improvement in their general capacities. This phenomenon has
been encountered several times and is known under many names, including “relativism” [183],
“mediocre stable states” or “collusion” [142], and “Red Queen dynamics” [138] (see section
3.1.3).3
Other pitfalls have been identified in coevolutionary progress. We have already mentioned
the possibility for a dramatic “loss of gradient” [183] or “disengagement” if one of the coevolving
lineages out-evolves the other: if one of the populations becomes so strong that any of its member
would be able to utterly defeat any opponent, no gradient remains to guide natural selection.4
Yet another threat is that of parasitism or opportunism: some individuals may exploit one
specific weakness of others, thereby reaping an ‘easy gain’ (which Watson & Pollack [183] call
“focusing on the wrong thing”); this may allow primitive, sub-optimal strategies to thrive at
the expense of more complex opponents. Although this mechanism has often been mentioned
as a temporary hindrance on the road to progress (e.g. by Stanley & Miikkulainen [170]), in the
course of our experiments we have been able to show that this may have dramatic consequences
and often leads to the displacement of promising sophisticated strategies by trivial opponents,
especially if the algorithm considered is prone to such exploitation. [125]
3.3.2 When progress is not progress
Even when an arms race does actually occur, we are not at the end of our troubles. Nolfi &
Floreano [133] have shown that sustained arms races do not necessarily result in optimum per-
formance. They performed two coevolutionary experiments based on a predator-prey scenario,
with one important difference: in one run, coevolution occurred in a straightforward manner, by
pitting individuals of a given generation against the current champion of the opposing population
3The term “Red Queen” dynamics may be slightly inappropriate: Van Valen’s original Red Queen hypothesis
does not preclude any long-term progress, and indeed this point is precisely the basis of Dawkins and Krebs’
arms race hypothesis. For Van Valen, “staying at the same place” really means “staying alive”, rather than a
stagnation in overall abilities.
4Notice that if competitions result in real-valued scores, rather than binary “victory/defeat” outcomes, then a
gradient may still exist even though one species consistently outperforms the other: we simply need to compare
the results of two individuals against a given opponent. For example, using Sims’ algorithm on the tasks presented
in this work, we have never encountered loss of gradient - simply because the real-valued scoring functions always
offered some kind of gradient even to hopelessly maladaptive species. We explored this effect further in another
paper. [125]
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(essentially Sims’ Last Elite Opponent algorithm [162], see above).
In the other run, however, individuals of a given generation were pitted not only against the
current opposing champion, but also against the previous champions of the opponent population.
This “Hall of Fame” technique, suggested by Rosin & Belew [152], forces new individuals to prove
their worth not only against the current opponents but also against previous champions. Clearly
we can expect that such a selection regime will favour the onset of arms race, that is, situations
in which current individuals outperform their ancestors, since with this method, superiority over
ancestors becomes part of the selection criteria.
Unfortunately, as Nolfi & Floreano have pointed out, the very fact of maintaining a gallery
of permanent opponents in the selective process decreases diversity in the challenges that must
be overcome by new individuals, possibly leading to what we might call an “ossification” of the
fitness landscape. This makes the algorithm increasingly closer to a standard genetic algorithm
based on a fixed fitness function, as time goes on and the addition of each new individual
represents a smaller and smaller proportional increase of the archive (and thus a smaller and
smaller injection of novelty).
In some circumstances, when the authors compared the results of coevolution with and
without a Hall of Fame, they found out that individuals evolved with a Hall of Fame were
defeated by individuals evolved without it. This occurred despite the fact that the Hall of
Fame method had demonstrably enforced a more reliable evolutionary progress, in the sense
that individuals evolved with a Hall of Fame were significantly better at defeating their own
ancestors than those without. While progress had been more steady and continuous, it had also
been more limited in scope. In short, this shows that a better arms race does not necessarily
lead to better individuals.
3.3.3 Implicit assumptions
From this perspective it seems that coevolution is fraught with many disparate, unrelated prob-
lems, which prevent arms race from occurring or, if they do occur, reduce their supposed effi-
ciency. Coevolution does not do what early practitioners expected it to do. But at this point it
might be useful to ask a basic question: what is it exactly that we expect it to do?
The discrepancy between expectations and outcomes does not result exclusively from tech-
nical limitations, which could be addressed by some kind of algorithmic manipulation. In recent
years various authors have pointed out fundamental conceptual ambiguities and assumptions in
early coevolutionary research. In short, much of the early work in coevolution has overlooked
the highly ambiguous nature of the concept of ‘progress’ in evolution, a notoriously controver-
sial topic in mainstream evolutionary theory (as was emphasised in recent high-profile debates
[71, 72, 40]). This ambiguity has silently percolated into the argumentation of several authors,
leading to implicit assumptions that have only recently been emphasised. [53]
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3.4 The meaning of “better”: superiority relations
3.4.1 Comparing coevolving individuals
If we are to obtain progress through our algorithms, and if we wish to design algorithm which
reliably produce “increasing levels of performance”, it would be useful to define exactly what it
means to have ‘better performance’. What does it mean for a given individual to be ‘better’ than
another one? This is clearly a prerequisite for evaluating the outcome of a given evolutionary
process, or for comparing the outcomes of two different evolutionary processes. It is striking
that until recently most authors did not explicitly describe the notion of performance that they
had in mind, though as we will see the implicit underlying notion can be inferred easily. It is
only recently that Ficici attacked the subject by introducing the notion of a “solution concept”,
which we will describe in section 3.7 (and in more detail in Appendix E). First, we introduce a
somewhat different treatment, based on the notion of a superiority relation. Intuitively, to have
a clear idea of what we want coevolution to do, we need to make clear exactly which individuals
should be preferred to which others, that is, define a superiority relation according to which we
can decide whether one individual is to be preferred over another.
3.4.2 Superiority is always relative to a certain set of opponents
In the domain of symmetric competitive coevolution, all individuals are evaluated by direct
opposition against each other. This seems to provide a clear basis for comparing any two
individuals: if A defeats B, then A is in some sense “better” than B. However, this apparent
simplicity is tainted by the problem of intransitivity: let us imagine a situation in which a given
individual A is able to defeat many (or even all) opponents, except for one single individual
Z, which cannot defeat any opponent except A itself.5 If we accept direct competition as
the fundamental criterion of superiority, we must say that Z is better than A, and therefore
that a coevolutionary algorithm that would converge to Z should be preferred to one that
would converge to A. This does not seem to fit the intuitive notion that underlies the word
“performance” as used in the sentence above.
This hints at the notion that superiority between any two individuals cannot be estimated by
isolating these two individuals, independently of their results against other opponents. Rather,
the superiority of an individual A over an individual B can only be determined (or even mean-
ingfully discussed) with regard to a common set of opponents. Only by comparing their perfor-
mances against certain other opponents can we usefully call A or B “better” than the other. The
particular set of opponents over which this superiority is decided is as important as the particu-
lar criterion which is used to calculate this superiority. As we will see, using different categories
of opponents produces different notions of “progress” (which are often implicitly confused).
3.4.3 The need for a superiority criterion
While a common “reference” set of opponents is necessary to establish superiority between
two individuals A and B, it is not sufficient: we also need a criterion according to which this
5As Stanley & Miikkulainen point out [170], parasite-host relationship offer frequent examples of large, suc-
cessful organisms exploited by highly specialised organisms.
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superiority must be calculated. The criterion determines how the results of the competitions
between A, B and the set of opponents are combined to perform a comparison.
It seems that the intuitive notion of superiority is best expressed by the following, simple
idea: A is superior to B if A can obtain significantly better scores against significantly more
opponents than B. This loose definition can be made more formal: De Jong [94] (who calls this
concept ‘maximisation of expected utility’) defines as a solution “the individuals that maximise
the expected score against a random opponent”. Ficici calls this the “Best Scoring Strategy”
(BSS), calling it the “conventional” criterion. When taken against all possible opponents (that
is, when the reference set of opponents is the entire search space), this criterion seems to cover
the intuitive notion of global performance that underlies many papers in coevolutionary research,
either explicitly or implicitly.
Other simple superiority criteria exist. One prominent example is Pareto dominance [56, 22]:
an individual A dominates an individual B if A performs at least as well as B against all possible
opponents (within a certain set), and better against at least one. It seems reasonable enough to
say that A is better than B in such a situation. Unfortunately a problem with Pareto dominance
is that it is often undecidable: typically, in many cases, an individual A will be able to defeat
some individuals that defeat B, but will also be defeated by some individuals that B can defeat.
This means that the set of non-dominated individuals will tend to be quite large, providing
little information. Ficici & Pollack [56] report over 75% of the total explored space for some
experiments and resort to diversity-maintenance techniques to introduce an additional selective
gradient.6
Let us mention one last criterion for comparing individuals, namely the Nash equilibrium
criterion [54]: In this context, a strategy S is a Nash equilibrium if it is its own best answer, that
is, no strategy has a better expected score against S than S itself. Unfortunately, the existence
of a such a Nash equilibrium is only guaranteed if we allow mixed strategies: a mixed strategy
is a set of individual (“pure”) strategies endowed with a probability distribution over these pure
strategies, such that for each competitive event one of these pure strategies is picked from the
set according to the probability distribution.7 Mixed strategies may appear somewhat awkward,
but Ficici [54] shows that Nash equilibria possess a highly interesting property with regard to
progress, that of monotonicity. We discuss this point, together with other results obtained by
Ficici, in section 3.7 and Appendix E.
3.4.4 Summary
To summarise this section, we note that in order to define a superiority relation between any
two individuals in a coevolutionary experiment, one needs to define two components:
1. The criterion which is to be calculated to determine superiority (best average score, Pareto
6It must be noted that Pareto coevolution is especially vulnerable in the face of parasitism. For any non-trivial
problem, successful individuals are likely to be defeated by simplistic, opportunistic opponents that exploit some
of their weaknesses (but would easily be defeated by many other individuals). Thus, for non-trivial domains, the
“non-dominated set” might not be much smaller that the search space itself.
7It is easy to see that if mixed strategies are not allowed, then the criterion becomes exceedingly harsh; for
example any strategy that is consistently defeated by even one single opponent in the entire search space cannot
be a Nash equilibrium, so only strategies which can consistently defeat all possible opponents may qualify. For
even moderately complex problems, such an ‘all-powerful’ strategy is unlikely to exist.
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dominance, Nash equilibrium, etc.)
2. The set of “reference” opponents against which this criterion is to be calculated and
compared for both individuals.
3.5 Local, historical, and global progress
Once we have chosen a concept of superiority, it might seem that progress is easily defined:
progress occurs if new individuals are superior to previous ones. However, as was pointed out
in the previous section, useful concepts of ‘superiority’ can only be measured by comparing
performance against a given set of opponents; for example maximum expected opportunity or
Pareto dominance can only be decided between any two competitors if we make it clear over
which set of opponents they should be measured. This point (also stressed by Ficici [54]) has
given rise to ambiguities and confusions in the literature, to the point that some authors have
used the same word (“progress”, “monotonicity”) to express different concepts.
Depending on the set of “reference” opponents being used, the results of the comparison
will not only differ, but actually reflect different concepts of superiority. It turns out that these
different concepts of superiority, in turn, underlie different concepts of progress. Part of the
confusion arising in the literature can be reduced to a confusion between these various types of
progress.
Let us describe the problem more specifically: we have a population of interest, composed of
individuals which may be grouped into one or more species. This population changes over time
according to a particular algorithm, by finding new individuals and incorporating them (or not)
into the population. It turns out that in the course of an evolutionary process, at any time, the
term “progress” can have three distinct meanings:
1. Local Progress: The new individuals are superior to their ancestors, when compared
against their current competitors. This means that when newer individuals and their
ancestors are evaluated (according to a defined superiority criterion) against the current
set of opponents, the newer individuals are found to perform better.
This local form of progress is the one that guides natural selection; because natural selec-
tion is a local process, both in space and time, local progress is the one type of progress
that is directly and mechanically brought about by natural selection. Any further effect
must rely on additional causes, which should be made explicit if these effects are expected
to occur.
2. Historical Progress: The new individuals are superior to their ancestors, when compared
against all the competitors that have been encountered so far by the evolutionary process.
This is essentially the concept that is expressed in the term “arms race”8.
The local progress brought about by natural selection can easily be harnessed to drive
historical progress by the use of an archive. An archive is a collection of previously
8Actually the canonical concept of an “arms race” as expressed by Dawkins and Krebs [41] may be understood
in a more restrictive way, in that it seems to imply historical progress based on the solution concept of Pareto-
dominance: new individuals must be able to defeat any opponent that their ancestors could, and then some.
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encountered individuals which is maintained and enriched throughout the evolutionary
process. The purpose of an archive is simply to keep past opponents within the current
selective environment, thereby making local and historical progress identical. Archive al-
gorithms include Rosin & Belew’s Hall of Fame method [152], or De Jong’s Incremental
Pareto Coevolution Archive [42] and MAXSOLVE algorithm [94] (intended respectively
for the superiority criteria of Pareto dominance and maximum expected score).9 Archive
mechanisms have also been used for tracking and analysis purposes, for example Cliff &
Miller’s Current Individual vs. Ancestral Opponents (CIAO) method [32]. Master Tour-
nament matrices [133] and Dominance Tournaments [170] have been suggested both for
evolutionary selection and post-evolutionary analysis.
As mentioned in section 3.2.1, several authors have claimed that maintaining a successful
arms race is the goal of coevolutionary algorithms, and naturally leads to ever-increasing
levels of “performance”: because the use of coevolution is based on the arms race concept,
a successful arms race and a successful coevolutionary run are one single concept, and
the result of a consistent arms race is mechanically the expected result of a successful
coevolutionary run. In this view, historical progress is progress, period. This explains
the popularity of archive-based mechanisms, not only to guide evolution, but to assess its
performance a posteriori, as in Master Tournament matrices and Dominance Tournaments.
However we have already pointed out that arms races do not seem to be absolutely iden-
tical to progress in the sense that we are really expecting. Indeed, as we will see, Ficici
demonstrated that for many solution concepts (including maximum expected utility / best-
scoring strategy) a perfectly successful arms race may lead the evolutionary process away
from the overall optimum, at least temporarily (but then in this case ‘temporarily’ may
mean ‘until the whole search space is exhausted’). Furthermore, as mentioned in section
3.3.2, Nolfi & Floreano’s experiments showed that using a Hall of Fame could improve
historical progress, while decreasing overall performance. This highlights a discrepancy
between the concept of historical progress and a third notion of progress, which seems to
correspond more to the implicit objective of artificial coevolution:
3. Global progress: The new individuals are superior to their ancestors, when compared
against all possible competitors across the entire search space. We believe that this global
notion of “progress” is the one that captures the intuitive goal of artificial coevolution:
it describes quite simply what we would like coevolution to do. Unfortunately it is not
directly related to the other two. It is not clear that an algorithm could be devised
that would directly impose this kind of progress as mechanically as archives can enforce
historical progress: this would involve knowledge of unknown opponents, which is absurd.
Therefore, a practical option is to examine the conditions under which local and historical
9IPCA maintains an archive of learners and an archive of tests. At every cycle, new candidate learners and
tests are generated. Candidate learners are only included in the archive if no member of the archive can defeat
all the tests (including newly generated candidate tests) that this candidate learner can defeat. Candidate tests
are only included in the test archive if they can be defeated by some of the newly admitted candidate learners,
but not by any previous member of the learner archive [42]. MAXSOLVE is similarly organised, but candidates
are only included in the archive if they can defeat more tests than some of the current members; candidate tests
are only kept if they are defeated by one or more learners.[94]
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progress can be harnessed to obtain global progress with some degree of reliability.
It is clear that these three notions of progress are essentially based on three notions of
superiority: local, historical and global superiority, that is, superiority when comparing perfor-
mance against the current opponents, current and past opponents, and all possible opponents
respectively10. This last notion of global superiority is especially interesting, since it naturally
establishes a global scale of comparison, a single measure of “goodness” through which any two
individuals could be (theoretically!) compared, and which possesses one or more optima. The
difficulty, of course, lies in the fact that unless the entire search space can be sampled, this
global superiority cannot be calculated directly: at any time, all that we can safely estimate is
local and historical superiority. But even though this global fitness landscape is hidden, it still
exists, in contrast to more pessimistic opinions which express the impossibility of such a global
unambiguous scale in coevolutionary situations (see section 3.7).
The distinction is particularly important in that historical and global progress are not only
different, but may even be contradictory. We already mentioned Nolfi & Floreano’s experiment,
in which an archive brought about a steadier arms race, but poorer final performance against
unseen opponents. In other words, the use of an archive improved historical success, but damaged
global progress. On the theory side, Ficici demonstrated that for many “solution concepts”
(including maximum expected utility / best-scoring strategy), and even without discarding any
information, a perfectly successful arms race may lead the evolutionary process away from the
overall optimum, at least temporarily (but then in this case ‘temporarily’ may mean ‘until the
whole search space is exhausted’). We will discuss this in detail in section 3.7.
Let us take an example: De Jong [94] asserts that the MAXSOLVE algorithm ensures “mono-
tonic progress” in terms of how many opponents the population can defeat. However, MAX-
SOLVE involves discarding candidates that might potentially be superior (in a global sense) to
those currently known. De Jong justifies this as follows:
We note that a candidate discarded in this manner could potentially solve more
unseen tests than the candidates that are maintained. This does not violate the
monotonicity of the archive, however, since progress is measured with respect to
the set of tests seen so far. If the rejected candidate solution does indeed solve more
tests, this will eventually be discovered given sufficient further search, at which point
it will be included.
Thus MAXSOLVE does enforce historical progress, but does not enforce global progress. De
Jong points out that any superior solution will eventually be recognised after enough information
has been gathered. This is true, but not necessarily usable: it expresses the obvious fact that
over time, the set of opponents “seen so far” becomes closer and closer to the entire space of
possible opponents, and thus that superiority against previously seen opponent will necessarily
become more and more equivalent to superiority against all possible opponents. In this trivial
10To avoid any misunderstandings, we reiterate that we are not talking about being superior to past, current
or unseen opponents; we are talking about three different relationships of superiority, determined between any
two individuals, and which differ in the fact that they are calculated against different groups of opponents; say,
for the maximum expected score concept, any two individuals can be compared by evaluating the result of their
competitions against current opponents, against past and current opponents, or against the whole opponent space.
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sense, historical progress does converge to global progress - but only after a significant portion (or
in fact the totality) of the search space has been explored. In the meantime, as shown by Nolfi
& Floreano’s experiments and Ficici’s theoretical results (described below), perfect historical
progress may well lead the algorithm away from global progress, by discarding individuals that
are historically inferior, but globally superior. This highlights the fact that the term “progress”,
when used on its own (as it usually is), is thoroughly ambiguous.
3.6 Two fragile assumptions in early coevolution research
We can apply these concepts to some of the earlier work in coevolution. It is clear that, in
addition to the absence of a clearly defined concept of superiority (as pointed out by Ficici),
some of the early works on artificial coevolution are based on two implicit assumptions which
may be difficult to justify in the general case:
1. Local progress implies historical progress: Coevolution is expected to lead, mechanically,
to an arms race in which newer individuals are superior to their ancestors (which may
mean that they are being able to defeat these ancestors, or to defeat more opponents than
them, or to defeat all the opponents that they could - and then some). This assumption
was qualified early on with appropriate restrictions: Cliff & Miller’s efforts to “track the
Red Queen” [32] or Nolfi & Floreano’s discussion of intransitive cycles [133] come to mind.
2. Historical progress implies global progress: If an arms race occurs, that is, if newer indi-
viduals are consistently superior to their ancestors, then mechanically some form of global
optimum is being approached. In fact this assumption often takes the form of a lack of
distinction between the two forms of progress: in this view, historical progress is progress.
While, as we mentioned, Nolfi & Floreano [133] already invalidated this assumption, Ficici
was apparently first to demonstrate that it was not justified for many “solution concepts”
- that is, for many superiority criteria.
3.7 Solution concepts, monotonicity and progress
Recently, Ficici has made important contributions to the understanding of coevolution. Ficici’s
results are summarised in a recent paper [54] and in his Ph.D. thesis [53]. We provide an
extensive description and discussion in Appendix E. Here we will only summarise the main
points of interest in the context of the present chapter.
Ficici introduces the notion of a solution concept. A solution concept is essentially the
partition of the search space (or any subset of it) into two parts, one of which contains those
individuals that we call ‘solutions’, while the other contains ‘non-solutions’. Thus defining a
solution concept is equivalent to stating what exactly we are looking for, before starting to look
for it. To quote Ficici, “while this point may seem obvious, years of coevolutionary practice
indicate otherwise.” [53, Conclusion] For our purposes, “solution concepts” can be thought of
very roughly as what we call superiority criteria.11 Solution concepts include maximum expected
score, Pareto dominance, Nash equilibria, etc.
11See Appendix E for a more precise explanation.
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An important point of Ficici’s formalism is the notion of monotonicity : certain solution
concepts are monotonic, while others are not. Using our terminology, we can easily summarise
Ficici’s notion of monotonicity. A monotonic solution concept is one in which historical progress
implies global progress. That is, for every new individual, if we know with certainty that the new
individual is historically superior to the current champion, then monotonicity guarantees that
the new individual will also be globally superior to the current champion. Thus, when using a
monotonic superiority concept, a new individual that performs better than the current champion
(under this solution concept) against known opponents, will also perform better against all
possible opponents - including unseen ones.
It is important to stress that this guarantee only applies to the sequence of solutions: at any
time, even if we have enforced perfect historical progress, the current champion is not necessarily
the best individual found so far. It is possible that a previously encountered individual, that
was not previously seen as a champion, will eventually replace the current champion after more
information is gained [Ficici, personal communication]. However, we can be certain that the
replaced champion will not become a champion again, no matter how much information is
gained: demoted champions will never be reinstated. Thus, with a monotonic solution concept,
evolution will never need to backtrack.
In addition, Ficici demonstrates that the “conventional” solution concept of maximum ex-
pected score, or “Best Scoring Strategy” (BSS) is not monotonic. Thus, with this solution
concept, perfect historical progress does not imply global progress, even if we never discard any
information. However, Ficici also demonstrates that the solution concept of Nash equilibrium
(as described in section 3.4.3 above) is monotonic.
Ficici’s monotonicity is clearly a desirable property. However, monotonicity comes at a
cost. The most obvious is that monotonicity only “works” if we never discard any information.
In addition, we must constantly compare older and newer individuals against all previously
encountered opponents. Using our terminology, we can easily see the reason: these are two
obvious requirements of perfect historical progress. This may quickly become intractable in
practice.
Second, only two monotonic solution concepts are known: Nash equilibria and (under certain
conditions) Pareto dominance. While Nash equilibria appear conceptually simple, they imply
the use of mixed strategies, that is, sets of strategies from which the individual chooses randomly
(according to a certain distribution) at every interaction. This requirement is rather unwieldy
from an implementation viewpoint, especially considering that neither the number of strategies
in the set nor the probability distribution, are fixed. As for Pareto dominance, we have already
highlighted its specific problems (especially the prevalence of non-dominated individuals) in sec-
tion 3.4.3. By contrast, the Best Scoring Strategy concept is simple, and intuitively corresponds
to the common notion of superiority in coevolutionary optimisation. This is precisely why Ficici
calls it the “conventional” concept. Thus, while Ficici’s results are of considerable theoretical
importance, in practice, the intuitive appeal of conventional superiority criteria may overcome
the theoretical cost of non-monotonicity.
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3.8 Summary and conclusion
In coevolution, the concepts of superiority and progress are not as self-evident as in fitness-based
evolution and must be carefully defined. To evaluate the superiority of an individual A over
another individual B, we must define two things:
1. A superiority criterion (maximum expected utility, Pareto dominance, etc.)
2. A common set of opponents over which this criterion will be assessed and compared be-
tween A and B.
In the course of coevolution, different sets of “reference” opponents characterise different no-
tions of progress, namely local progress (superiority of newer individuals over their predecessors,
evaluated against current competitors), historical progress (superiority of newer individuals,
evaluated against all previously encountered competitors) and global progress (superiority of
newer individuals, evaluated against all possible competitors). The first is all that natural se-
lection is concerned with. The second can be brought about by means of an archive or similar
algorithmic devices. The third is the most desirable form of progress in coevolution, but is diffi-
cult to achieve reliably. In particular, it does not mechanically follow from any of the previous
two.
Ficici has shown that, for some solution concepts (a notion closely related to that of superior-
ity criteria), historical progress is demonstrably equivalent to global progress: newer champions
are better than previous ones, not just against previously encountered opponents, but against
the entire search space. However, monotonic solution concepts (such as Nash equilibria and
Pareto non-dominated fronts) carry additional requirements and limitations which may make
them rather unwieldy in practice. The conventional superiority criterion (Best Scoring Strategy,
or maximum expected score against a random opponent), while non-monotonic, may be seen as
preferable due to its intuitive appeal and its conceptual and technical simplicity.
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Chapter 4
A software platform for evolving
virtual creatures
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Evolving (better) virtual creatures
In this chapter we introduce the experimental system that we will use to test and illustrate
the concepts and methods devised in the remainder of this thesis. This system is based on
autonomous creatures in a physically realistic, three-dimensional (3D) environment, similar to
those introduced by Karl Sims [163, 162] (described in Appendix B). Creatures are articulated
structures composed of rigid blocks and controlled by embedded neural networks. The main dif-
ferences with Sims are, first, the use of standard McCulloch-Pitts neurons (instead of a set of ad
hoc, complex functional neurons) and, second, an improved genetic encoding and developmental
system (allowing fine-grained control of neural connections in duplicated morphological features,
and replication-exaptation processes). We also describe some results of early experiments with
this system. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first replication of Sims’ efforts to
achieve results comparable to Sims’ in efficiency and complexity, with standard neurons and
realistic Newtonian physics.
4.1.2 Sims’ creatures and their descent
It has now been more than a decade since Karl Sims presented the results of his experiments on
the evolution of virtual creatures in a three-dimensional (3D), physically realistic environment
[163, 162] (see Appendix B for a detailed description). These experiments have had a rich legacy.
The evocative morphology of these creatures, and the immediate realism of their behaviour,
bears an uncanny resemblance to biological organisms that can hardly be found in any other
experiment in the field.
While there has been a significant amount of work in projects related to the simulation of
3D creatures, much of it has concentrated on specific areas of research such as developmental
Most of the material in this section has been published in previous papers. [123, 124]
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systems or modular robotics. For example, Bongard & Pfeifer [18] used such a system to build a
model of genetic regulation in development, based on genetic regulatory networks. Because the
study of regulation networks was the central subject of this work, resulting creatures were rather
limited in their behaviours and did not exhibit the efficiency and nature-like aspect of Sims’ -
neither of which were objectives of this study. More recently, Bongard and colleagues have
explored new directions in the joint evolution of morphology and behaviour: real-world robots
engage in continuous self-modelling and self-simulation, in effect evolving models of themselves.
This allows the robot to recover from random damage, e.g.: “when a leg part is removed, [the
robot] adapts the self-models, leading to the generation of alternative gaits.” [17]
Applications to modular robotics were also reported. Marbach and Ijspeert [111] and Mesot
[120] simulated modular robotics systems, in which identical elementary modules were assembled
into larger robots. In these two systems, either the controllers or the morphology (or both) were
strictly constrained, with controllers being typically reduced to coupled oscillators.
Hornby & Pollack [83] offered a more computational model, in which development was di-
rected by the application of a genetic grammar based on L-systems. The system involved
creatures made of sticks arranged in complex 3D shapes. Their physics engine was strongly
restricted, in that it assumed that the simulation is stable at each timestep, thereby preventing
any dynamic behaviour such as running or jumping. The same can be said of the GOLEM
project [107], in which creatures made of rigid cylinders were first evolved in simulation, then
built in the real world using 3D printing. Taking a very different route, Ray [145] chose to de-
velop Sims’ model toward aesthetic evolution. Creatures were evaluated on subjective aesthetic
performance, in order to encourage the generation of “interesting” appearances and behaviours.
Full replications of Sims’ results were a long time coming. Taylor & Massey have attempted
to replicate this work [174], with limited results. In fact, the present work (as originally intro-
duced in [123] and [122]) apparently constitutes the first example of such a complete replication
and extension. More recently, Shim and Kim [160] have evolved flying creatures. However, they
used parametrised sinusoidal functions rather than neural networks, and morphologies were
more constrained than Sims’ (which is understandable, considering their objective of designing
functional wings.) Chaumont and colleagues [29] have reimplemented Sims’ model and success-
fully applied it to the evolution of catapults. Lassabe and colleagues [104] also implemented a
Sims-like system, using classifier systems selecting among pre-set activation patterns rather than
neural networks, and used it to evolve various locomotive behaviours in rugged environments
(including relief, trenches, etc.) and simple tasks such as block-pushing.
4.1.3 Ad hoc machinery in virtual creatures
Besides physics simplification, another common feature in the simulation of 3D creatures is the
widespread use of high-level, ad hoc elements in the controllers. Sims’ creatures, in particular,
were controlled by functional networks, including arithmetic functions, tunable oscillators and
logic operators (among others) as elementary building blocks. This represents a significant
amount of a priori knowledge given to the system. Sims [163] acknowledged the ad hoc aspect
of this choice in which, in his own words, led “a creature’s brain [to] resemble a dataflow computer
program more than a typical neural network”. Hornby & Pollack [83] and Framsticks [97], among
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others, also resort to high-level functions such as oscillators.1 High-level, ad hoc elements have
the obvious advantage of facilitating the emergence of certain types of behaviours, especially
with regard to locomotion; however this may come at the expense of generality. We believe that
using simple McCulloch & Pitts neuron may provide more freedom to the system in the type of
behaviours it generates. At any rate, it would reduce the amount of a priori knowledge in the
system, and thus offer a higher evolutionary challenge.
4.2 The system
Our system is broadly similar to Sims’, but with important differences. Our work brings two
contributions with respect to Sims’:
1. Our creatures are controlled by standard neural networks, based on classical McCulloch
& Pitts neurons with sigmoid or radial activation functions. This is in contrast with
the ad hoc functional neurons used by Sims. While Sims’ approach was entirely justified
given the seminal aspect of his work, we believe that using standard neurons provides
a higher level of generality to our model: creatures cannot rely on complex neurons to
generate behaviours, they must build these behaviours ‘from scratch’ (including simple,
vital behaviours such as oscillations).
2. We introduce extensions to the genetic-developmental system described by Sims. First, we
address a problem not mentioned by Sims: structures which are replicated by the develop-
mental system, either through symmetry (reflection) or through recursion (segmentation),
initially possess identical neural information and thus cannot be independently controlled
or provide distinct information to ancestor limbs. We solve this problem by adding ge-
netic flags which control the actual wiring.2 Second, we make it possible for developmental
duplications of genetic nodes to be transcribed back into the genome, creating several (ini-
tially similar) genetic nodes which may then evolve independently, in analogy with the
duplication-exaptation process found in Nature.
Other minor differences with Sims exist. For example, our system did not originally include
any contact sensor (these were introduced later, see chapter 5.) Our sensors were limited to
proprioceptors measuring the angle of a given joint, as well as sensors detecting the distance of
an object of opponent along the x and y axis of the limb’s frame of reference (both of which
were present in Sims.) Also the actuators of our creatures specified a desired angular speed,
rather than torque. As in Sims, inter-penetration between limb was forbidden, with a limited
exception for adjacent limb. However, while in Sims adjacent limbs can penetrate each other
up to a limit set by one half of each limb, we simply introduce a limit on the amplitude of each
joint. The fact that joints can only rotate within a given range of angles has consequences for
the emergence of sustained motion, as we will see.
1Oscillators in general are ubiquitous in physics and biology, and might be argued to be fundamental elements
in their own right; however the type of oscillators referred to here are high-level oscillating ‘neurons’, with a
tunable frequency calculated by temporal integration of inputs, arguably a high-level mechanism.
2Although Sims does not discuss this problem in his papers, one anonymous reviewer informed us that Sims did
in fact address it with undocumented, unpublished features. This information is apparently based on a personal
communication from Sims himself.
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We also provide a complete description of our system, as well as the original source code.
The lack of information on crucial aspects of Sims’ system has been an obstacle to replication.
At the time of writing, the software described in this chapter is available (together with video
samples) at the following location:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~txm/creatures/
We note that several authors (including Sims himself, but also Taylor & Massey [174] and
Chaumont and colleagues [29]) have pointed out the problem of stability in physics simulation.
Physics simulation may become unstable, generating non-physical behaviours that are quickly
exploited by evolution. However, we have managed to find (through perspiration more than
inspiration) adequate values of certain parameters that made the system reliably stable. Since
then, we did not observe any troublesome case of non-physical behaviour exploited by evolu-
tion to its advantage: the system is consistently realistic. These parameters are described in
Appendix A, section A.5, and may be of interest to users of the ODE package.
A complete technical description of our system can be found in Appendix A, as well as in two
previously published papers [123, 124]. Here we only provide a brief description of the system’s
features and of simple experiments.
4.3 Experiments
4.3.1 Locomotion: a (not-so-)simple evolutionary task
Our early experiments focused on a simple evolutionary task (locomotion), based on a straight-
forward fitness function (distance covered within a fixed period of time). In these early experi-
ments, we used a simpler version of the platform (lacking certain niceties such as “segmentation”
- see Appendix A).
While locomotion is a conceptually simple task, performing it with any efficiency is not
trivial in our system - in fact it is significantly more difficult than in Sims’ model. The reason
is that, in our system, any efficient locomotion must of necessity include oscillatory behaviours,
and therefore oscillatory neural activation: in the absence of oscillation, any creature will end up
stuck in place after all limbs have reached the maximum angle allowed at their respective joints.
Now in Sims’ model, oscillatory neural output is provided “for free” by using complex neurons
with a sinusoidal output. In our model, however, exclusive use of standard McCulloch-Pitts
neurons implies that outputs are strictly growing functions of their (weighted) inputs. Any
oscillation must occur through the suitable organisation of connections and feedbacks within
the network: oscillators must be discovered by the system, using neural connections and simple
sigmoid activation functions. This implies an additional level of complexity in comparison to
Sims’s model concerning the evolution of robust locomotion (or any sustainable behaviour at
all).
Our experiments involved populations of 500 individuals, which were evaluated for 10000
timesteps, each timestep corresponding to 0.01 second of simulated time. We chose to use a
simple steady-state genetic algorithm (SSGA, as described in e.g. Mitchell [128]) with “triple
tournament” selection: after a whole population of individuals is randomly generated, and each
individual is evaluated, the algorithm randomly picks three individuals and replaces the one
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of locomotion: four creatures from four different runs. from left to right:
a simple crawler, a “snake”, a tailed crawler and a bouncer.
with the lowest score with a recombination of the other two, or a heavily mutated version of one
of the other two. If the resulting offspring is non-viable (i.e. two non-adjacent limbs intersect,
or the developed phenotype contains too many limbs), this step is repeated as often as necessary
until a viable creature is produced. The resulting offspring is evaluated, and the cycle starts
again.
Our system was successful in consistently evolving successful locomotion. We note that this
was achieved through a wide range of different behaviours: “crawlers”. “Crawlers” use two sym-
metric limbs to propel themselves forward by direct contact with the ground, “snakes” undulate
in a coordinated way to obtain efficient locomotion, “bouncers” use very quick oscillations at
one or several joints and exploit the resulting momentum to jump forward, etc. An important
feature is proper exploitation of dynamics: the most efficient creatures are able to remain in
a constantly dynamic, unstable state, in other words, they are constantly “jumping”.3 This
diversity is reflected in Figure 4.1, which represents four creatures obtained in four different
runs.
4.3.2 Coevolution: the “box-grabbing” task
After these encouraging early results, we performed more complex experiments, this time per-
taining to coevolution. The task being considered is the “box-grabbing” contest described by
Sims [162]. Two creatures compete to gain control of a cubic box. At the beginning of each
3Note that such behaviour could not have occurred in a simplified simulation system that only allows stable
states, such as the one used in the GOLEM project. [107]
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Figure 4.2: Creatures from four different runs for the “box-grabbing” coevolutionary task. In
the first run, a two-armed ‘centipede’ creature tries to wrestle the box from a massive creature
which uses its mass to pin it down (the centipede uses both segmental and symmetric duplication
of limbs). In the second picture the left creature uses horizontal wiggling to crawl forward, while
the right creature uses ample vertical sinusoidal movement from its ’tail’ to propel itself against
the ground. In the third picture one creature has just knocked the ball away, using the constant
rotatory movement from its right ‘arm’ (the left arm is fixed, a clear example of differential neural
control over two duplicated limbs); but the other creature, using its accordion-like segmented
appendages, will eventually displace it and interpose itself between its opponent and the cube.
In the fourth picture, the creature uses a sinusoidal crawling movement from its tail to move
past the cube, and relies on its sensor to turn around it, thereby cutting off its opponent.
contest, the box is placed at the centre of the environment. Both competing creatures are placed
on opposite sides of the box, at a certain distance from it. The creatures are then left to act
for a given period of time. At the end of the evaluation period, the score for each creature is
determined by their relative distances from the box: if one creature is at distance d1 from the
box (as defined by the distance between the centre of the creatures’ closest limb to the box,
and the centre of the box) and the other at distance d2, then the former creature’s score is
d1− d2, while the latter’s is d2− d1. Creatures have four kinds of sensors, measuring the x and
y distances of either the opponent or the box, within the frame of reference of the limb in which
the sensor exists.
The evolutionary algorithm that we used for these particular experiments is a “3-strikes-out”
algorithm, a simple steady-state genetic algorithm for coevolution of our devising. In general,
the 3-strikes out algorithm simply consists in performing competitions between randomly picked
creatures, and removing individuals that have been defeated 3 times over their entire history. Our
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Figure 4.3: Functional subnetworks extracted from the neural networks of two creatures. The network
on the left is taken from one of the accordion-shaped appendages of the creature seen in the third picture
of Fig. 4.2. The network on the right is taken from the “encircling” creature seen in the fourth picture
of Fig. 4.2. Thickness of lines is proportional to connection weight. See text for details.
preferred reproduction strategy, which we use in the present experiments, is simply to replace
the removed individual with either a heavily mutated copy of itself, or a heavily mutated copy
of the individual by which it has just been defeated, or some form of recombination between
both. Importantly, when the problem involves two species, then victory and defeat are assessed
by comparing the performance of two individuals of one species against a common opponent
in the other species. This involves two simulated competitions; however, the result of one of
these competitions is used in the next round (when two individuals of the other population are
compared), so each new comparison requires the simulation of just one new competition. A
complete description and justification of N -strikes-out algorithms can be found in a previous
publication.[125]
Some examples of evolved creatures can be seen in Fig. 4.2. These runs involved two
populations of 100 individuals each. Interactions between two individuals were simulated over
15000 timesteps, each timestep corresponding to 0.01 second of simulated time.
From visual inspection it is clear that our system managed to come up with diverse solutions
to the problem. Locomotive behaviours emerged rather easily. A locomotive behaviour requires
some sort of cyclic, oscillating movement, which in turn implies some coordination between pro-
prioceptors and actuators. Additionally, sensorimotor coordination was observed, for example
the creature in the third picture of Fig. 4.2 can adjust its trajectory depending on the position
of the box. A complete description of the system and results (with analysis of evolved neural
controllers) can be found in the related paper. [124]
Comparing these results to those obtained by Sims is not easy for several reasons. First, Sims
apparently used far fewer interactions (100 generations with two populations of 100 individuals,
which is much less than the 1˜00K evaluations used in the present experiment). Furthermore Sims
used complex neurons which automatically provided behaviours such as oscillations ‘for free’.
Restrictions imposed by Sims on the morphology of creatures (maximum numbers of genes, of
blocks, etc.) are unknown.
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The diversity of morphological plans is reflected in the neural controllers. Figure 4.3 de-
scribes the functional subnetworks of two creatures. The network on the left corresponds to one
appendage of a crawling creature (the other appendage, being a symmetric replication, contains
a similar network). It is easy to notice the feedback loop between the proprioceptors and ac-
tuators of limbs 1 and 2, leading to an oscillating movement of the corresponding joint which
propels the creature forward. Other, small-weight connections originating from sensors lead to
a folding of the appendage in the direction of the box.
The network on the right, however, is more complicated. It describes the functional subnet-
work of the “encircling” creature shown in Fig. 4.2. The basic core of the neural controller is
easily isolated: the “feedback cascade” in limbs 2, 3 and 4 provides the coordinated sinusoidal
movement which propels the creature forward (limbs 2, 3 and 4 are a recursive replication se-
quence which corresponds to the segmented motile appendage of the creature). The sensor in
limb 1 influences the shape of the creature in order to change the direction of motion depending
on the relative position of the box.
However the behaviour of the creature is also dependent on all other connections and neurons,
even though their exact function is difficult to isolate individually. Collectively, they ensure that
the creature assumes the right shape and posture (and maintains them) to follow the desired
trajectory. This occurs through coordination of activities which are tuned to the morphology
of the creature (mass and orientation of limbs, etc) in order to skew the trajectory correctly.
Experimental lesions in this network reduce the efficiency of the creature in various ways, which
range from a slowdown to a loss of trajectory. Several other connections were present in the
network (including between the neurons depicted) but were found to have no impact on the
behaviour of the creature. All in all, it appears that an intricate collection of characters (neurons,
connections, shapes of limbs) with no obvious individual effect, collectively provide a useful and
reliable function - a good example of evolutionary “bricolage” (tinkering).
4.4 Conclusion
We have described a software platform that constitutes the first complete replication of Sims’
result. In contrast to Sims’, this platform uses standard McCulloch-Pitts neurons, rather than
complex functional neurons; it also extends the developmental system to increase flexibility. In
the next sections we will extensively build upon this platform to perform various experiments
and improve our understanding of evolution.
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Chapter 5
Evolving physical combat among
artificial creatures
5.1 Limitations of the box-grabbing task
The box-grabbing task introduced by Sims has many advantages, not least simplicity: it is easy
to understand, easy to evaluate numerically, and easy to implement. It also has the less obvious
advantage of offering a fitness function that can “work” at all stages of the evolutionary process,
in that it can offer an informative evaluation both to very poor and very advanced competitors.
This is due to the fact that it is based on relative distances, and that even the most primitive
creatures will possess some heritable variance in this characteristic (if only by falling down).
However, this simplicity can also be seen as a limitation. While there are several ways to grab
a box, the variety of efficient behaviours is necessarily limited. Another problem is that it is not
easy to see how this task could be extended to large numbers of competing individuals. We might
imagine box-grabbing competitions involving a few creatures; we might even fancy the evolution
of “rugby-playing” creatures, in which teams of individuals would compete against each other.
But there does not seem to be any obvious way in which box-grabbing could meaningfully be
used as a competition involving many independent individuals, constantly competing against
each other, with varying lifespans and asynchronous births and eliminations.
As a consequence, it appears that box-grabbing is not easily applicable to systems based
on unconstrained natural selection among a population of free-living creatures. For this type
of system, we need another type of task - something more direct, less constrained than the
box-grabbing setup.
5.2 Evolving fighting creatures
5.2.1 Physical combat: the appeal of (virtual) violence
Physical combat between creatures appears intuitively appealing as a basis for evolution. This
comes in no small part from the fact that physical combat is ubiquitous in nature. Predation,
sexual competition among males and other forms of fighting have been fruitful sources of evolu-
tionary creativity in many lineages, producing remarkable examples of arms races and mutual
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adaptations. Another attractive feature of physical combat is that it is a very direct form of
interaction, requiring no mediating device or instrument (as opposed to box-grabbing, and there-
fore box-requiring, experiments). This means that it can be used in many different settings with
relatively few constraints. Crucially, while it may be used in head-to-head competitions very
much like the box-grabbing task, it should be transposable to free-living creatures in an open
environment. We can begin to envision a virtual world, in which creatures would roam freely
and fight each other in an unconstrained fashion.
5.2.2 Related work
Many evolutionary experiments use some idealised form of “fighting” or “killing” behaviour as
part of a range of pre-defined behaviours. These include Geb [27], Echo [84], Polyworld [197],
Framsticks [97] and others (see Appendix B). However, in these systems, the actual process
of fighting is essentially abstract. It corresponds to a pre-defined rule, hard-coded into the
program, such as “eliminate the individual with lowest energy level”, or even simply “eliminate
the targeted individual, no matter what” (as in Geb). Evolution bears on when and how to use
the abstract fighting behaviour, not on how to fight.
In fact, despite the possibilities offered by physical combat, we have only been able to find
one attempt at evolving physical combat in a 3D environment: O’Kelly and Hsiao [135] have
implemented a modified version of Sims’ model, based on a very simple form of combat. In this
system, “the first creature to touch its enemy’s root node is deemed the winner.” This simplified
form of combat is easy to implement and assess, and avoids the difficulties described in the
following sections. However, it is also less flexible in many ways, not least in being an “all-or-
nothing” measure of success. To provide a gradient for evolution, O’Kelly and Hsiao add another
component to their fitness function: at the end of each round, both creatures are rewarded with
a value inversely proportional to the final distance between the two. This is expected to favour
the emergence of simple approach behaviours in the early stages of evolution. Of course this has
the drawback that the corresponding reward is equally given to both creatures, independently
of how much each creature contributed to reducing this distance.1 Another problem with this
method of combat, especially for our own block-based creatures, is that it has an obvious weak
point: simply protecting the root limb makes a creature effectively invincible.
We would like to create a more realistic system, relying on a much less abstract form of
combat. Essentially, we want to obtain behaviours that are as lifelike as possible, and ideally
where combat itself is the sole basis of evolution. This immediately leads to several difficulties.
5.2.3 Difficulties of physical combat: Newton vs. Darwin
The central question in physical combat is to determine how damage should be evaluated: when
do we say that an individual has somehow hurt, or otherwise dominated, its opponent? This
apparently simple question turns out to pose significant problems.
1A simple way to reward creatures more fairly would be to calculate, at each timestep, the modification in the
distance between the position of each creature and the previous position of the other. In this manner, creatures
that actually move towards their opponent could be rewarded, while those which stay put or move away from
their opponents would not.
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The most obvious answer is simply to use impacts (and some measure of kinetic energy at
the time of impact) as the basis of combat: essentially, to let individuals trade blows with each
other. However, this introduces a difficulty caused by Newton’s third law (often summarised
as “action equals reaction”). If two rigid blocks come into collision, and suffer some damage
as a result, then both blocks will suffer equivalent damage. This is because physical damage
is mostly related to kinetic energy. Clearly the relative velocities of each limb with regard to
the other are equal in magnitude (and of opposite signs), and the resulting kinetic energy (and
associated impact damage) will therefore be equal for both. The consequence is that when a
creature hits another, the creature dealing the blow will suffer the same damage as the one
receiving it. Clearly this is not conducive to the evolution of fighting behaviours.
In nature, the main reason why physical combat can occur is simply the heterogeneity of
materials. Flesh, bones, teeth, skin, horn, etc., have different properties that make it possible
to inflict damage on an opponent without suffering too much as a result. The cheetah’s claws
are harder than the gazelle’s skin and flesh, and can therefore damage it more than they are
damaged by it. Martial arts fighters attempt to throw their fists and heels at their opponent’s
face and stomach - rather than the other way round - because the bone structure of those parts
favour (closed) hands and feet in collisions against the nose and the belly. Additionally, the
geometry of object plays a roles: sharp, pointy objects will behave differently than flat or dull
objects in collisions - hence the variety of mammalian tooth shapes.
Implementing such variety of materials in our simulation would clearly be cumbersome and
difficult to “get right.” In addition, we would need to impose some cost on the toughness of
materials, to prevent evolution from turning into a simple maximisation of toughness. In nature,
such runaway escalation in armour is simply prevented by the trade-offs imposed by available
resources and other tasks. This would not be readily transposable in our simple model.
5.2.4 Solution: favouring the aggressor
To overcome this difficulty, we chose to evaluate the damage inflicted by a creature upon another
by measuring “how much” this creature contributed to the occurrence and intensity of the
collision. The result is that the creature that initiates contact more than the other (that is, the
creature that is “dealing the blow”) is favoured in the interaction.
Collision intensity is estimated by penetration depth. How can we measure how much each of
the colliding limbs contributed to this collision? This is estimated by suspending the simulation,
and then letting each of the colliding block in turn move for one timestep at its current velocity,
while the other one is kept fixed; the resulting increase in penetration depth, if any, is used as
a measurement of how much this creature contributed to the collision - that is, how much it
actually moved towards the other (see Figure 5.1). After this, all blocks return to their original
positions, and the simulation proceeds normally.
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Figure 5.1: Damage calculation. 1: A collision occurs between limbs A and B, moving with velocities
Va and Vb respectively. 2: Letting B move at its current velocity for one timestep (while keeping A fixed)
results in a large increase in penetration depth. 3: By contrast, letting A move at its current velocity
for one timestep (while keeping B fixed) results in a smaller increase in penetration depth. Thus, in this
collision, B inflicts more damage upon A than A upon B. Note that if Va was pointing away from B,
then letting A move for one timestep would actually reduce penetration depth, and thus A would not be
inflicting any damage upon B at all.
5.3 Summary of platform modifications
5.3.1 Collisions and damage
In line with the preceding discussion, the main modification we brought to the platform was to
implement damage in collisions. Anytime a collision occurs between two blocks, the following
procedure is applied:
1. Keeping one block fixed at its current position, allow the other one to move on for one
simulation step. Record the resulting penetration depth.
2. Restore block positions and do the same thing with the other block. Record the resulting
penetration depth.
3. Whichever block caused the greater penetration depth in these “virtual futures” is deemed
to have dealt the blow; the other limb (the victim of the blow) suffers an amount of damage
proportional to the relative velocity between the two limbs.
5.3.2 New sensor types
In the previous sections we used sensors that perceived the distance of a certain object (another
individual, or a box) in a given direction (the x or y direction). Here we replace these sensors
with a more informative type of sensor, inspired in no small part by those introduced in Geb[27].
The new sensors produce an output that is proportional in magnitude to the inverse of the
Euclidean distance of a certain object. The sign of this output is determined by whether the
object in question lies on the “left” or “right” of the limb in which the sensor is located, relative
to the axis of rotation. More precisely, the sign of the output produced is such that applying
an input of the same sign to the motor joint of the limb would make the limb rotate towards
the object. If a sensor is directly linked to the motor joint of the limb that contains it, and if a
certain object (to which this sensor is receptive) is placed in the vicinity of the limb, then the
limb will tend to reach towards the object.
Two types of sensors are used. One of these sensors detects the closest individual (more
precisely, the trunk of the individual whose trunk is closest to the limb in which the sensor
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exists). The other sensor type detects the closest limb, that is, the direction and distance of the
closest limb of any other individual in the simulation. If no other individual exists then both
sensor return zero output.
5.3.3 Contact proprioceptors
In previous experiments, we did not use any contact sensors. However, considering the impor-
tance of physical contact in the present experiments, we introduce a contact sensor, the output
of which is one if the limb in which the sensor exists is in contact with a limb of another creature,
and zero otherwise.
5.3.4 Rules of engagement
In the box-grabbing task, creatures were pushed away from the box by a certain distance, then
further pushed behind a slanted plane inclined by 45 degrees so that they could not exploit their
length to get closer to the box (by simply falling down.) Here we chose to dispense with this
latter precaution.
Competitions between two creatures are organised as follows: first, creatures are put on each
side of a vertical plane, and then pushed away from each other by a very small distance to avoid
any contact. Then creatures are allowed to move according to their controllers’ output. Over the
first 10% of evaluation time, creatures benefit from an “immunity period”, during which they
can neither hurt nor be hurt by each other; this allows creatures a safe period to reach their
stable configuration, and discourages trivial behaviours such as just falling over one’s opponent
(in this sense it is an equivalent to Sims’ “inclined plane” in the coevolution of box-grabbing
[162]). After this immunity period has elapsed, damage is evaluated according to the previously
described method, and accumulated over the entire evaluation period.
The fact that creatures are initially close favours the probability of contact occurring, even
in the very early stages. This provides an immediately exploitable gradient for natural selection
to act upon.
At the end of the evaluation period, each creature is given a final score equal to 1 + (Damage
inflicted - Damage suffered) / (Damage inflicted + Damage suffered). This calculation is inspired
by Sims [162]. Note that this score always falls within the [0, 2] range.
5.4 Experiments and qualitative results
We used various algorithms (mostly variants of Sims’ Last Elite Opponent algorithm) with this
platform. The following chapters describe these algorithms in full, and provide quantitative
results. In this section, we only provide a short, qualitative description of our results.
Useful creatures consistently evolved within a couple of generations. The system generated
a wide range of morphologies, as shown in Figure 5.2. In general, the creatures evolved made
very little use of external sensors. Their initial proximity gives them little incentive to track the
movements of any opponent. Rather, the strategies focused on how to inflict maximum damage
without moving away too much, implying a balance between fast motion (necessary to inflict
damage) and stability.
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Figure 5.2: Four pairs of fighters obtained in the course of the experiments described in the next
chapter. In the top-left corner, one simple creature uses its rotating cubic head to perform a
“compass” motion, while the other creature uses three rotating appendages both as flails and
legs. The dark colour indicates that the creatures are still within their immune period. In the
top-right corner, a three-legged creature confronts a two-legged creature. In the bottom-left
corner, a creature with three rotating appendages has just dealt a blow to its opponent (as
indicated by the darker colour of the opponent’s head). In the bottom-right corner, a large
creature uses three undulating appendages as powerful legs to “steamroll” its opponent.
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One commonly observed strategy was the “compass” method, in which one extremity of the
creature remains fixed on the ground (mostly through sheer mass) while the other extremity
features a constantly rotating structure, behaving like a rolling arm, with a plane of rotation
perpendicular to the axis of the creature. As the rolling arm pushed the head sideways, while
the tail remains fixed, the creature undergoes a compass-like motion: the head describes a circle
around the end of the tail. In addition, the rotating arm serves as a striking implement to inflict
damage upon opponents. This simple strategy proves very effective, as the creature literally
laminates anything that passes within its radius. Notice that the rotating arm requires the co-
operation of at least two oscillating limbs (one limb oscillating vertically, the other horizontally)
to achieve overall rotation.
A variant on this strategy is the “flail” method, in which the head and single arm are replaced
with a group of heads and arms, which may vary widely in size and complexity. More generally,
“whipping appendages” were widespread. A different, less common approach is the “steamroll”
method, which simply consists in repeatedly bumping into the opponent at full speed, constantly
pushing it away in the process.
5.5 Conclusion
We have implemented a system for evolving physical combat among 3D creatures. The consistent
success in evolving efficient fighters indicates that the system can be used as a platform for
further experiments. This system is important for two reasons. First, it provides us with a rich
experimental device with which we can study coevolution in a complex environment. Second,
having implemented physical combat among creatures, we can use it as a basis of interaction for
free-living creatures, dwelling upon the surface of an open environment. As mentioned in section
5.2.1, this is in contrast with previously proposed coevolutionary tasks, such as box-grabbing.
5.6 Looking back, looking ahead: summary and future direc-
tions
So far in this thesis we have mainly been concerned with a “buildup” phase, in which we intro-
duced a set of concepts, definitions and tools to serve as a sound basis for further investigations.
This basis includes usable definitions of evolution, natural selection, and superiority and progress
in coevolution. On the practical side, it also includes the software platform discussed in this
chapter and chapter 4.
In the remainder of this thesis, we will move to an “exploitation” phase, in which the concepts
and tools previously developed will be used extensively. First, building upon our concepts of
superiority and progress in coevolution, we will discuss methods to analyse the dynamics of
coevolution and assess its performance. We will use our software platform as an experimental
device to demonstrate and validate the use of these methods.
Then, we will discuss the notoriously vexing relationship between evolution and complexity,
using the definitions laid out in the first chapters of these thesis. We will introduce a method,
called Fitness Transmission, for detecting the activity of evolutionary adaptation within a system
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(that is, a signature of Darwinian evolution); in particular, we will also point out that previously
suggested methods (such as the Bedau-Packard measure of evolutionary activity [11]) should not
be used for this purpose.
Finally, building upon our implementation of physical combat among virtual creatures, we
will introduce an artificial environment in which a population of free-living creatures interact,
reproduce and evolve. This will lead us to a discussion of what it means for evolution to occur
“without a fitness function” (also known as “intrinsic adaptation” [137] or “natural” selection,
as opposed to “artificial” selection [28]), in the face of the necessity for any artificial system
to possess rules for determining survival and reproduction of any given individual (that is,
precisely, a “fitness function”). We will conclude our discussion by applying fitness transmission
to demonstrate the onset of adaptive evolution within our system.
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Chapter 6
Methods for coevolutionary analysis
and evaluation
6.1 Introduction
In the previous sections we saw that progress and performance need to be defined carefully in
the context of coevolution. This leaves us with another question, namely the practical problem
of detecting, and estimating, performance and progress in coevolutionary experiments. We need
practical methods to analyse the outcomes of coevolution. In particular, we seek to address the
following problems:
• How can we detect the presence or absence of (historical or global) progress in a coevolu-
tionary process?
• Given two coevolutionary algorithms, how can we determine which one produces the best
individuals (for equivalent computational effort)?
Obviously, the latter question is especially important from a practical viewpoint: if we
want to devise efficient methods for coevolution, we need to compare the efficiency of different
algorithms in a reasonably unambiguous manner.
6.2 Methods for analysing and monitoring coevolution
The problem of tracking progress and performance in coevolution has been recognised early on.
The Red Queen effect, by making it difficult to assess the intrinsic quality of an individual (see
chapter 3), also complicates the task of assessing the behaviour of a particular algorithm. Several
types of statistics have been proposed for analysing the results of coevolutionary processes, with
a stress on the identification of progress.
Much of this chapter has been published in a separate paper [122]. Also some extracts from another paper
[125] have been included.
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Figure 6.1: Master Tournament matrices, taken from Nolfi & Floreano [133] in a predator-prey
experiment. Black (resp. white) dots indicate a victory for the champion of the predator (resp.
prey) population. The picture of the left represents an “ideal” situation of perfect progress, in
which each champion is able to defeat all previous opponents. The picture on the right represents
the results of a real experiment.
6.2.1 CIAO and Master Tournament
Cliff & Miller’s “Current Individual vs. Ancestral Opponents” method (CIAO) [32] and Nolfi &
Floreano’s “Master Tournament” method [133] both use a similar principle. At every generation,
a champion is selected (often a champion is naturally provided by the algorithm at hand.)
Then, we pit the champion of every generation against the champion of all other generations
(or, for CIAO, of all previous generations.) The result of each confrontation is represented by a
coloured dot within a grid, such that the dot at coordinates (n,m) in the grid is darkened if the
champion of generation n in the first population defeats the champion of generation m in the
other population, and left blank otherwise (in tasks where draws are possible, a three-colours
scheme can be used.) The CIAO method pits the champion of a population at generation n
against the champions of each previous generation in the opposing population, thus resulting in a
triangle of dots. The Master Tournament method collates the results of confrontation between all
champions of all generations, producing a square matrix of dots. The Master Tournament square
corresponds to the collation of two CIAO triangles (one for each of the competing populations)
joined along their common hypotenuse, the diagonal of the square.
Both methods can be applied to two-species or one-species coevolution. If we draw a Master
Tournament grid for single-species coevolution in a symmetric problem, then the grid will be
symmetric along the diagonal, since (m,n) represents the same confrontation as (n,m) (namely,
between the current champion of the species at generations m and n.) However, if the task is
not symmetric (that is, if pitting A against B may produce different scores for each individual
than B against A), then the dot matrix will in general not be symmetric either.
The data from a Master Tournament matrix can also be summarised in a simple graph, in
which, for each species, the percentage of opponents defeated by the current champion is shown
as a function of generation number. We call such a graph a Master Tournament summary graph,
by contrast to Master Tournament matrices. Importantly, both are visual representations of the
data generated by the Master Tournament method: we must not reduce this method to either
the matrices or the summary graphs.
These methods have the advantage of providing reasonably complete information about an
entire evolutionary run. However this completeness comes at a price. An obvious problem with
these methods is their computational cost. Let N be the total number of generations. Since
N2 evaluations are needed to obtain a complete Master Tournament grid ((N2 − N)/2 in the
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single-population, symmetric case), as soon as N becomes even moderately large, calculating
the figure is a time-consuming process. Of more concern to the analyst is the fact that the
resulting figures are often somewhat obscure: although “ideal” conditions of progress lead to
a very simple figure, these ideal conditions are rarely met in practice. Real experiments often
produce disorderly arrangements of dots from which it may be difficult to extract any meaning
at all (see Figure 6.1.)
Cartlidge [26, Chap. 7] has proposed a graphical method to facilitate the analysis of CIAO
plots. He applies image processing techniques (essentially blurring and binarisation) to the plot,
which enhances the visibility of patches and strips within the graph. This makes it easier to
identify the presence of regular cycling between strategies, and to measure the period and reg-
ularity of this cycling: regular cycling produces regular diagonal bands on the graph. However,
while the method seems ideally suited for detecting regular cycling, it is not clear whether other
patterns have a direct signature on the resulting graphs. The method has only been applied
to domains with an inherently cycling structure (Rock-Paper-Scissors) or to populations under-
going random drift; distinguishing between the two occasionally proved difficult [26, 145]. The
method may also produce spurious structures [26, 139,144]. In addition, note that the method
requires a full CIAO plot, so there is no reduction in computational cost.
6.2.2 Dominance Tournament
A more recent technique for observing progress in coevolution has been proposed by Stanley
& Miikkulainen under the name of Dominance Tournament [170]. Dominance Tournament was
developed for single-population coevolution, but can be readily extended to multiple populations.
In a dominance tournament analysis, one must keep track of every new individual that defeats all
previously dominant individuals. Dominance is defined recursively: The first dominant strategy
d1 is the champion of the first generation; then, at every generation, the current champion
becomes the new dominant strategy di if it can defeat all previous dominant strategies dj<i.
Thus the dominance tournament method concentrates on a sequence of individuals which
are seen as particularly important, due to their recursive superiority relationship. Dominance,
in this context, is not synonymous with superiority: dominant strategies need not be historically
or globally superior to their predecessors. Clearly, there is an implicit assumption behind that in
practice, dominance should be more or less correlated with (at least) historical superiority. This
assumption is reasonable if the search space is not too complex or chaotic, though estimating
this would in itself be an interesting problem.
Dominance Tournament has the advantage of being much easier to compute than Master
Tournament, since at any time the total number of dominant strategies against which candidates
are to be tested is significantly lower than the total number of generation champions. It is also
much easier to analyse, since it can be represented as a one-dimensional series of ticks along a
time-coordinate axis, each tick corresponding to the appearance of a new dominant strategies.
However, the massive simplification of the statistics eliminates a lot of information, and it is
not clear exactly how precisely the Dominance Tournament captures the global trajectory of a
given run.
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6.2.3 Limits of historical methods
Note that these methods (CIAO, Master Tournament, Dominance Tournament) must be applied
to the history of a particular run: they essentially rely on “single record” analysis. They are
useful in studying the trajectory of evolution and the presence (or absence) of historical progress.
However, they do not bring direct information about general progress in the sense of overall
superiority when evaluated against the whole search space - that is, global progress. We will
expand on this in the next section.
6.2.4 Comparing the performance of algorithms
A simple method to compare the efficiency of two algorithms or techniques is simply to perform
an “all-against-all” comparison: we pit all champions generated by a given algorithm, against all
champions generated by another, and we simply tally the results. Clearly, if champions generated
by algorithm A1 consistently defeat many more champions generated by algorithm A2 than the
other way round, we may deduce that A1 is superior to A2. Crucially, because the individuals
being compared have not coevolved together, they may serve as impartial reference for each
other. This simple method is used by Nolfi and Floreano [133]. However, it has the drawback
of being a single-number method, providing aggregate data rather than detailed information.
More importantly, since it includes all champions generated by either method over time,
it may produce undesirable results due to the inclusion of early, non-representative champions.
Imagine an algorithm that would consistently produce individuals that defeat 50% of all possible
opponents; now imagine another algorithm, that would initially produce very poor individuals
with 0% success rate, but would consistently end up producing optimal individuals with 100%
success rate against unseen opponents after a certain period of time. If we are ready to give
enough time to the algorithm, we would certainly prefer the latter “late-optimal” over the former
“stable-mediocre” algorithm. However, it is very possible that the “all-against-all” comparison
method would produce the opposite result, favouring the stable-mediocre algorithm over the late
optimal one. This is simply because the early, poorly-performing champions would overwhelm
the results of the latter, optimal champions, and their overall average may still prove lower than
the average of constantly mediocre champions generated by the other algorithm.
6.3 Historical methods cannot assess global progress
As we saw in Chapter 3, distinction has not always been made between historical and global
progress. Methods based on the data of a single run (such as Master Tournament, CIAO, Domi-
nance Tournament, etc.) essentially measure historical progress: they compare the performance
of individuals, when opposed to the set of opponents they have evolved against. Saying that
such methods can assess “progress”, without any qualification, only emphasises the troublesome
ambiguity of the word “progress.”
In fact, inferring global progress (or its absence) from historical methods is akin to a well-
known error in statistics, namely that of using the training set as a test set. In historical
methods, all individuals involved are supposed to represent populations which have been used
as a training set for each other. In fact, for certain algorithms (including Sims’ algorithm and its
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extensions based on a Hall of Fame), the champions of each populations are each other’s training
sets. Observing continuous, “perfect” historical progress with these methods, is equivalent to
obtaining classifiers that successfully classify all of their training data. But it is well-known that
such a feat cannot be used as a measure of the general performance of the classifier: rather, we
need a test set, distinct from the training set, against which the classifier will be evaluated. This
allows us to assess the performance of the classifier against unknown examples, and therefore
its actual usefulness in practical use.
In the case of the Master Tournament method, this must be qualified: each individuals is
not just evaluated against past opponents, but also future opponents, which neither it nor its
ancestors ever encountered. This is outside the scope of strictly historical progress. However,
if B is a future opponent of A, then A is a previous opponent of B - that is, an opponent of
one of B’s ancestors (again, a Master Tournament matrix is a collation of two purely historical
CIAO matrices, each describing the history of one of the coevolving species.) Furthermore,
future opponents are descended from previous opponents, which means that they are clearly not
independent of them. Thus, in a Master Tournament matrix, for each species, half the test set
is composed of the training set, and the rest is derived from it.
Of course, in practice, strong historical progress may well carry some evidence of global
progress. For example, in Master Tournament matrices, if the champion of generation 1 defeats
no opposing champion, while the champion of generation N defeats all opposing champions,
then we may suspect that the champion of generation N is indeed not just historically, but
globally superior to the first champion. This is not a logical necessity, but a reasonable inference
that we can make if the difference is large enough. Similarly, in classification, if one system
correctly classifies no example of the training set while another system correctly classifies all
training examples, then we may suspect that the latter will indeed prove more powerful than
the former, not just against the training set, but also against the test set or indeed any set of
examples. However, we must keep in mind that such a generalisation is not always justified, and
that lesser differences in success over the training set may not carry any information regarding
performance against random examples. Similarly, historical superiority may not imply global
superiority, and therefore historical progress may not imply global progress.
6.4 Coarse-Grained Master Tournament
6.4.1 Coarse-Grained Master Tournament matrices
Master Tournament matrices are an informative method to evaluate historical progress in co-
evolution. However, as previously mentioned, they are computationally expensive and may be
difficult to read due to their fine texture.
To monitor the historical progress of evolution, we introduce a modified version of the Master
Tournament method. Our method simply consists in performing a regular sampling operation
- a “coarse graining” of the matrix. Instead of performing a full tournament between the
champions of all N generations, we simply pick a fixed number k of champions, evenly sampled
through time, and use this sample to produce a coarse-grained Master Tournament matrix. This
means that we only perform tournaments between champions of generations which are integer
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multiples of the N/k fraction. In our example, we chose to sample the champions of every 10th
generation, condensing a run of 500 generations into a 50x50 grid. Note that because of the
N2 cost of Master Tournaments (graphically illustrated by the square aspect of the resulting
matrices), by sampling 10% of the generations, computing costs are divided by 100.
Like any sampling process, coarse-graining incurs a loss of information. However, the infor-
mation which is lost by coarse-graining is expected to be short-term, small-scale information.
When analysing the results of a coevolutionary experiment, we are usually interested in higher-
level trends, especially regarding evolutionary progress. Coarse-graining should preserve much
of this type of larger-scale information. In particular, the question of whether or not a given
individual can generally outperform older ones, which is the crucial aspect of the “arms race”
concept, is not affected by coarse-graining. Moreover, coarse-graining can actually make a Mas-
ter Tournament matrix more descriptive by suppressing spurious, irrelevant information: as we
make clear in the following paragraphs, coarse-grained Master Tournament matrices may exhibit
discernible, informative features which are often difficult to observe in full matrices.
6.4.2 Experimental setup
We apply our method to coevolution among artificial creatures, as described in the previous
chapters. We use the same task as Sims [162]: two creatures compete for control of a single
cube. The setup is similar to that described in the previous chapter for this task, except that we
do use Sims’ original LEO algorithm. For every run, creatures are divided into two populations.
At every generation, creatures of each population are evaluated against the current champion of
the opposing population. The creature which obtains the best score becomes the new champion
of this population. Survival rate is 50%, which means that half the population is replaced at
every generation.1 Selection of parents occurs by direct tournament selection based on score.
New individuals are created with equal probability by one of three operations: grafting between
the two individuals, crossover between the two parents, or three successive applications of the
mutation operator to one of the parents. Then the mutation operator is applied to the resulting
creature and produces the final offspring. Each run covers 500 generations - clearly a prohibitive
number for an original Master Tournament matrix, but easily manageable after coarse-graining
by 10% sampling.
6.4.3 Reading a coarse-grained Master Tournament matrix
Figure 6.2-left shows a coarse-grained Master Tournament matrix for a particular run. Each
(m,n) location is marked with a dark square point if the champion of population 1 generation
10 ∗ m defeats the champion of population 2 at generation 10 ∗ n, or with a light cross mark
otherwise. The y = x line, drawn in a lighter shade, provides a time axis for the actual run.
Points on this line indicate how the actual run went along, indicating the victorious population
at each generation. On a coarse-grained Master Tournament matrix, vertical patterns are re-
lated to individuals from population 1, while horizontal patterns are related to individuals from
population 2.
1This is a much more conservative value than Sims’ 20%. In later experiments, we actually found that Sims’
more aggressive parameter proved much more successful.
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Figure 6.2: Coarse-grained Master Tournament matrix for two different runs. Squares indicate
victory for the x species, while dots indicate victories for the y species. See text for details.
A first observation for this run is that the y = x line goes through several regions of different
colour. This means that the champions of the two populations successively outperform each
other, an indicator of healthy competition. However, the particular patterns of this alternation
provide a better insight about the course of evolution in this run.
Identifying similar phenotypes from their competitive profiles: The graph in Figure 6.2-left
contain many similar lines and columns. In particular, it may be seen that many columns
offer strikingly similar patterns of dark and light marks, although with appreciable variation.
Each column, however, corresponds to the competitive profile of a champion in population 1:
it accounts for its successes and failures against every champion of population 2. Two identical
columns denote two individuals that defeat the same opponents, and are defeated by the same
opponents. It is not too far-fetched to assume that similarity in competitive profile is linked to
similarity in phenotypes.
Similarity is not identity, and much variation can be seen. However there are at least two
columns which offer a significantly different profile to the neighbouring columns, namely columns
31 and 46. These two columns can be said to represent different types from their neighbours,
due to the difference in competitive profiles. In particular they are unique in being able to defeat
the opponents in rows 41-43.
The significance of the high similarity in columns after 12 can be seen as an indication that,
at least in population 1, evolution seems to have settled on a particular type of creature, which is
marginally “fine-tuned” in the later course of coevolution. This capacity to indicate phenotypical
convergence is an interesting property of coarse-grained Master Tournament matrices.
Evidence of breakdowns in arms race: The arms race concept implies that newer individuals
are consistently able to outperform their ancestors. Breakdowns in the arms race are associated
with a loss of adaptive function, since an ability (to defeat some individuals that could be
defeated by ancestors) has been lost by the newer individual [57].
Breakdowns or interruptions in arms races are easy to locate on a Master Tournament
matrix. Any dark mark occurring immediately above a light mark, or any light mark occurring
immediately on the right of a dark mark, indicates such an interruption: it means that a given
individual (from population 2 in the first case, from population 1 in the second case) was unable
to defeat an opponent that could be defeated by its ancestor. Such breakdowns may be very
short events, indicating a prompt recovery. Alternatively they may result in a long-term loss,
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or even permanent loss of the capacity to defeat some particular individuals.
Let us take the example of the first horizontal stripe of lighter marks, at rows 9-11. These
rows correspond to particularly fit individuals which are able to defeat a large number of oppo-
nents (all of them for row 11). In particular, they have no difficulty defeating the champions of
generations 12 to 18 in population 1, as can be seen from the fact that their rows are void of
dark marks in the section between columns 12 and 18.
Yet the same graph shows that, from generation 12 onwards, the first bisectant encounters a
series of dark marks, indicating superiority of the champions of population 1. This indicates that
by generation 12, the current champion of population 2 had become unable to defeat individuals
that earlier ancestors could defeat. How did this come to be? If the champion of population 2
at generation 11 was good enough to defeat all opponents that population 1 would ever come
up with, why was it displaced with one that would prove to be inferior?
Causes for breakdowns in arms races: This alternation between a lighter stripe and a sudden
block of dark marks indicates a dramatic example of a breakdown in the arms race. In this
particular case, the cause can be identified as over-specialisation. While it is true that the
champion of generation 12 in population 2 was potentially able to defeat a large number of
opponents, population 2 managed to come up with a new individual which was even better
(that is obtained a lower differential distance to the cube) against the current champion of
population 1. Unfortunately this change, while beneficial in the short term, proved fatal when
population 1 managed to evolve a counter-strategy which defeated this specialised opponent.
This allowed the newly evolved type of individual in population 1 to take the lead, even though
previous champions from population 2 would have been able to defeat it.
Figure 6.2-right shows the results of a different run. This figure exemplifies several other
informative patterns. In particular, let us look at the centre of the matrix, at row and column 25.
At that point, we see that the first bisectant encounters a kind of wedge, composed of two stripes
of dark marks - one vertical, one horizontal. Can we infer some meaning from this pattern? The
wedge shape indicates that a successful change in population 1 (indicated by the appearance of a
different competitive profile, leading to a distinct, darker series of columns) has led to a dramatic
breakdown in the arms race on the side of population 2. The appearance of this new champion
in population 1 has upset the hierarchy in population 2: the previous champion was no longer
the best possible candidate against this new opponent. Confronted with the new, successful
champion of population 1, population 2 has settled on a new champion, which happened to
perform better, or at least less badly, than others against this particular new opponent (though
not well enough to actually defeat it). This new “champion of fortune”, however, was not
particularly well-rounded and performed badly against a large range of opponents. Innovation
in population 1 has caused a confusion in population 2.
This idea of new individuals breaking down the arms race by upsetting the hierarchy and
voiding previous adaptations in their opponents is not necessarily linked to wedge-like patterns,
but simply to the appearance of a new type of opposing champions. For example, Figure 6.2-
left contains several dark horizontal lines, apparently isolated. In particular, the individual
in row 31 indicates that this champion suddenly lost much of its ancestors’ aptitudes against
opposing champions. What is the cause of this loss? If we track the point at which this new,
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poorly performing champion occurs (by locating its intersection with the first bisectant) and
observe the corresponding column, we notice that the individual from population 1 at column
31 has a subtly different pattern from its predecessors. The poor performance of population 2
at generation 31 is thus caused by the emergence of a new opponent which upsets the hierarchy
in population 2 and propels an apparently poor individual to the rank of “champion”.
These interruptions in the arms race (temporary or long-term) that can be observed on the
coarse-grained Master Tournament matrix are an indication of the local nature of co-evolution.
Because co-evolution is only concerned about the immediate present, it may directly induce a
loss of ability against past or future opponents. This loss may occur spontaneously (as in over-
specialisation) or may be provoked by a change in the opposing population (as in “confusion”).
6.5 From historical to global progress: Cross-validation of co-
evolutionary runs
Master Tournament matrices and summary graphs are a powerful method for analysing the
historical behaviour of coevolutionary processes. However, as we saw, we cannot use them to
reliably assess any global progress, even though the latter usually constitutes the true objective
of coevolutionary optimisation. It would be desirable to possess a method that allows us to
detect global (rather than just historical) progress, while still being able to perform historical
comparison between successive generations.
A simple generalisation of the Master Tournament method is to include other opponents
taken from other evolutionary runs than the one to which the evaluated population belongs.
Because opponents from different runs do not coevolve together, they do not influence each
other’s evolution, and therefore offer test elements distinct from the training set. In other
words, we use individuals from different runs to cross-validate each other, expecting that this
would provide more reliable information about their global efficiency. Thus, by evaluating the
successive champions of a given run against a set of champions from different runs, we can
actually obtain a valuable estimation of global progress. The reliability of this estimation is of
course directly related to the number of other individuals against which this cross-validation is
performed.
The basic principle of cross-validation is to pick N runs, and test each successive champion
of each population against all champions of all other populations. Clearly this imposes a much
higher evaluation cost. In fact, for N runs, and sampling k successive champions per run, the
cost grows with (kN)2/2. This quadratic cost can quickly become unacceptable. Fortunately,
we can still gain valuable information from very low values of N . We will now demonstrate this
by applying 2-runs cross-validation to the same evolutionary runs described in previous sections.
Figure 6.3 shows, for each champion of all 50 generations in each population, the number
of champions of all other opposing populations that it is able to defeat. 13-A and 13-B are
population 1 and 2 from the left-hand side matrix in Fig. 6.2, while 3-A and 3-B are population
1 and 2 from the right-hand side matrix. This graph is interesting both for its similarities and
its difference with the individual Master Tournament matrices in Figure 6.2.
Within this larger context, the best performing individuals are the champions of generations
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Figure 6.3: Cross-validation of each individual in each of the four populations shown in Fig. 6.2.
13-A and 13-B are population 1 and 2 from the left-hand side matrix, while 3-A and 3-B are
population 1 and 2 from the right-hand side matrix in Fig. 6.2.
34 and 36 from population 13-B, with a score coming close to the maximum 150, meaning that
they can defeat almost all other champions. Looking at the corresponding rows in Fig. 6.2, we
observe that they indeed obtain ‘clean sheets’ against all their opponents. However, this is also
the case with rows 11 and 28-30, yet these ones obtain a much lower score on the cross-validation
graph. This indicates a difference in performance that could not have been deduced from Master
Tournament (coarse-grained or not) or Dominance Tournament analysis, nor indeed from any
single-record analysis method alone.
Similarly, we see that population 3-A seems to perform rather poorly when compared to
others. Specifically, after generation 10, all champions of population 3-A obtain much lower
performance that champions in population 13-A. This is in contrast with the corresponding
Master Tournament matrices, in which it can be seen that some champions of population 3-A
are able to defeat all opposing champions from population 3-B (columns 25-26 and 33), while no
champion in population 13-A shows such a perfect record. Again, a single-record analysis could
not have detected this apparent superior performance of individuals from population 13-A.
6.6 Equal-effort performance comparisons between algorithms
and methods
6.6.1 How to compare algorithms?
In the previous sections we described various techniques to evaluate progress (whether historical
or global) in the trajectory of a coevolutionary process. Here we seek to address a different issue,
namely that of comparing the efficiency of different algorithms and methods for coevolutionary
optimisation. The question here is not: “do later individuals perform better than early ones”,
but rather: “does algorithm/method A create better individuals, for a given computational
effort, than algorithm/method B?”
In section 6.2.4 we mentioned a simple way to compare the efficiency of two methods, that
is, simply pitting all champions generated by one method against those generated by the other,
and count the number of victories for each. However, we noted that this method provides rather
58
crude information, and may even be misleading under certain conditions.
Here we introduce a different method, that we will use extensively in the next section. This
method simply consists in opposing individuals generated by different algorithms (in many dif-
ferent runs), with the restriction that all competitions should only oppose individuals generated
after equivalent computational effort - that is, after the same total number of competitions have
been performed.
More precisely, the procedure for equal-effort comparison is as follows:
1. Take several runs generated by two algorithms or methods A and B.
2. For each run, pick the current champions of this run after successive multiples of a certain
number of evaluations have been performed; that is, pick the current champion of the
run after i ∗K evaluations have been performed, for a certain pre-defined value of K and
successive values of i ∈ [1, N ]. This provides a sample of N “evenly spaced” champions
for each run.
3. For each rank i ∈ [1, N ], oppose the ith champion of each population generated by algo-
rithm A against the ith champions of all populations generated by algorithm B. Count
the total number of victories for champions generated by either algorithm. The resulting
values indicates the relative efficiency of each algorithm after iK evaluations have been
performed.
Here we associate computational effort with number of competitions, because we assume that
both algorithms being compared use the same task and the same parameters for each competi-
tion; therefore, competition time is independent of the algorithm being used. In more complex
situations (for example if we want to compare vastly different methods which use incomparable
evaluation processes), we may use elapsed time directly, but this requires a guarantee that both
methods are run on similar machines with similar loads, etc.
Note that equal-effort comparisons provide a “real-time” picture of the relative performance
between the two algorithms: we can track the relative performance of each algorithm over time,
and identify periods over which either of them is superior. As we will see, some methods may
prove superior in the early stages, and then be overcome as the process goes on.
In the next chapter we will use equal-effort comparisons to assess the effects of increasing
the number of competitions per evaluation, as well as of “sliding archives”. This application will
provide an illustration of how equal-effort comparisons can be used in practice.
6.7 Conclusion
It has long been recognised that the subtle dynamics of coevolution require specific methods of
analysis and evaluation. Existing methods tend to focus on historical progress, providing little
information about the more desirable property of global progress. Equipped with a consistent
notion of “progress” and with a clear distinction between historical and global progress, we can
refine our understanding of existing tools and design new ones, with a clearer picture of their
respective properties. In this section we have mainly introduced:
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1. Coarse-grained Master Tournament matrices, which provide not only an obvious gain in
computational costs, but also improved readability.
2. Cross-validation (multi-run Master Tournaments), which extend Master Tournaments to
include information about global progress. As a result, these methods provide information
that cannot be obtained from standard Master Tournaments alone.
3. Equal-effort comparison, a practical method to evaluate the relative performance of two
different algorithms or methods, and track variations in relative performance over time.
In the next chapters we will make use of some of these methods to gain information about
the properties of various algorithms.
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Chapter 7
Application: Evaluation of extended
LEO and archive methods
7.1 How many competitions is enough?
It is impractical to use many competitions to evaluate artificial creatures. This is mostly due to
the obvious computational costs of 3D physical simulations. Typically, using recent machines,
a 200000-competitions run takes more than ten days. Faced with such constraints, frugality in
the evaluation process is clearly paramount.
However, many methods in coevolution require high numbers of competitions. For example,
Rosin and Belew [151] use hundreds of competitions to evaluate any single individual. Stanley
and Miikkulainen [170] use twelve competitions (each consisting of two contests) to evaluate an
individual. While this is clearly less than an “all-against-all” evaluation method (where every
individual competes against every other individual within the population), the computational
cost for any single evaluation is still high. The problem is even more acute in theoretical
algorithms which focus on specific properties rather than sheer efficiency, such as MAXSOLVE
[94] and the IPCA [43] (see Section 3.5, note 9).
The intuitive justification for using many competitions is that any single competition tells
us little about the (global) performance of an individual. Pitting an individual A against an
opponent B will only tell us whether A defeats B or vice-versa; it brings no direct information
as to how either A or B would compete against any other individual. However, if we pit both A
and B against many opponents, and A turns out to defeat significantly more of them than B,
then (provided the fitness landscape is not utterly chaotic) we may begin to suspect that A is
indeed superior to B in a global sense. The more competitions we use, the more we can justify
this extrapolation. But how much more?
In this chapter we take the approach of enriching Sims’ original algorithm, which Cliff and
Miller [32] have since called the Last Elite Opponent (LEO) algorithm. As previously mentioned,
this algorithm only requires one competition (against the champion opponent of the previous
generation) to evaluate an individual. We will extend it by increasing the number of champions
used at every generation, as well as by using a small “sliding” archive, in the manner of Nolfi &
Floreano [133]. We will then use the method of equal-effort comparison (introduced in Chapter
6) to evaluate the effect of these additions. Thus this chapter provides both an informative
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comparison between various algorithms, and an illustration of the usefulness of equal-effort
comparisons.
7.2 Experiments and results
7.2.1 N-LEO: Extending Sims’ algorithm
Let us recapitulate the mechanism of Sims’ LEO algorithm[162]: at every generation, each
individual from population A is pitted against the current champion of population B. The
resulting score is used as a fitness value for selection and reproduction among individuals from
population A; it is also used to choose a new champion for population A (the individual from
A which obtained the best score against the current champion of B). Then the same process is
applied to population B, using the new champion of population A for evaluation, etc.
The obvious extension of using several champions at each generation immediately suggests
itself.1 In this N-LEO algorithm, at every generation, each individual from population A is
pitted against the N current champions of population B. individuals from A are then sorted
according to their average score against all N opposing champions. The N individuals with the
highest average scores are selected as the new champions of population A. The same cycle is
applied to population B, then again to population A, etc.
7.2.2 Details of equal-effort comparisons
Using equal-effort comparison, we can measure the effect of increasing the number of champions
N. To compare two versions of the algorithm (based on two different values of N), we first
generate a certain number R of runs with each version. Then, for each run, we pick the current
absolute champions in this run after multiples of a certain number of competitions have been
performed - that is, the current absolute champions of this run after k, 2k, 3k, etc. competitions
have been performed (for a pre-defined value of k). This provides us with a sample of n “regularly
spaced” champions for population of each run.
We then pit each sampled champion against all champions of equal rank (i.e. obtained after
equal number of competitions) generated by the other algorithm. Because each run contains two
populations, at each rank, this results in 2R2 competitions2 We then simply count the number
of victories for each algorithm at every rank. This provides a picture of which algorithm is more
efficient after k, 2k, 3k. . . evaluations.
In this chapter, for all experiments, 14 runs are generated for each algorithm. The value of
14 is an arbitrary choice based on practical considerations and on hardware resources. Each run
is allowed to reach 200000 competitions, and 50 champions are sampled from each population of
each run (thus selecting the current champions after 4000, 8000, 16000, etc. competitions have
been performed.) At each rank, we therefore perform 2 ∗ 14 ∗ 14 = 392 competitions.
1Such a process is indirectly hinted at by Rosin and Belew [151, sec. 3.2], but is not used by them (or indeed
by anybody else that we know of.)
2Each species of each run is arbitrarily labelled A or B, and competitions are only performed between members
of A and B species. A full, all-against-all tournament would result in 4R2 competitions for each rank.
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7.2.3 Results
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 describe the result of equal-effort comparisons between various instances of
the N-LEO, using successive values of N. The 1-LEO is simply Sims’ original LEO algorithm.
The first result of these graphs is that the N-LEO does indeed provide a gain in performance
against Sims’ original LEO algorithm. This is confirmed by the difference in performance be-
tween the 1-LEO and both the 2-LEO and 3-LEO algorithms. Similarly, the 3-LEO improves
upon the 2-LEO, as indicated both by their direct comparison and by comparing their results
against the 1-LEO. In particular, the long-term difference between 3-LEO and 1-LEO is found
significant at p < 0.013. The difference between 2-LEO and 4-LEO falls just short of significance
at p < 0.064 (see the Appendix of this chapter for details about the calculation of significance).
However, if we increase N beyond 3, things become less clear-cut. At N=4, it appears that the
4-LEO is initially less efficient than the 3-LEO, but catches up quickly; the long-term difference
is not found to be significant (p < 0.463). Increasing N further does not seem to bring any
significant advantage. In fact, if anything, the 6-LEO appears slightly inferior to the 4-LEO,
though the long-term difference was not found to be significant (p < 0.136).
In short, it appears that using more than one champion significantly increase performance,
but that this increases quickly reaches a plateau between 3 and 4 champions. Further increases
in the number of champions do not bring any improvement, and might actually decrease perfor-
mance.
7.3 Sliding archives
In this section we seek to quantify the advantage (if any) of using an archive. As has been
mentioned, archives are a popular device used to enforce progress in coevolution, though as
Nolfi & Floreano (and others) reported, they may have the opposite result. We explained this
fact by pointing that what archives enforce is historical progress, which does not imply global
progress.
Here we will consider what we call a “sliding” archive, a mechanism introduced by Nolfi &
Floreano [133]. For each population, we maintain a sliding archive that retains the absolute
champions of this population for the 15 previous generations. This archive is updated at every
generation. To evaluate individuals of a given population, we pit them against the current cham-
pion of the opposing population, and against a certain number K of opponents, randomly picked
within this archive of the 15 previous champions. In other words, the algorithm corresponds to
a 1-LEO, augmented with K opponents randomly picked from the sliding archive. Thus, every
individual undergoes 1+K competitions for each evaluation. Of course, the process could be
extended to including more current champions, resulting in N +K evaluations, but this will not
be discussed here. Rather, we will only consider 1+2 and 1+3 processes (1 current champion,
plus 2 or 3 from the archive), due to the fact that the 3-LEO and the 4-LEO seemed to bring
optimal results in the previous section.
Figure 7.3 provides the results of equal-effort comparisons between the 3-LEO, the 4-LEO,
and (1+2) and (1+3) sliding archives. These graphs indicate that the sliding archive provides
an advantage in the long run, though not in the short term. First, the (1+3) is significantly
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Figure 7.1: Results of equal-effort comparisons between various instances of the N-LEO. 50
champions are sampled every 4000 evaluations, for a total of 200000 evaluations per run. While
392 competitions are performed at each rank, the number of victories for each algorithm at each
rank do not sum up to 392 due to the widespread occurrence of draws (usually when fighters
avoid each other and no contact occurs.)
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Figure 7.2: Continuation of Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.3: Results of equal-effort comparisons between the 3-LEO, the 4-LEO, and (1+2) and
(1+3) sliding archives. Note the clear superiority, at least in the long run, of the 1+3 archive
process (1 current champion, 3 from the sliding archive.)
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superior to the 3-LEO (p < 0.032). There is also indirect evidence that the (1+3) process may
be superior to the 4-LEO in the long run; this evidence is indirect because the small, apparent
long-term difference between (1+3) and 4-LEO was not found to be significant (p < 0.194).
However, the possible superiority of the (1+3) archive process over the 4-LEO is supported by
the fact that the (1+3) process does obtain a significant advantage over the 3-LEO, whereas the
4-LEO did not (as observed in the previous section).
In the very short term, sliding archives actually seem to fare worse than simple N-LEO
methods; this is compounded by the similar effect caused by increasing the raw number of
competitions (observed in the previous section), as demonstrated by the comparison between
the 3-LEO and the (1+2) sliding archive.
7.4 Conclusion
These results support three conclusions:
• Using several champions rather than just one significantly improves the performance of
the algorithm.
• The benefits of increasing the number of champions peaks early between N=3 and N=4,
with the latter being more efficient in the long run at the cost of a performance hit in the
short term.
• Using a sliding archive improves the performance in the long run, especially when using
4 (1 current + 3 archive) champions. In the long run, this latter method is the best of
all considered methods. However, in the short term, the archive does bring a performance
hit.
The first result is clearly not surprising. By increasing the number of opponents used for
each evaluation, we expect that the reliability of these evaluations will increase. However, the
fact that this improvement seems to peak at N=3-4 deserves attention. This result suggests that
large numbers of competitions are not necessary to obtain reliable evaluation. This is in contrast
with many coevolutionary methods that require large numbers of competitions. The positive
results (in the long run) of using a sliding archive validate the use of this method, though the
short-term performance hit also deserves attention.
Whether these conclusions are specific to our particular domain (physical combat between
virtual creatures) or hold over a wide class of problems can only be ascertained through further
experiments. However, due to the rich possibilities offered by physical combat, we suspect that
similar results would be found for many other non-trivial domains.
Appendix: tests of statistical significance
Information from graphical methods is only useful if it can be confirmed with formal significance
testing. To test the significance of our data, we applied the following method. Recall that for
each experiment, our data consisted of 14 runs of each algorithm (let us call these algorithms I
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and II), each run involving two populations arbitrarily labelled A and B. First, we arbitrarily
match runs of both algorithms in pairs: to each run of one algorithm, we randomly associate
one unique run of the other algorithm. This gives us 14 pairs of runs, each pair containing one
unique run from algorithm I and one unique run from algorithm II. The purpose of this pairing
is to obtain independent samples.
Then, for each such pair, we pit the current A-champion of each algorithm against the current
B-champion of the other, after every multiple of 4000 evaluations. Thus, after every multiple
of 4000 evaluations, we have two contests per pair of runs (AI vs. BII , and AII vs. BI). Note
that this data was already collected during equal-effort comparison.
Importantly, we only consider the information obtained in the second half of all runs (that is,
after 100000 evaluations have been performed), since we are interested in the long-run behaviour
of algorithms.
Then, for each pair, we simply add up the number of victories obtained by either algorithm,
from 100000 evaluations onwards. This gives us 14 pairs of victory counts. We perform a two-
tailed Wilcoxon Matched-Pair Signed Rank test using these 14 pairs of values. The resulting
value of p is used to assess the significance of the difference, as reported in the text.
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Chapter 8
The relationship between evolution
and complexity
8.1 Introduction: the “Arrow of Complexity” hypothesis
It appears that the maximum level of organismal complexity in the biosphere has increased, in
some sense and at a certain scale, over time. Bacteria are simpler than humans, if only because
humans contain millions of (interacting) cells, each much more complex than bacteria. Sponges
are simpler than flatworms, which are simpler than trilobites, which are simpler than birds.
This crude, large-scale growth of the maximum of complexity seems to hold for any notion of
organismal complexity which we know of (and as we will see there are quite a few of them). To
our knowledge, no serious author has explicitly denied an overall increase in the maximum of
complexity at a global scale, though some have urged caution [117]. At a slightly lower level,
there is some evidence that the maximum number of cell types (a common measure of organismal
complexity) has increased over time within metazoans [19, 178].
Faced with such a remarkable increase in complexity, some authors have suggested a fun-
damental tendency of evolution to create more and more complexity. This position actually
predates Darwin, being found in Lamarck. One variant of this notion is the “Arrow of Com-
plexity” hypothesis [12]:
. . . the hypothesis of the arrow of complexity asserts that the complex functional
organization of the most complex products of open-ended evolutionary systems has
a general tendency to increase with time.
It turns out that this apparently straightforward statement has generated significant amounts
of confusion and misunderstandings. We need not go very far to find one example: in the same
article, the author goes on to express that this hypothesis is not accepted by Gould[71], Maynard
Smith and Szathma´ry[165] and McShea [117]. Yet these authors, and those works, do not deny
that the complexity of the most complex organism increases in evolution. At most, McShea
This chapter is based on a paper that has been accepted for publication in a special issue of the Artificial Life
journal on the evolution of complexity. It benefited greatly from the comments of several anonymous reviewers.
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professes “emphatic agnosticism”. Gould, however, writes (p. 169): “I do not challenge the
statement that the most complex creature has tended to increase in elaboration through time”
- an almost verbatim statement of the arrow of complexity hypothesis1. As for Maynard Smith
and Szathma´ry, their book is a description of several successive “major transitions” in the
history of evolution, many of which can reasonably be interpreted as increases in complexity
(more precisely hierarchical complexity[117]).
How can such confusion arise? The crux of the matter, of course, is that while nobody
seems to utterly deny the fact that maximum complexity has increased over the entire course
of evolution, there is much debate regarding the interpretation of this fact: as we will see,
what these authors explicitly question is not that increasingly complex individuals are found
in Nature, but rather the notion of an built-in evolutionary drive, or bias, towards increased
complexity in evolution.
It is one of the achievements of recent evolutionary theory to have shown that this controversy
results in no small part from a conjunction of misunderstandings. The crux of the matter is
that the question of whether ‘there is a tendency for complexity to increase in evolution’ is an
extremely ambiguous question. This is because almost every word in it can be understood in
many different ways, leading to much unnecessary confusion. When fuller attention is given to
details (and to the implicit assumptions which may lurk behind apparently innocuous terms),
it is realised that the sustained growth of maximum or average complexity does not necessarily
imply a pervasive bias towards complexity in evolution.
8.2 What is complexity?
8.2.1 Descriptive and functional complexity
If we are to study the relationship between evolution and complexity, we need to explain what
we call “complexity” in the first place, if only to avoid unnecessary confusion. It turns out that
definitions and measures of complexity abound throughout the literature (for a broad panorama
see [50, 117, 2]). We will concentrate specifically on two notions of complexity, which we believe
are of particular interest when discussing the effects of Darwinian evolution: descriptive (or
morphological) complexity, and functional complexity.2
Descriptive or morphological complexity is easily defined: it is the amount of information
that is necessary to describe an object. In the words of Dawkins [40]: “A crab is morphologically
more complex than a millipede because, if you wrote a pair of books describing each animal down
to the same level of detail, the crab book would have a higher word-count than the millipede
book. The millipede book would describe a typical segment then simply add that, with listed
exceptions, the other segments are the same. The crab book would require a separate chapter
1In a different, related piece [69], Gould writes: “No one can doubt that more complex creatures arose se-
quentially after this prokaryotic beginning - first eukaryotic cells, perhaps about two billion years ago, then
multicellular animals about 600 million years ago, with a relay of highest complexity among animals passing from
invertebrates, to marine vertebrates and, finally (if we wish, albeit parochially, to honor neural architecture as a
primary criterion), to reptiles, mammals and humans.”
2Adami and colleagues [3, 2] have introduced a specific concept called “physical complexity”. They claim that
this notion of complexity “is forced to increase” in evolution. However, physical complexity is quite distinct from
the everyday concept of complexity. See Appendix F for details.
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for each segment and would therefore have a higher information content.” However, very much
in the same way as with Shannon entropy (another measure of information content), it turns
out to be maximal for completely disordered objects. A pile of rubble consists of many more
parts, each much more different from any other, than a standing wall of bricks, so its descriptive
complexity would be higher.
What about functional complexity? We choose to simply define functional complexity as the
descriptive complexity of a functional system. A ‘system’ is any set of interacting parts. We
call it ‘functional’ if the interaction of the parts produces a certain external result, which would
not be obtained if some (or any) of the parts failed to behave just as it does. Note that the
result must come from the actual interaction of active parts, not just from their mere existence.
Functional complexity is simply descriptive complexity applied to any such functional system,
that is, a growing function of the number of parts and of their mutual differences.
While we admit that this is a rather crude definition, we believe that it does capture much
of the intuitive notion of functional complexity within a system. In particular, it does retain
the idea of ‘difficulty’ (in a design sense), or ‘improbability’, which we associate with highly
complex biological features: clearly a certain system which depends on the precise behaviour
of many parts is somehow more improbable or surprising than one which only depends on the
collaboration of a few. Similarly, it stands to reason that systems relying on the interactions of
many similar parts are somehow easier to arrive at than systems relying on the precise features
of many differentiated parts.
This notion of functional complexity may be contrasted with that of Heylighen [79], which
emphasises the joint occurrence of separation and interconnection; or to that of Dawkins [39],
which stresses the improbability of the result (rather than the ‘emerging improbability’ resulting
from the highly constrained interactions of many parts). For example, in our view, ‘Rube
Goldberg’ contraptions (phantasmagoric constructions in which highly intricate machinery is
used to obtain trivial results) would be regarded as functionally complex, whereas Dawkins’
view would regard them as comparatively non-complex, due to their underwhelming output.
‘Functional complexity’, in our sense, is more about the functioning than the function being
performed.
8.2.2 Implications of the definitions
With this notion of functional complexity in mind, we can already make a few inferences. The
most important one is that adaptive functional complex systems are rare in the space of all
possible systems. Any given set of parts is unlikely to be actually performing any meaningful
function, let alone an adaptive one. This unlikeliness increases with the descriptive complexity
of the system: the more parts there are, the more improbable it is that they will harmoniously
cooperate (a requirement for functional complexity). This is important, because it implies that
generating random systems would be a very inefficient way to come up with adaptive complex
systems, while other search methods (such as Darwinian evolution) might, under the right
conditions, prove more successful.
Another observation is that although adaptive functional complexity is rare in the space
of all systems, it comes in ‘loose clusters’: coming up with a new, more complex, yet still
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successful design is typically much easier if we use an already complex, successful design as a
starting point. More precisely, slightly altering a successful complex system has a higher chance
of yielding another system of equivalent or higher complexity than random search. If we have
access to the mechanism of a working clock, random alterations to this existing mechanism
are much more likely to result into other working clocks than random assemblages of gears.
Importantly, this is not a logical necessity; rather, it is a reasonable inference which we may
assume holds for many system spaces.
8.3 What is a tendency?
While having a working notion of complexity is important, it appears that much of the confusion
actually derives from the notion of tendency. What do we mean when we say that the maximum
or average complexity “tends” to increase in evolution?
8.3.1 Trends, passive trends and driven trends
McShea [116, 117, 119] has devoted much work to the conceptual clarification of trends and
mechanisms in evolution. The most widely known result of this work is probably the operative
distinction between passive and driven trends. A trend is any sustained directional change
in a summary statistic of a certain quantity (such as maximum or average size, complexity,
etc.) within a particular clade. Such a trend is called driven if it can be shown to result from
a pervasive, consistent bias, applying to all sub-clades; for example, if speciation or extinction
events are consistently biased towards higher values of the quantity. Passive trends, on the other
hand, are those which occur mechanically in globally unbiased processes, possibly constrained
by a local inhomogeneity - for example, a ‘hard’ boundary which the value cannot cross. Figure
8.1 illustrates this distinction graphically.
Figure 8.1: Passive and driven trends. In both of these graphs, the maximum and the average
increase sustainedly through times, creating a trend. In the left-hand graph, these trends are
passive: the branching process is not biased towards higher or lower values. A trend in the
maximum emerges mechanically by envelope expansion. A trend in the average also emerges,
because the process is constrained by a ‘hard’ lower bound which cannot be crossed. Both trends,
resulting from a globally unbiased process, are passive. In the right-hand graph, however, the
trends of increase in the average and the maximum are driven: the underlying branching process
is clearly biased towards higher values.
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It is important to note that passive trends may well be enforced by active, external forces,
such as natural selection. For example, we might have a situation where no member of a certain
clade is selectively viable under a certain size, or complexity level. In this case, provided there
is no constraint on the maximum, the average would mechanically grow over time.
Furthermore, even in a globally passive trend, the small-scale behaviour of each individual
lineage may well be everywhere governed by a local, driven trend - as long as these many local
trends do not exhibit any consistent global direction. In other words, passive trends may well
be everywhere driven3 [116, p.1751]. Conversely, non-selective forces may enforce driven trends.
Thus the important distinction between passive and driven trends does not lie in the source
or mechanism of the bias which creates this trend, but solely on whether this bias is local or
pervasive, respectively, throughout the space explored by the clade [119].
8.3.2 Benefits of the terminology
This sound terminology goes a long way to identify (and prevent) possible sources of misun-
derstandings. Restated in McShea’s terminology, the “arrow of complexity” hypothesis simply
states that evolution spontaneously generates a trend of increase in the maximum of organismal
complexity over time. It is silent on the question of whether this trend is driven (the result of
a pervasive bias in Darwinian evolution towards higher complexity) or passive (the result of a
direction-blind branching process, mechanically pushing the external envelope).
We can now see where much of the controversy arises: what some authors (especially Gould
[71]) reject is not the existence of the trend, but the idea that it should necessarily be driven,
rather than passive. This, in turn, seems to be misconstrued by others as denying the existence
of the trend itself, or the role of evolution in its emergence: the implicit assumption is that any
trend must of necessity be driven, and therefore, that denying bias is tantamount to rejecting the
trend itself. This seems to explain why Gould, for example, is portrayed as a “skeptic” regarding
the existence of a trend [12], or even as denying that “complexity increases in evolution” [2].
Gould, as we saw, certainly agreed that complexity increases in evolution: what he rejected
was the idea of a general, pervasive bias or drive towards complexity. This illustrates the high
potential for confusion that lies behind such deceptively straightforward terms as ‘trend’ and
‘tendency’.
8.4 Reformulating the question
Using McShea’s terminology, we can now reframe our previously ambiguous question in a more
satisfying manner. We admit that, at a sufficiently large scale, there has been a trend of
increasing complexity in evolution: there has (so far) been an “arrow of complexity” from
exclusively simple forms to a variety of simple and complex forms. This point is uncontroversial
and widely accepted, though appropriate caution is necessary [117]. We are now left with two
3This point deserves particular attention: in everyday language, the words “passive” and “driven” seem to
be mutually exclusive. But in McShea’s terminology, a trend is passive if it is globally unbiased, which does not
imply that its local behaviour at any point must be: even in a globally unbiased (passive) branching process, each
particular branch may well be strongly biased (driven) in its own local direction. Any overall trend will still be
called passive if the many local biases are not correlated, resulting in a globally unbiased process.
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questions:
1. Has this trend been driven (whether by selection or by some other mechanism), or passive?
Is there a built-in bias in evolution to push average or maximum complexity preferentially
upward, in general?
2. What is the role of the evolutionary mechanism in the emergence of this trend? What are
the necessary conditions for the arrow of complexity to arise in Darwinian evolution?
The following sections will address both questions in turn.
8.5 Theoretical justifications for a driven complexity growth
It is interesting that, independently of the evidence for or against a general, driven trend of
increasing complexity in evolution, several theoretical justifications have been suggested for
such a driven trend. We will discuss a few typical examples.
8.5.1 The “complexity advantage” assumption
An apparently common (though often implicit) viewpoint is that functional complexity should be
favoured by selection, in general, because living organisms can generally be made more efficient
by increasing their functional complexity. A statement of this position is apparently offered by
Darwin himself, in the crucial fourth chapter of the Origins of Species [34] (quoted with this
intent by Rosslenbroich [153]):
If we take as the standard of high organisation, the amount of differentiation and
specialisation of the several organs in each being when adult . . . , natural selection
clearly leads towards this standard: for all physiologists admit that the specialisa-
tion of organs, inasmuch as in this state they perform their functions better, is an
advantage to each being; and hence the accumulation of variations tending towards
specialisation is within the scope of natural selection.
However, the continuation of this passage (not quoted by Rosslenbroich) paints an altogether
different picture:
On the other hand, we can see . . . that it is quite possible for natural selection
gradually to fit a being to a situation in which several organs would be superfluous
or useless: in such cases there would be retrogression in the scale of organisation. . .
But it may be objected that if all organic beings thus tend to rise in the scale, how is
it that throughout the world a multitude of the lowest forms still exist; and how is it
that in each great class some forms are far more highly developed than others? Why
have not the more highly developed forms everywhere supplanted and exterminated
the lower? . . . On our theory the continued existence of lowly organisms offers no
difficulty; for natural selection, or the survival of the fittest, does not necessarily
include progressive development - it only takes advantage of such variations as arise
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and are beneficial to each creature under its complex relations of life. And it may be
asked what advantage, as far as we can see, would it be to an infusorian animalcule -
to an intestinal worm - or even to an earthworm, to be highly organised. If it were no
advantage, these forms would be left, by natural selection, unimproved or but little
improved, and might remain for indefinite ages in their present lowly condition. And
geology tells us that some of the lowest forms, as the infusoria and rhizopods, have
remained for an enormous period in nearly their present state.
To the na¨ıve view that natural selection spontaneously leads to complexification, Darwin
opposes a more neutral notion of evolutionary progress, according to which species simply adapt
to their own particular conditions. This may, or may not, lead to increases (or decreases) in
complexity over time. In other words, the flaw of the ‘complexity advantage’ assumption is that,
while it rightly recognises the possible advantages of complexity, it fails to consider the possible
advantages of simplicity. The world is sufficiently complex that there is an almost infinite
number of ways to ‘earn a living’, and on the whole, evolving lineages may just as readily gain
advantage through simplicity as through complexity.
8.5.2 Modern endorsements of the “complexity advantage” assumption
Despite Darwin’s own objections, several authors have used the complexity advantage assump-
tion as an implicit justification for the idea that Darwinian evolution by natural selection entails
a drive towards complexity.
Coevolution and “arms races”
One way in which evolution is sometimes said to favour the increase of complexity is through
coevolution between lineages which must adapt to each other’s evolving features. As seen in
chapter 3, this is expected to lead to an “arms race”[41], in which coevolving lineages should
come up with more and more adaptive features to defeat each other. Let us recall Rosin and
Belew’s summary of the argument [151]:
When the parasites evolve to overcome this failure [against the hosts], they create
new challenges for the hosts; the continuation of this may lead to an evolutionary
“arms race” [39]. New genotypes arise to defeat old ones. New parasite types should
serve as a drive toward further innovation, creating ever-greater levels of complexity
and performance by forcing hosts to respond to a wider range of more challenging
parasite test cases.
It is interesting that these authors, like several others, cite Dawkins as a source. Dawkins,
co-author of the original “arms race” hypothesis, has explicitly and emphatically denied that
the progress brought about by arms race was intrinsically linked with complexification - as we
shall see in section 8.5.4.
But at any rate, the problem with this position is easily identified: it implicitly assumes that
the most straightforward way to cope with an opponent’s increase in complexity is a correspond-
ing, ‘countering’ increase in complexity. In other words, complexity calls for complexity, because
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only complexity can cope with complexity. Unfortunately, as many practitioners of artificial co-
evolution (including Rosin and Belew themselves) have remarked [183, 55, 125], the opposite is
often true: simplicity is often quite efficient at dealing with complexity, with devastating effects.
The most obvious example is the phenomenon of opportunism, or parasitism, whereby promis-
ing complex organisms are systematically defeated by simplistic opponents which successfully
exploit some of their ‘weak points’ (what Watson and Pollack call “focusing on the wrong thing”
[183]). We may also mention “mediocre stable states” [55] (also called “collusion” [142] or “im-
mature inductions” [6]), where competitors remain stuck in a small, uninteresting section of the
search space from which none has any incentive to budge - the coevolutionary equivalent of a
local optimum. As a special case of the latter, we may mention the possibility of cycles [133],
in which competitors cycle through a short, predictable sequence of simple behaviours without
any long-term gain in general performance or complexity4.
In general, these problems can be summarised by this simple observation: evolution is inter-
ested in immediate advantage, rather than in complexity or generality, and there seems to be no
general relationship between the two: to reliably obtain the latter, one must forcefully connects
it to the former by means of algorithmic contrivance [133, 151, 170, 162, 125].
To be sure, there are many examples of specific situations where certain coevolutionary
pressures have clearly driven increases in complexity; some will be discussed in section 8.6.
What must be doubted is not the existence of coevolutionary-driven increases in complexity,
but the fact that these should be a general rule rather than interesting specific cases.
A cybernetic argument for the complexity advantage
Heylighen [79] uses a cybernetic argument to justify the complexity advantage assumption. In
short, natural selection should favour organisms which are able to cope with a larger variety of
perturbations; but, by application of Ashby’s law (Heylighen argues), this in turn requires higher
‘countering’ variety in the behaviour of these organisms, and thus more functional complexity:
[Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety] states that in order to achieve control, the vari-
ety of actions a control system is able to execute must be at least as great as the
variety of environmental perturbations that need to be compensated. The larger the
variety of available counteractions, the larger the set of disturbances that can be
corrected, and the larger the domain of potential environmental situations in which
the control system can survive. All other things being equal, greater control variety
implies greater fitness. . . Therefore, evolution through natural selection will tend to
increase control, and thus, because of Ashby’s law, internal variety. This can be in-
terpreted as a functional differentiation, i.e. the appearance of more diverse activities
or functions. . .
All other things being equal, a system that can survive situations A, B and C, is
absolutely fitter than a system that can only survive A and B. Such an increase in
absolute fitness is necessarily accompanied by an increase in functional complexity.
Thus, evolution will tend to irreversibly produce increases of functional complexity.
4Interestingly, examples of such coevolutionary cycles have actually been reported in Nature [164].
76
This leads to interesting questions. For example, by any measure of organismal complexity,
beetles are arguably less complex than chimpanzees. Yet there does not seem to be many
“situations” that could be survived by chimpanzees, but not by beetles - as opposed to the
other way round. More generally, it is not immediately clear that more complex individuals can
cope with more environments than simpler individuals.
Quite possibly, the crucial difficulty in this argument is that Ashby’s law applies when one
needs to actively counter certain variations in order to homeostatically control certain variables;
but in Nature, adapting to a change in an external variable does not necessarily entail countering
this change. Evolving lineages may well cut their dependency on certain variables (as in previ-
ously carnivorous lineages turning into herbivores), or simply ignore the variation in question.
To use Heylighen’s own example of “warm-bloodedness,” we note that birds and mammals are
the only surviving lineages of warm-blooded animals: insects, whose range, diversity and total
biomass vastly exceed that of either mammals or birds, have hardly suffered from their lack of
internal temperature control mechanisms. If Nature is any guide, surviving more “situations”
can be obtained by simplicity just as readily as by complexity, which contradicts the premise of
the argument5.
To summarise, it seems that the cybernetic argument, like the arms race argument, attributes
a general advantage to complexity by disregarding the potential advantages of simplicity: it
essentially assumes that only complexity (in the evolving lineage) can deal with complexity (in
the environment).
8.5.3 Cope’s rule and the “size-complexity insight”
Bonner [19] has proposed a way in which natural selection might indirectly drive an increase
in the maximum of complexity. The basis of this argument is Cope’s rule, that is, the gen-
eralisation that there is a tendency for lineages to grow in size over time. Bonner provides a
justification for this rule by pointing out that “there is always room at the top”: “by becoming
larger the organisms enter new size worlds where, among other things they avoid predation and
competition.” Bonner also notices that size is (very roughly) correlated with complexity: on
the whole, larger organisms tend to be more complex. Bonner takes the practical approach to
define complexity as the number of cell types in an organism.
Bonner argues that the relationship between size and complexity is explained by considera-
tions of engineering and efficiency: creating and maintaining a larger body is likely to require
higher division of labour. Thus, a selective drive for size creates an indirect selective drive to-
wards complexity, though Bonner is very clear that this is only one component among many
of selective action on complexity (p. 221). He repeatedly points out that this selection-driven
increase in size and complexity only applies at maximum values: intermediate forms have cer-
tainly been maintained, and “every biological community on the globe today contains a complete
spectrum from the smallest to the largest organism” (p. 221). In addition, Bonner emphasises
that selection for increase and decrease in size and complexity have occurred concomitantly
throughout evolution.
5The author extends the cybernetic argument to coevolutionary situations and arms races, which can be
answered in a similar manner: adapting to an “increase in variety” in a competing species does not entail
matching this variety. Adaptation is simply not a problem of control in Ashby’s sense.
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This argument is not without difficulties. First, it relies on Cope’s rule, which is itself the
subject of recurrent controversy within evolutionary research [89, 5, 67]. But more generally,
the argument does not seem to provide any compelling evidence to show that the observed
trend is indeed driven (biased), rather than passive (diffusive). In fact, the very possibility of
a passive trend is simply not considered at all. It should be pointed out that the book was
written before McShea and Gould began to draw attention to the question of trend mechanisms.
Because the possibility of a passive trend is not considered, the increase in maximum value is
seen as requiring an explanation, a causative force, which happens to be the “room at the top”
principle6.
In fact, with hindsight, the wealth of data and evidence provided by Bonner appears to
be not only compatible, but strikingly suggestive of a passive trend. This applies particularly
to ancestry data taken from the fossil record (such as Fig. 8, 9 in the book), which do not
seem to show any pervasive upward bias, but rather an apparently undirected branching process
constrained by a lower bound. Also Gingerich’s evidence [64, 63], which Bonner discusses several
times (including in the passage quoted above), is suggestive of a passive trend: when no pervasive
bias exists, but rather species evolve both up and down indifferently along the scale and the sole
constraint is a local boundary, we may expect that the overall rate of change will decrease as
we average it over longer periods7
8.5.4 Expert opinion against the complexity advantage assumption
More generally, theoretical justifications of a complexity advantage face a difficulty: the variety
of environments (both biotic and abiotic) faced by evolving lineages, as well as their remarkable
plasticity, implies that at any time there is a very wide range of ways to ‘earn a living’ in Nature.
Optimising the efficiency of a population in its chosen way of life (or, if the opportunity arise,
switching trades altogether) is what Darwinian evolution does. There does not seem to be any
compelling reason why the majority of natural lifestyles should benefit from continuous increases
in complexity.
This point has been admirably expressed by Dawkins, in an unduly overlooked piece [40]
from which we will now quote at length:
Why should any thoughtful Darwinian have expected a majority of lineages to in-
crease in anatomical complexity? Certainly it is not clear that anybody inspired
by adaptationist philosophy would. . . Our human line happens to have specialised
in complexity, especially of the nervous system, so it is only human that we should
define progress as an increase in complexity or in braininess. Other species will see it
differently, as Julian Huxley. . . pointed out in a piece of doggerel entitled “Progress”:
-
The Crab to Cancer junior gave advice:
6Incidentally, this may show that Gould’s and McShea’s argument is not quite as “obvious” or “routine” as it
may have seemed to some [40].
7This interpretation of Gingerich’s data now seems consensual: see Weiner[184], quoted in pp. 106-109 of [20].
Valentine and colleagues [178] provide refined data on the increase of cell types among metazoans, and model this
increase with a passive system.
78
Know what you want, my son, and then proceed
Directly sideways. God has thus decreed
Progress is lateral; let that suffice.
Darwinian Tapeworms on the other hand
Agree that Progress is a loss of brain,
And all that makes it hard for worms to attain
The true Nirvana peptic, pure and grand.
Man too enjoys to omphaloscopize.
Himself as Navel of the Universe. . .
. . . Huxley’s tapeworms, using a parasite-centred definition of progress, see the point
with opposite sign [from human authors, who focus on increasing complexity]. A
statistically minded swift would search in vain for evidence that a majority of evo-
lutionary lineages show trends towards improved flying performance. Learned ele-
phants, to borrow a pleasantry from Steven Pinker. . . , would ruefully fail to uphold
the comforting notion that progress, defined as a driven elongation of the nose, is
manifested by a statistical majority of animal lineages.
In this quote, the opinions of three authors (all of them well-known evolutionists, all of
them staunch supporters of the power of natural selection) are cited. It is interesting that this
passage is taken from a review of Gould’s own book on the subject of progress [71], which on the
question of complexity adopts pretty much the same position. In the beginning of this section we
showed that Darwin had already expressed very similar feelings. Let us also cite Maynard Smith
and Szathma´ry, who unambiguously reject the notion that evolution should be biased towards
complexity in the first chapters of their book [165] (this chapter carries the rather explicit title
“The fallacy of progress”). Similarly we may quote Mayr [113] (see also [9, sec. 3.2]):
Among all the forms of life, neither the prokaryotes nor protists, fungi or plants
has evolved smartness, as it should have if it were “better.” In the 28 plus phyla
of animals, intelligence evolved in only one (chordates) and doubtfully also in the
cephalopods. And in the thousands of subdivisions of the chordates, high intelligence
developed in only one, the primates, and even there only in one small subdivision.
So much for the putative inevitability of the development of high intelligence because
“it is better to be smart.”
All in all, we note that there is much expert opinion against the idea that natural selection
should drive a pervasive trend towards increasing functional or behavioural complexity in evolu-
tion. Rather, the consensus seems to point towards Darwin’s original conception of evolution by
natural selection: a recklessly opportunistic process, which will constantly exploit any possible
way to make a living, independently of whether it leads to increases or decreases in complexity.
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8.6 The evidence: complexity in evolution
8.6.1 The enduring dominance of simple lifeforms
A significant argument against the idea of an active, pervasive, selection-driven bias towards
complexity growth over the course of evolution is that simpler life forms still dominate the
planet. In a typically engaging section, Gould [71] famously argued that “on any possible,
reasonable or fair criterion, bacteria are - and always have been - the dominant forms of life on
Earth.” Prokaryotes (Bacteria and Archaea) are more ancient, more numerous, more diverse,
have conquered more environments and apparently compose vastly more of the cellular biomass
than all other living entities combined (a position only reinforced by later estimates [185]).
Simpler prokaryotes have clearly not been displaced by their more complex eukaryotic cousins.
We note that it is possible to extend this pattern to other taxonomic levels. The most
functionally complex animals, besides humans, are arguably great apes - of which, it turns out,
many happen to be on the verge of extinction. We may compare this with the success (whether in
numbers, range, or conservation prospects) of ‘lesser’8 simians, especially the genus of macaques,
the most widespread of all primate genera. Non-human primates in general are significantly less
successful, by any measure of ‘success’, than the placid artiodactyls (ruminants, pigs, etc.).
Chordates (the phylum which includes vertebrates) are vastly exceeded in number, diversity
and total biomass by arthropods, the truly dominant form of metazoan life [14]. Land animals
in general are simply overwhelmed by land plants in terms of total biomass. The dominance
of prokaryotes, Gould’s “modal bacter”, merely crowns what appears to be a general pattern,
or rather the absence of a pattern: at any given taxonomic level, more functionally complex
entities are simply not more successful than their simpler counterparts. In fact, a lot could be
said for the opposite position, though of course counter-examples abound.
The important fact here is not the enduring existence of some primitive lifeforms, per se.
What is significant is that at almost any given scale, and for any sub-tree of the Tree of Life, we
observe that simpler organisms not only endure, but often seem to dominate the more complex
organisms. This leads to the following question: if evolution is indeed generally biased towards
complexity, then why do only a minority of lifeforms become more complex? Why did all those
simple forms fail to feel the supposed “pull” of the complexity drive? This pattern would suggest
that those taxa which did reach high complexity did so because of certain particular, specific
selective pressures, to which they somehow adapted by increasing their complexity.
8.6.2 Examples of particular selection-driven trends towards complexity
Considering the amount of confusion which has been pointed out by McShea, Gould, Dawkins
and others, it may not be entirely futile to stress the obvious: nobody denies that in many cases,
active, selection-driven increases in complexity do in fact occur. Complex adaptations often do
confer a definite selective advantage over relatives which do not possess them. The result is
that they will mechanically propagate throughout the population. Such trends have happened
at all levels, ranging from individual sub-species to the entire biosphere, both within and across
8Quantitative measures of behavioural complexity and neocortex development among primates are given by
Dunbar. [48]
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lineages. We will only give a few examples which we believe are of particular interest.
For a specific example, we need look no further than the evolution of our own species, Homo
Sapiens [20, 105]. Modern humans are the latest stage in a sequence of various groups, start-
ing with the early australopithecines (essentially bipedal apes), going through the early Homo
branch (the ‘Habilis group’: H. Rudolfensis, H. Habilis. . . ), the ‘Erectus group’ (H. Ergaster, H.
Erectus. . . ), the ‘archaic’ Homo Sapiens (H. Heidelbergensis, H. Neanderthalensis), and even-
tually modern humans, presumably descended from the same branch as H. Heidelbergensis (in
parallel to the Neanderthal derivation). Now this sequence shows two notable features. First,
each new group showed demonstrably more complex behaviour than its predecessors, as can be
deduced from artifacts. A trend of increase in brain size is also apparent (especially in certain
stages, such as the Erectus and Sapiens groups [105]). Second, at a sufficiently large scale, these
groups tended to thrive while their predecessors were displaced. It is therefore reasonable to
argue that this sequence constitutes a trend, driven by natural selection, whereby increasingly
complex groups successively displace their predecessors. Is it possible that the specific case
of human evolution, in which natural selection did drive a sequential increase in complexity,
influenced our view of evolution in general?
However, even in this most indisputable of trends, it is important to exert caution. First
of all, the appearance of early Homo certainly did not displace the australopithecines. On the
contrary, australopithecines continued to expand and radiate, with a trend towards ‘robust’ forms
(A. Basie, A. Robustus), for at least another million years [61]. The divergence somewhere along
the line of the early Homo branch (the Habilis group) was apparently a “much more isolated
and insignificant trend” [105, p.328] which locally reversed the general tendency. Only with the
‘Erectus group’ did Homo finally achieve prominence. Furthermore, it is not absolutely clear
that the displacement of each group by its successor was invariably caused by the latter’s higher
complexity: climate changes have clearly had an influence on the evolution [101] (and apparently
the extinction [60]) of various human lineages. Thus, even in the clearly driven trend of human
complexification, the pluralism of evolution shows its signs.
More generally, the evolution of complex organs constitutes a remarkable, ubiquitous ex-
ample of selection-driven increase in complexity. Historically, the paradigm of complex organ
evolution is the eye, a high feat of engineering that has been discovered many times in the course
of evolution. Dawkins [39] has famously described the highly complex sonar of certain bats, using
it as a replacement for the often-used vertebrate eye as an example of complex organ evolution.
The evolution of such complex organs, each composed of several, highly heterogeneous, inter-
dependent parts delicately assembled to obtain a certain result (and thus functionally complex
according to our definition) has necessarily involved a long sequence of gradual increases in com-
plexity, each of them preserved by selection. In the case of the eye, many of these intermediate
stages have actually been found in living species [150, Fig. 13.2]. Of course, we should keep in
mind that many creatures (perhaps most impressively ants) do very well with ‘low fidelity’ eyes.
The massively enlarged primate brain must of necessity be the result of a selection-driven
trend; this is because primate brains are costly structures, especially in terms of energy. As
Dunbar [48] explains, “because the cost of maintaining a large brain is so great, it is intrinsically
unlikely that large brains will evolve just because they can.” Dunbar provides a wealth of
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evidence which indicates that the relative size of the neocortex in primates (including humans)
correlates remarkably with measures of social behaviour (such as the size of the social group),
but not with ecological aspects such as diet, foraging behaviour or range size. This would suggest
that social pressures, rather than ecological factors, were the proximal drive for larger neocortices
in primates - a clear example of a coevolutionary-driven complexity increase. Because courtship
and mating are important aspects of social interactions, there is clearly much overlap between
this position and that of Miller [126], which strongly emphasises sexual selection as a driving
factor in the enormous growth of the human brain.
The evolution of complex chemical cycles within cells may be seen as a counterpart (and
predecessor) to the evolution of complex organs in multicellular organisms. Perhaps the most
remarkable case is aerobic respiration, an intricate oxygen-based cycle which extracts energy
from complex organic molecules. This highly efficient process, yielding up to 36 ATP molecules
for each glucose molecule (against 2 for anaerobic fermentation), is now extremely widespread
among living creatures: exclusively anaerobic creatures, once dominant, have been relegated to a
secondary role (though by no means eliminated altogether) by creatures endowed with the more
complex, but more powerful aerobic respiration apparatus9. Of course, anaerobic fermentation is
still present as a component of the aerobic respiratory cycle, to the effect that aerobic cells may
revert to anaerobic fermentation in the absence of oxygen (much to the satisfaction of certain
higher mammals not entirely adverse to the effects of fermented beverages).
More generally, it is widely acknowledged that the general architecture of modern living
systems (based on nucleic acids and proteins) is too complex to have arisen spontaneously, in
its present form, from abiotic reactions. Therefore, intermediate forms (now extinct) must have
preceded the appearance of modern life. The utter elimination of these early systems, which
we may surmise to have been quite varied, can hardly be explained by pure contingency. In
fact, it is reasonable to posit that these ‘ur-organisms’ were actually displaced by modern life,
which simply proved more efficient in assimilating precious carbon atoms and free energy. From
this viewpoint, the total domination of modern life can be seen as a selection-driven trend,
through which a sequence of increasingly complex systems successively displaced their simpler,
less efficient ancestors.10 This process, however, has not endured into the evolution of modern
life, as can be shown by the massive dominance of prokaryotic forms in the present biosphere.
8.6.3 Examples of particular selection-driven decreases in complexity
Having shown particular examples of driven trends towards complexity, we feel obliged to em-
phasise that trends often run in the other direction as well.
One obvious form of selection towards lower complexity is the emergence of parasitism in
previously free-living species: an organism which was originally able to survive on its own, finds
itself dependent on its host. This often leads to a reduction in complexity, as Gould [71, p.220]
9Even then, things are not quite clear-cut: the fermenters’ higher rate of consumption may actually allow them
to overcome respirators in certain situations of direct topical competition [141].
10This account is agnostic with regard to which processes led to the emergence of early life, as long as it
is accepted that some now-extinct intermediate form(s) preceded modern organisms. However, if we follow
Fernando’s interesting hypothesis[51, 52] of the appearance of life as the culmination of a natural selection process
among early pre-biotic chemical systems divided by external forces, then the very origin of life itself would be the
result of such an active selection-driven trend towards increasing complexity.
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predictably observes11. This phenomenon is well-known and does not require further emphasis.
Another common source of selectively driven decrease in complexity is miniaturisation. Bon-
ner [19], pursuing his argument that size and complexity often go hand in hand, mentions
the case of ‘dwarf’ rotifers which, because of new biomechanical constraints imposed by their
nanism, replace their gut system with a continuous cytoplasm nested with small food-carrying
vacuoles. The result is a decrease both in structure differentiation and in number of cell types.
A well-known example of miniaturisation (and associated loss of complexity) is that of acari,
particularly among the most minute mites. For example, dust mites have shed off much of their
digestive structure (including their stomach), and as a result must ingest the same piece of food
several times and use external digestion.
More generally, in parallel with the constant elaboration of complex organs, an equally
constant process of complexity reduction occurs in Nature. We need only cite a few well-known
examples. The most obvious tell-tales of evolutionary simplification are vestigial structures.
The vermiform appendix in humans is the remnant of a structure which allows its bearer to
digest cellulose in plants, something that humans cannot do: this is clearly a diminution in
functional complexity, by any measure. The small pink pouch in the inner corner of our eyes
is the non-functional remnant of the nictitating membrane (the ‘third eyelid’) found in many
other animals, including cats and dogs. Modern whales retain small, undifferentiated bone
structures as a memory of what used to be perfectly functional pelvis and hind legs[175]. This
also affects the paradigmatic eye: in many creatures which have reverted to dark environments,
the functional complexity of their visual systems has decayed into non-functionality, sometimes
culminating into the complete elimination of the eye itself (the cavefish Astyanax is interesting
in that various stages of eye loss can be observed in distinct modern populations [93]). Even the
pinnacle of animal complexity, the vertebrate brain, has undergone significant morphological
and functional simplification in certain lineages: let us mention salamanders[154] or certain
bats[158]12.
Finally, we will mention a rather spectacular form of successful complexity decrease. This
example, tentatively suggested for this purpose by McShea [118] (and recently confirmed by
further studies [47]), concerns the appearance of infectious tumour cells. In at least two separate
examples (one affecting dogs in a rather benign way, the other affecting Tasmanian devils with
a usually fatal outcome), it has been found that a certain lineage of tumour cells could be
transmitted from host to host through contact, with the result that the tumours effectively
behaved as populations of single-cell parasites of the host species. In both cases, the tumour
cells were shown to share a common origin (being genetically similar to each other across hosts,
and different from their hosts), and thus can be considered a distinct species. For our purpose,
the key point is that these single-cell species originated from mutated cells within multicellular,
‘higher’ organisms. In other words, in at least two separate occurrences, a major transition of
evolution[165] (namely the invention of multicellularity) was successfully reversed. This dramatic
11However Gould also reminds us that in many case, parasites may also exhibit high complexity at some stages
of their life: Sacullina is mentioned as an example both of extreme simplicity (in its almost amorphous host-bound
form) and complexity (in its remarkably intricate development cycle).
12Brain evolution in vertebrates is a complicated business, despite an overall highly conserved structure. Many
fishes have similar brain size to mammals and birds, relative to their body size. Many independent increases in
brain size have been identified, but stability and decreases have also occurred[134].
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drop in complexity from highly complex mammals to single-cell organisms created new, simpler,
yet successful species, especially in the case of the dog tumour lineage which is thought to be at
least several centuries old.
8.7 Conclusion: the passive trend of complexity growth in evo-
lution
8.7.1 Passive growth of complexity
In summary, both theory and evidence suggest the same interpretation: there has been a trend
of increase in the maximum of complexity in evolution, and this trend seems to have been
resolutely passive - that is, globally unbiased. At all scales, individual lineages will be driven to
whatever form of adaptation evolution may encounter, which may or may not lead to increases,
or decreases, in complexity. There does not seem to be any overarching bias, neither in evidence
nor in theory, which would drive a majority of lineages towards higher complexity. The Tree of
Life does not ‘seek’ complexity as actual plants seek sunlight.
Again, it is important to note that this does not contradict the hypothesis of an “arrow of
complexity”; it does, however, contradict certain interpretations, namely those which surmise a
built-in tendency for Darwinian evolution to drive lineages towards increasing complexity. This
does not imply a rejection of the existence of a trend: a passive trend is still a trend.
8.7.2 Non-triviality of passive trends
In addition, we must stress that a passive trend does not in any way imply that Darwinian
evolution is neutral or irrelevant to complexity growth. There is a tendency to see passive
trends as somehow trivial, or not requiring any particular explanation. That this is not the case
is of fundamental importance. Complexity has indeed risen to extraordinary levels, and the ease
with which Nature comes up with complex forms demands explanation.
The difficulty of obtaining a sustained arrow of complexity is amply demonstrated by the
field of artificial evolution, in which thorough use of Darwinian evolution has indeed created
appreciable levels of complexity [162, 107], but nothing that could even be compared to the
enormous growth of complexity in Nature. In fact, the difficulty of initiating “open-ended” evo-
lution in artificial experiments is widely noted [110]. Consequently, the very fact that evolution
seems unbiased towards higher or lower complexity is in itself worthy of note, because in arti-
ficial settings the process seems very much biased against continuing complexity growth. The
apparent absence of a bias for or against complexity in Nature only seems trivial if we forget
how strong the bias against complexity seems to be in computers.
8.7.3 New questions
This casts a new light on our problem. If a passive trend has occurred in the evolution of
complexity, the question then becomes: what makes such a trend possible? What conditions are
necessary for the appearance and sustained increase of complexity (that is, for the emergence of
an “arrow of complexity”) in a system? What is the role of the Darwinian mechanism in this
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emergence? This is the second part of our reformulated question (as put forth in section 8.4),
with which the remaining sections of this chapter will be concerned.
8.8 The role of Darwinian evolution in complexity growth
8.8.1 Systems, designs and complexity
In this section we want to evaluate the effects of Darwinian evolution on complexity, in the
most abstract, general sense. Our perspective is unabashedly conceptual: we want to gain
insight into the relationship between evolution and complexity, rather than devise technical
methods to be used in actual experiments. To do this, we ask which constraints on complexity
exist in abstract non-evolutionary generative systems, then we ask how the introduction of an
evolutionary mechanism alters these constraints.
Let us consider an abstract generative system, of which we only know two things:
• A certain ‘design generator’ is being used to generate new designs; the particulars of the
design generator define a certain space of possible designs which can be explored.
• New designs are being generated according to a certain heuristic; in other words, the space
of available designs is being sampled in a certain sequence, as specified by the heuristic.
For now, we assume that the heuristic used to generate new designs is unknown: it could
be random, evolutionary, hill-climbing, or anything else. We now ask the question: what is
necessary for such a system to produce unbounded growth in functional complexity?
A moment’s thought suggests that in principle, at least two (rather obvious) conditions are
absolutely necessary. First, the system generator must in principle be able to generate arbitrarily
complex designs. Second, the search heuristic must not impose a hard upper bound on adaptivity
or functional complexity of the designs being sampled. It need not favour complexity, it may
even discriminate against it, but not to the point of forbidding it entirely above a certain level.
Provided these two conditions are met, over time, the system should mechanically produce
arbitrarily complex designs, regardless of which heuristic is being used.
8.8.2 Limitations of non-evolutionary complexity growth
Inefficiency
However another moment’s thought will make it clear that, without any further device, such
a system might well take impossibly long times to come up with any such complexity. This
is because, as we have pointed out in section 8.2.2, functionally complex designs are rare in
the space of all possible designs. A random design generator may come up with arbitrarily
complex designs, given enough time, but what good would that be if “enough time” exceeds the
thermodynamic limit of universal heat death?
Finite populations and finite lifetimes
Another difficulty occurs when designs are eventually removed from the system. For example,
designs might have a specified maximum lifetime (which would mean that all designs are eventu-
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ally eliminated), or the population could have a maximum size (which implies that some designs
must be eliminated).
In this case, while the system will still come up with designs of unbounded functional com-
plexity over time, we have no assurance that the maximum of complexity at any time will
sustainedly increase. This is because, without any further assumption, we have no way to know
that the rate at which complex designs are being generated balances the rate at which they will
be removed: in fact, the opposite is much more likely. While arbitrarily complex designs will
eventually occur, these designs may very well be mere ‘blips’ in an otherwise consistently low
background: if the current maximum of complexity is removed, we have no assurance that it
will be replaced by designs of similar complexity. Again, this is because functionally complex
designs are rare within the space of all possible designs. The consequence is that, barring further
assumptions, the population may well spend most of its time at a very low level of functional
complexity.
Consequence: no arrow of complexity
We must therefore conclude that, while the two “obvious” requirements expressed above are
sufficient to generate arbitrary complexity over (much) time, they are not sufficient to create
what we would call an “arrow of complexity.” This would imply a sustained, noticeable increase
in the maximum complexity, rather than the highly occasional appearance of fleeting, isolated
complexity spikes.
8.8.3 Impact of evolution on complexity
The Darwinian heuristic
Now let us introduce a new requirement: we posit that our system is evolutionary, that is, it
follows the “Darwinian heuristic” as elegantly formulated by Wagner and Altenberg [181]: “the
Darwinian heuristic is to choose sample points by perturbing the more fit ones among those
sampled thus far.” In other words, new designs are not generated arbitrarily: rather, existing
designs are evaluated after a certain metric (their ‘fitness’), and those designs which exhibit a
relatively high fitness are selected as starting points for small ‘jumps’ towards newer designs.
Our question is: how does this new specification affect the emergence of functional complexity?
The Darwinian mechanism restricts exploration
The first thing to note is that the Darwinian heuristic actually imposes a restriction on the
search process: the search process will now follow certain directions at the expense of others.
This restriction constrains both the scope and the direction of the search process. The restriction
in scope comes from the fact that, because evolution proceeds by small jumps from existing
designs, newer designs can only be chosen in the neighbourhood of the current population. The
restriction in direction comes from the fact that only those designs which exhibit a high fitness
will be used as starting points for further exploration.
In unfavourable conditions, this restriction may severely limit the exploration of design space.
For example, if the population happens to be in a certain domain of the search space, which is
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entirely surrounded by relatively unsuccessful designs, then the process may well end up being
‘trapped’ into that domain. Conversely, potentially highly fit designs may never be reach if they
are surrounded by a region of unfit designs. This suggests at least two conditions for complexity
to appear in evolutionary systems, namely, that it should be successful and reachable13.
Benefits of the restrictions
On the other hand, this restriction has important potential benefits. First of all, when successful
designs are found, they will tend to be preserved, even beyond the lifetime of individuals - or
at the very least, they will stand an immensely higher chance of being preserved than under
random search, as long as they remain successful within the context of the current population.
This permits the persistence of functional complexity, despite its rarity in design space, even in
the face of finite lifetimes: complexity is no longer condemned to occur only in short ‘blips’ over
an otherwise simple background.
Furthermore, as we have already noted in section 8.2.2, adaptive functional complexity tends
to come in ‘loose clusters’ in design space: if we want to obtain a successful complex design,
we stand a much higher chance to obtain it by slightly altering another successful design of
lower complexity, rather than by randomly poking at the entire design space. The consequence
is that, by preserving existing (successful) complexity, the Darwinian heuristic also facilitates
further increases in complexity, provided such increases are possible within the neighbourhood
of the population: a successful complex design may act as a ‘stepping stone’ towards even
higher complexity. This is, in essence, the basis of the “Blind Watchmaker” mechanism, so
vividly expounded by Dawkins [39]: by slowly accumulating small beneficial improvements, each
working as a stepping stone towards the other, the Darwinian heuristic may eventually produce
enormous amounts of adaptive functional complexity, with incomparably higher probability than
under random search.
Thus we see that certain requirements must hold if evolution is to generate designs of un-
bounded complexity: it is necessary that, at all times, successful designs of higher complexity
exist within the current neighbourhood of the population. At first sight, these conditions might
seem rather straightforward. However, are they really sufficient?
Enter the Red Queen: variable fitness and complexity
So far we have not considered a certain aspect of fitness, namely the fact that it is not necessarily
stable over time. A design which is successful at a certain time may later prove unsuccessful if
conditions have changed. This is particularly the case in situations of coevolution, that is, when
the fitness of a given design depends at least in part on the features of other existing designs
within the population. In this case, species evolve constantly in order to adapt to each other’s
evolution - and those which fail to do so, disappear. This is the well-known Red Queen effect
[177, 32].
For our purposes, the basic consequence is that even if all previously mentioned conditions are
13In the context of this discussion, a design is ‘successful’ if its fitness is high enough, relatively to the current
population, to be used as a starting point for further samples. A point in design space is ‘reachable’ if certain
successful designs within the current population might be altered into the corresponding design.
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met, an evolutionary process may still fail to produce a sustained increase in complexity. Even if,
at any time, there exists potentially successful complex designs in the reachable neighbourhood of
the current population, complexity will not necessarily grow over time. This may seem counter-
intuitive: at first sight, if at any time successful complex designs exist within the reachable
neighbourhood, then we would expect that eventually evolution would find them, and thus
complexity would grow.
The reason why fitness instability may prevent such continuous growth is that it may disrupt
the ‘stepping stones’ effect on which this growth relies. If fitness is variable, then designs
of intermediate complexity may become unsuccessful before they have a chance to be altered
into more complex designs, putting the latter beyond reach of the process. Thus, despite the
constant presence of reachable, successful designs of higher complexity, no continuous process of
complexification may occur. If moderately complex designs are not sufficiently robust to serve
as stepping stones towards higher complexity, the Blind Watchmaker fumbles, and the arrow
of complexity is broken. The effects of this phenomenon in artificial coevolution have been
mentioned in section 8.5.2.
Thus we see that for complexity to appear in evolutionary system, it needs not only be
successful and reachable: it also needs to be robust, even in the face of possible instabilities
(including new competitors, parasites, etc.), at least sufficiently so to provide a stepping stone
for further complexity growth. This is an additional requirement which, if not observed, may
actually prevent the rise of complexity in evolutionary systems.
Putting it all together
How can we express these requirements as concisely as possible? We suggest the following
formulation:
• At any time, there are more possible jumps towards successful designs of higher or equal
complexity, than towards designs which would make the starting points of these jumps
unsuccessful.
Here “higher or equal complexity” is to be understood in comparison to the current maximum
of the population. A jump is the creation of a new design, using an already existing design (the
‘starting point’ of the jump) as a parent. Clearly, by definition, the starting point of a jump
must be successful.
This condition is clearly statistical: even if such jumps exist and constitute the majority of
possible jumps, we have no guarantee that they will be taken in the next step, so the corre-
sponding complexity increase may not occur immediately. Conversely, even if jumps towards
higher complexity are rare, we may still occasionally encounter one of them. What this condition
determines, however, is the presence or absence of a trend - that is, a long-term tendency. If
this condition does not hold over time, then statistically we do not expect any long-term trend
towards higher complexity to emerge; similarly, if it does hold consistently, then a long-term
trend towards higher complexity is statistically expected.
More importantly, this condition is very much local (both in time and in design space).
If the condition holds at a certain time, it does not mean in any way that it will keep doing
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so in the future: any new jump runs the risk of breaking the condition. For example one
particularly unlucky jump might discover a niche of devastatingly efficient simplistic individuals
(in the extreme, we might conjure images of ‘grey goo’ bacteria). Should this happen, then
the probability of jumps might become highly biased towards these simplistic individuals, and
thus the condition would not hold any more. Conversely, when the condition does not hold, one
particularly lucky jump may stumble upon a new area of robust complex adaptations, making the
condition valid. Therefore, maximum complexity will tend to increase as long as the condition
is consistently met - but only that long. Complexity will not tend to increase (or may even tend
to decrease) if the condition consistently fails to hold.
8.8.4 Evolution and complexity: a double-edged sword
In summary, we suggest that the conditions under which Darwinian evolution will generate a
sustained trend of increase in the maximum of complexity (that is, an “arrow of complexity”)
can be summarised as concisely as possible in the following manner:
1. Arbitrarily complex adaptive designs must exist in the design space explorable by the
design generator.
2. The search heuristic must not impose a hard upper bound on the functional complexity
of designs.
3. At any time, there are more possible jumps towards successful designs of higher or equal
complexity, than towards designs which would make the starting points of these jumps
unsuccessful.
It is in this way, and under these conditions, that Darwinian evolution can really be said
to create an “arrow of complexity”. It does not mean that evolution will consistently ‘seek’
complexity, or that evolution is intrinsically a complexifying force - rather, it means that, if
some advantageous complexity exists, and as long as it is successful, reachable and sufficiently
robust (in the sense made explicit by the third requirement), then Darwinian evolution will
indeed produce an arrow of complexity which could not emerge without it. But as soon as
the requirements cease to hold, then evolution may actually prevent the growth of complexity
altogether.
Thus we see that there is a deep ambiguity in the relationship between evolution and com-
plexity. This ambiguity is captured in the third requirement above, which as we saw is very much
specific to Darwinian evolution. Random search, for example, may create arbitrary amounts of
complexity over (much) time, even if this requirement does not hold, while Darwinian evolution
cannot. But if (and as long as) this requirement holds, then Darwinian evolution can actually
create an “arrow of complexity” (a sustained, noticeable trend of increase in maximum complex-
ity), which is utterly beyond reach of random search. In this sense, with regard to complexity,
Darwinian evolution is very much a double-edged sword.
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8.9 Conclusion
Clearly, at this point, we have gone a long way to clarify the statement that “open-ended evo-
lutionary processes have an inherent, law-like tendency to create creatures with increasingly
complicated functional organization”. We have seen that the hypothesis of an “arrow of com-
plexity” can be interpreted in several ways, with varying support for each interpretation. We
have seen that the undeniable increase of maximum complexity in evolution is best explained
as a passive (unbiased) trend, that is, a side consequence of an otherwise complexity-neutral
process of reckless local adaptation.
We have seen that Darwinian evolution is capable of creating an arrow of complexity (that
is, a sustained, noticeable trend of increase in maximum complexity) which could not exist
without it, provided certain requirements hold. These requirements are that at any time, higher
complexity should be reachable, successful and reasonably robust. They result from the re-
strictions imposed by the Darwinian heuristic on the exploration of search space. As long as
these evolution-specific requirements are consistently met, then evolution will keep producing
designs of increasing adaptive complexity in a sustained manner. But if they cease to be, then
evolution will not only fail to produce an arrow of complexity - it may actually prevent com-
plexity increases altogether. In other words, with regard to complexity growth, evolution is a
double-edged sword, which may slash both ways.
Thus the appearance and growth of complexity in evolution results neither from a built-
in, relentless march to “progress”, nor from the miraculous conjunction of a series of vastly
improbable coincidences. Rather, it is simply ascribable to the presence of certain objective
conditions, applying to the capacities of the design generator and the structure of design space.
Evidence from Nature and the fossil record indicates that the design space faced by eukaryotic
life has met the appropriate conditions in a roughly constant manner - give or take an asteroid
or two. The fundamentally explorative nature of evolution has been able to find successful,
reachable and robust forms of complexity, repeatedly and sustainedly, over the entire history of
modern life. No grand scheme of cosmological destiny, no poignant tale of triumph against all
odds; just the pedestrian, plainly logical, yet amazingly powerful consequence of the properties
of modern life in the face of the challenges and opportunities posed by the laws of physics, the




Darwinian evolution with genealogic
records
9.1 Introduction
9.1.1 The problem: Are we evolving yet?
Consider the following problem: imagine that you are observing a simulation, in which a popula-
tion of agents move, interact and reproduce. The simulation is complex, or its output is obscure
(or both), and it is not easy to grasp what, if anything, is going on. Knowing that these agents
reproduce, we may ask ourself the question: are they also evolving? Are they undergoing genuine
natural selection and adaptive evolution? Or are they just perpetuating random genetic traits,
following a chaotic trajectory through genotype space without ever undergoing any meaningful
evolution?
This question arises from the fact that when a population of reproducing agents is observed,
it is not always immediately clear whether the dynamics of the population result from Darwinian
evolution, or merely from random variations and stochastic effects such as genetic drift. The
particular system at hand may also introduce its own effects, which may bias or alter the
dynamics of the population in unpredictable ways. When this system is sufficiently complex,
determining whether a population is evolving in a Darwinian sense may not be a trivial task.
Besides its conceptual implications, the question is of practical interest. It is often desirable
to determine whether natural selection and evolutionary adaptation are occurring within a given
system, especially in the fields of evolutionary computation and artificial life. Indeed in some
situations, the onset of significant adaptive evolutionary activity is by itself a major objective of
the system: for example, artificial environments such as Echo [84] and Geb [28] (both described
in Appendix B) were explicitly designed with the aim of exhibiting meaningful evolutionary
This chapter benefited greatly from the comments of several anonymous reviewers for the Artificial Life
journal.
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activity. Being able to detect the presence of genuinely adaptive evolution is a fundamental
pre-requisite for the validation of such systems.
9.1.2 What is evolution?
As we saw in the first chapter, evolution is simply a change in the inherited characteristics of
a population, from generation to generation. The word “evolution” only refers to change, in
the general sense, and does not carry any implication of value or improvement. In particular,
evolution can be random, as seen in genetic drift. However, the mechanisms which cause or
drive evolution can certainly steer evolution towards increased adaptation. Of course, this is
particularly true for natural selection, the mechanism originally purported by Darwin as a cause
for the remarkable adaptation of living beings.
Note that this Darwinian mechanism, which explains adaptive evolutionary change, may also
lead to local, temporary stability, for example if the population is currently located around a
convenient local optimum: hence the concepts of ‘stabilising selection’ and ‘evolutionary stasis’
(see chapter 4 of [150]).
Here we are interested not just in evolution, but specifically in evolution by natural selection.
Our aim is to provide a measure to detect the active presence of the Darwinian mechanism of
evolution by natural selection. We want to detect the presence (or absence) of Darwinian
forces which actively shape a population, as opposed to the mere accumulation of incidental,
non-adaptive fluctuations - to catch the ‘invisible hand’ of natural selection in the act, as it
were. We are specifically not interested in measuring ‘progress’ or complexification, two notions
sometimes associated with the idea of “measuring evolution” [24]. Neither are we trying to
determine how innovative or successful evolution is in terms of optimisation. Our objective is
simply to find out whether the trajectory of a given population of reproducing agents through
genotype space is the result of Darwinian evolution by natural selection - no more, no less.
One consequence is that our measure will give high marks for systems that are being actively
molded by natural selection, even if this molding consists of actively maintaining the population
around a given optimum. In other words it will give high marks to systems undergoing stabil-
ising selection (except in extreme circumstance where stabilising selection is so strong that no
mutation can survive at all, as discussed in section 9.6.) Importantly, our measure will differen-
tiate such a system from ‘frozen’ systems in which no genetic variation occurs at all, which will
be given a zero score. This is precisely what is required.
9.1.3 Fitness Transmission: A signature of Darwinian evolution
We posit that the defining characteristic of Darwinian evolution is the differential propagation
of heritable, fitness-affecting characteristics, that steer the population in locally adaptive direc-
tions. From this rather uncontroversial basis, we deduce that it should be possible to detect the
presence or absence of Darwinian evolution from the observed genealogical dynamics of evolu-
tionary processes. Roughly, our reasoning is that if any transmission of heritable fitness-affecting
traits is occurring, then on the whole, individuals sharing a common lineage, which tend to in-
herit similar traits, should also tend to have some degree of similarity in their fitnesses - that
is, their reproductive success. For example, we might expect that fitter (resp. less fit) parents
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should tend to have fitter (resp. less fit) children. Thus if heritable, fitness-affecting charac-
teristics are being transmitted, a tenuous, but persistent correlation should exist between the
fitness of individuals sharing a common lineage: the differential transmission of fitness-affecting
characteristics should result in a differential transmission of fitness. This differential transmis-
sion of fitness is the genealogical signature which we believe characterises the presence of active,
Darwinian adaptation through natural selection based on heritable characteristics.
9.2 Related Work
9.2.1 Traditional methods for detecting natural selection
The problem of detecting natural selection has a long history in biology. Endler’s authoritative
treatment [49] describes the traditional (that is, non-molecular) methods for detecting natural
selection. However, all these methods are based on phenotypic observation of chosen traits: they
require collecting statistics on the frequencies of certain, pre-defined traits, and then performing
some calculations to determine whether or not natural selection has acted on these traits. This
is precisely what we seek to avoid here: we do not ask whether natural selection has acted on
this or that trait, but simply whether it is active in the population. Also we want to dispense
with detailed phenotypic observation.
The molecular revolution in biology has made it possible to collect vast amounts of genetic
data. This creates new possibilities for the detection of natural selection, based on direct assess-
ment of nucleotide variation (Sabeti and colleagues [157] provide a recent review.) But these
approaches require access to a full genetic record. Furthermore, biological genomes are simple
sequences of items in a four-letters alphabet; but artificial life models need not be so simple, and
this may affect the applicability of these methods. By focusing on the genealogic record alone,
we avoid any such difficulty.
9.2.2 The Bedau-Packard measure of evolutionary activity
Bedau and Packard [10, 11] have developed a groundbreaking set of concepts and methods to
“discern whether or not evolution is taking place in an observed system”. It should be noted
that Bedau and Packard’s aim in that work is somewhat different from ours here. Here we
are interested in detecting the presence of natural selection, that is, in finding out whether
the trajectory of a population in configuration space is being actively shaped by Darwinian
evolution and natural selection. Bedau and Packard, on the other hand, are specifically interested
in the innovations produced by evolution, and in the capacities of various systems to keep
on producing adaptive innovations over time - or not. This requires a method to determine
whether an apparent innovation is indeed adaptive or merely the result of random fluctuations,
which clearly relates to our own concerns. To this end, Bedau and Packard introduce a set of
methods to compute the “evolutionary activity” of components and, by extension, of systems.
These methods form the basis of a classification of systems into various classes, each class being
associated with a certain type of evolutionary dynamics.
The Bedau-Packard measures of evolutionary activity are based on persistence of adaptive
innovations: they identify components that persist over time at a level that exceeds what would
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be expected under purely random conditions. In a short introduction to the framework [23],
Bullock and Bedau provide the following rationale:
A paradigm of the idea of evolutionary activity is the notion of measuring the con-
tinued persistence of elements in an adaptive system as a proxy for their adaptive
significance – if a particular element persists in the system for a long time, this is
likely to be because it is being maintained by selection.
In this short passage, we already perceive the basic reason why Bedau and Packard’s statis-
tics are not readily applicable to our purposes of detecting the presence of natural selection:
by asserting that persistence “is being maintained by selection”, we are already assuming the
presence of Darwinian selection in the first place. It is not unthinkable that persistence could
occur through other processes than natural selection and individual adaptation - and as we will
see, it is easy to come up with (non-evolutionary) systems in which this occurs.
If we are to use persistence “for a long time” as a criterion for detecting evolution, we need
a method to determine what “a long time” is. When do we decide that a given element has
persisted long enough to be regarded as ‘adapted’? It is clearly impractical to provide a general
answer to this question a priori, which could apply to all systems and in all situations. To tackle
this problem, Bedau and Packard introduced the idea of using a neutral “shadow” of the system
under study: a replication of the original system, in which birth, reproduction and death of
individuals occur in synchronisation with the real system, but are applied to randomly chosen
individuals. More precisely, every time a new individual is being created in the real system
under study, a new individual is also created in the shadow; but with the difference that, in the
shadow, the parents of the new individual are chosen randomly. Thus the neutral shadow is
expected to show the behaviour that would be seen in the system, in the absence of any selective
pressure. By comparing the persistence data obtained in this “shadow” to that obtained in the
real system, Bedau and Packard argue, it should be possible to detect whether selection and
adaptive evolution are present.
Building upon the concept of enduring persistence as a measure of evolutionary activity,
Packard and Bedau have developed a series of evolutionary statistics based on persistence infor-
mation. These statistics include:
• DiversityD: The number of different components present at a given time in the population.
• Activity ai(t): The age of component i at time t, indicating how long it has persisted so
far.
• Cumulated activity Acum(t): The sum of the ages of all individuals present at time t.
• New activity Anew(t): The sum of the ages1 of all ‘new’ (Bedau and Packard use the
term ‘adolescent ’) components present in the system at time t, divided by diversity at
1In the original presentation [11], there is a discrepancy between the discrete formula (sum of all ages) and the
continuous formula (integration of the distribution function, which would correspond to number of counts within
that range rather than the sum of their values.) Perhaps interestingly, this dissonance is repeated in the literature,
where some authors choose to sum activities [173] while others choose to count the number of individuals that
reach the relevant activity [169].
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time t. Entities are ‘new’ if their age ai falls within a certain interval [a0, a1]. The idea
is that a0 is the minimum age at which a new component can be regarded as adaptively
significant: if a component reaches age a0, then we assume that it has persisted more
than could be accounted for by mere random fluctuations, and that this persistence is a
sign of its adaptive value. A suitable value for a0 is to be determined empirically through
comparison with a neutral ‘shadow’ system. Anew(t) is used as a measure of significant
innovation taking place in the system at a given time.
Bedau and Packard have used these statistics as a basis for classification of evolutionary
dynamics into three classes: Class I (“no adaptive evolutionary activity”), Class II (“bounded
adaptive evolutionary activity) and Class III (“unbounded adaptive evolutionary activity”).
Class III, in particular, is expected to encompass truly ‘lifelike’ evolution, similar in creativity
and endurance to that found in nature. It requires that the total evolutionary activity Acum
(the sum of the ages of components present at time t in the population) be unbounded, that is,
grow at least linearly with t, and that new activity Anew(t) be positive.
Bedau and Packard’s measures are arguably the most widely known of their kind. They
applied these measures to several systems, including artificial ecologies such as Echo, and (no-
tably) the fossil record of the biosphere [11]. Other researchers have successfully applied them
to various systems. [169, 27, 173, 136, 100]
9.2.3 The Bedau-Packard statistics and non-Darwinian systems
The Bedau-Packard method is a powerful tool for observing the activity and creativity of evolu-
tionary systems. However, it is not suitable as a method to assess whether a system is specifically
undergoing Darwinian evolution by natural selection, as opposed to other, non-evolutionary pro-
cesses.
The basic reason why the Bedau-Packard statistics cannot be used as a detector of evolution
by natural selection is that they may attribute a positive score to processes which are clearly
not “evolutionary” in a Darwinian sense, because no heritable variance in fitness (and thus
no evolutionary adaptation) occurs. Importantly, this is the case even if a shadow is used to
normalise activity scores. The crux of the matter is that these statistics essentially track “excess”
variance in the persistence of components, which is used as a proxy for selection and therefore
(it is argued) for adaptive value. The shadow is used to define the level of persistence which can
be termed “excess.” But what if some high variance in persistence occurs that is not heritable?
If we apply the Bedau-Packard statistics to such a system, we may find that the Bedau-Packard
measure classifies such a system as adaptive, even though it is not - even if we use a shadow.
It is easy to devise examples of systems that illustrate this distinction. For instance, consider
a population of individuals in which reproduction and removal occur completely at random,
except for the following caveat: certain randomly chosen individuals (the set of which changes
over time by losing and gaining random members) are allowed to survive longer and reproduce
more than the others. Clearly this process is not “evolutionary” in a Darwinian sense, let alone
adaptive. Crucially, we should not expect the children of these ‘lucky’ individual to show any
superior reproductive success: no heritable variance in fitness would be observed. Furthermore,
whichever notion of ‘adaptation’ we use, no novel adaptive ability would be introduced into the
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system. However, in this system, the activity a(t) of the genetic components associated with the
favoured individuals would actually be positive, even when normalised against a shadow. This
is because the (randomly chosen) favoured individuals would survive much longer than others,
giving rise to strong persistence scores; in addition, because they reproduce more, their genetic
material would tend to dominate the population: even though their offspring would not exhibit
remarkable fitness, their sheer number would alter the distribution of genetic material.
Another example is a system in which evolution occurs normally, except for the fact that
fitness is randomly attributed to each individual at birth, independently of its genome. That is,
while genetic material is transmitted as expected from parent to offspring, this genetic material
has no influence over fitness, which is chosen randomly and arbitrarily for each new individual.
Again, note that no heritable variance in fitness occurs, nor does any adaptive innovation take
place. In such a situation, those individuals that happen to be highly fit (out of sheer luck)
will tend to persist for a long time, and may flood the population with their (short-lived, but
nevertheless genetically similar) offspring. No such thing will be observed in the shadow, where
reproduction and survival will be random, leading to random diffusion of the genetic material
throughout genotype space. Therefore, a difference will occur between the activity counts (and
diversity counts) of the shadow and of the real system, creating a positive signal on the Bedau-
Packard measure and associated tests.
In figure 9.1 we describe the results of Bedau-Packard statistics applied precisely to such
systems.2 In both cases, the system is a simple steady-state genetic algorithm in which, at every
“generation”, 10 out of the 100 individuals are eliminated and replaced by new individuals,
created by copying and mutating a surviving parent.
In the first system, selection of survivors and of parents occur randomly, except that at any
time one half of the population is “favoured”: individuals in this set are 5 times “more likely”
than others to be selected for survival and for parenthood. More precisely, an individual is
randomly picked, and immediately selected if it belongs to the favoured set; if not, a random
number between 0 and 4 is chosen, and if this number is 0 the individual is selected, otherwise
the process is repeated until an individual is selected. Any given individual can only be remain
“favoured” for a finite number of generation, randomly and uniformly chosen between 1 and
1000 (note that the graph of cumulative frequency distributions, or “waves”, demonstrates that
some genomes routinely persist much longer than this limit.)
In the second system, selection of survivors occurs by fitness ranking, and selection of parents
occur through tournament selection, very much as in a normal genetic algorithm. However, the
fitness of individuals is randomly chosen at birth, independently of their genome. The actual
method to “calculate” fitness is to increase a certain counter repeatedly until a random number
picked between 0 and 9 is equal to 0 (thus the distribution of fitnesses is exponential.) In
the shadow systems for both experiments, selection of survivors and parents are random (thus
2In these experiments we have applied the Bedau-Packard statistics to entire genotypes, in order to follow the
authors’ method [11]. However we are not at all certain that whole genotype persistence is a reliable indicator
of evolution. In particular, Bedau and Packard [11, pp. 7-8] seem to state that, when parents consistently differ
from their children (due to mutation), no adaptive evolution occurs (as shown by the absence of persistence
signal.) We note that in nature, it is very unlikely that any genotype ever persists for more than one generation.
However this should not affect our discussion: this problem may prevent the detection of adaptive evolution where
it exists, whereas we want to show that the Bedau-Packard statistics can actually return a positive signal even
when natural selection is clearly absent.
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the shadow systems for both experiments are essentially identical, which predictably results in
similar graphs).
Note, in particular, the onset of high average activity, the flattening of the cumulative distri-
bution of persistence counts (with an order of magnitude difference between the longest-living
genotypes of real and shadow systems), and perhaps most significantly the appearance of large
“telic waves” [10] (tall, lengthy lines) in genome frequency plots, despite the decidedly non-
teleological nature of these environments.
Surely many other examples could be found. More generally, these simple systems illustrate
the fact that high variance in persistence can be caused by many other processes than natural
selection. “Random” systems, in which no meaningful evolution or adaptation occurs, can
still obtain high marks on the Bedau-Packard measure if they produce high variance in genetic
persistence.
Of course, in these systems, it is easy to see (just by looking at their rules) that variance in
persistence is due to random fluctuations, and that no true natural selection exists. But this is
precisely the heart of the matter. First, when we study a real system, we may not have access to
its internal rules, so clearly in this case we cannot use the Bedau-Packard statistics as a test of
Darwinian evolution. But even if we do have full access to the rules of the system, the complexity
of even mildly elaborate systems may prevent us from asserting with absolute certainty whether
or not a “random force” generates strong variance in persistence. For example, considering a
system similar to Echo, can we really exclude, a priori, that such a factor could come into play?
Can we offer absolute guarantee, simply by looking at the rules of the system, that no weird
effect will arbitrarily and significantly favour certain individuals rather than others (without
being based on these individuals’ heritable features)? The answer, of course, is that we cannot.
It follows that, if we apply the Bedau-Packard statistics on such a system and obtain a positive
result, we cannot (in the absence of further information) use this fact alone to conclude that
adaptive evolution is active in the system.
It is important to be clear about the meaning of these results: this should not be interpreted
as a minimisation of the importance of Bedau-Packard statistics. Rather, this is a reminder that
these statistics should not be used to detect adaptive, Darwinian evolution, even by normalising
against a shadow. If we know, a priori and through other means, that the entity under study
is indeed affected by natural selection that can causally drive genuine adaptation, and if we can
rest assured that “weird” effects will be nil or negligible, then we can fruitfully apply the Bedau-
Packard measure to assess the dynamics of long-term evolutionary innovation within this system.
The valuable contribution of these statistics in this regard has often been pointed out. However
we cannot use these statistics to determine the presence of evolution by natural selection within
a system, as opposed to any system-induced dynamics which create high variance in persistence:
the Bedau-Packard statistics are not designed to distinguish the former from the latter, even by
using a shadow system.
In a sense, the Bedau-Packard statistics illustrate the distinction between “evolution” in
general, and the specific Darwinian process of evolution by natural selection. By focusing on
varying persistence, the Bedau-Packard statistics track changes in the genetic makeup of the
population, that is, “evolution” in the most general sense. The shadow filters out evolution
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Figure 9.1: Graphs showing the results of Bedau statistics for two non-Darwinian systems, as
well as for corresponding shadow systems. For each experiment, the topmost graph indicates
average cumulative activity A¯cum(t) =
Acum(t)
D(t) - the sum of all persistence counts of genomes
present at a time, divided by the number of genomes present at that time. The middle graph
indicates the cumulative distribution of persistence counts for all genomes over the history of
a run (that is, for each value, the number of individuals that survived longer than this value.)
The lowest graph shows the cumulative frequency counts for each genome over time (that is, the
running sum of the frequency of each genome within the population at each generation.) These
graphs are consistent with what is expected from real evolutionary systems [10, 11].
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caused by random drift, but cannot determine whether the remaining change is actually the
result of natural selection, rather than some other, unknown effect. The measure proposed here,
by contrast, takes pretty much the opposite approach: here we focus on the question of whether
or not a system is undergoing active Darwinian evolution, rather than the question of actual
genetic change or innovation.
The following section provides a description and justification of our measure, based on an
analysis of the Darwinian mechanism of evolution by natural selection.
9.3 Fitness Transmission: A test statistic for natural selection
9.3.1 Darwinian evolution: randomness, selection and heredity
As we saw in chapter 2, evolution in its broadest sense is simply a change in the heritable
characteristics of a population over generations. Natural selection is variance in reproductive
success caused by heritable characteristics. The Darwinian mechanism of evolution by natural
selection occurs when natural selection is sufficiently strong to produce noticeable evolution.
Darwin saw that adaptive evolution automatically results from the existence of fitness-
impacting, heritable variations. Variations that improve fitness will be propagated quickly,
initiating thriving lineages; while those that reduce fitness will hinder their own propagation,
creating feeble (or even quickly extinct) lineages. Thus lineages constantly branch out into vari-
ants, and the uneven distribution of these branches, being dramatically skewed towards those
which result from fitness-enhancing variations, will result in the overall effect that the newer
descendants of the original lineage will tend to be those better adapted to their current, local
environment: heritable fitness-affecting variation will have “steered” the original lineage towards
adaptive directions among all those encountered by mutational variations.3
Note that although this process will usually result in a modification of the species over
sufficiently long periods of time, it will also often result in temporary stasis. If a species happens
to be located at a convenient local optimum in the fitness landscape, then many variations which
depart from the optimum will tend to reduce the fitness of the individual. In this case the
differential transmission of characteristics enforced by natural selection will actively maintain
the population around the optimum: the population will be constantly steered back towards
its current position. This also occurs when being close to the population average is by itself
advantageous. This phenomenon, known as ‘stabilising selection’, is actually regarded as more
common than directional selection (see [150], Chap. 4.4). Lungfish and horseshoe crabs, which
have remained very similar (though not exactly identical) over the last 200 million years, are
well-known examples of evolutionary stasis. Indeed, distinguishing the continuing action of
Darwinian forces when the population remains globally stable (as opposed to mere absence
of variation or reproduction, which is a passive, non-evolutionary phenomenon) is one of the
challenges faced by any detector of natural selection.
3Or, in short: as creatures replicate, traits propagate, adaptations proliferate, and species originate.
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9.3.2 Fitness Transmission: A genealogic signature of Darwinian forces in a
reproductive system
From this discussion we can deduce a method to detect the active presence of natural selection.
If fitness-impacting, heritable traits are actually being transmitted and propagated, then this
should have an impact on the genealogical record: individuals sharing a common lineage, being
more likely to inherit common fitness-impacting characteristics, should therefore tend to exhibit
slightly similar fitnesses in comparison to the rest of the population. In other words, if some
fitness-affecting traits are being transmitted, then there should be some degree of correlation
between the fitnesses (that is, the reproductive success) of individuals from a common lineage:
the transmission of heritable, fitness-affecting traits should result in some degree of differential
transmission of fitness.
Fitness transmission is our proposed signature for natural selection. It is, quite simply,
the statistical correlation between the fitness of children and parents. The basic idea of fitness
transmission is that, when natural selection is active in a population, parents and children should
exhibit a tenuous, but persistent correlation in fitness.
This correlation would certainly be quite weak. Partly this is because the impact of any single
trait on a particular individual’s fitness is usually small. Reproductive success is determined
by very many factors (chance being often an important one). In addition to this, children
will usually not inherit all of their parent’s traits, so the fitness-impacting traits may not be
transmitted to all children. The result is that in general, the fitness of a particular child cannot
be precisely estimated from the fitness of its parents alone. Heritable fitness-impacting traits do
not predictably alter evolution at the level of a particular individual; but when many individuals
are considered, then over a large enough sample a tenuous correlation should emerge between
the reproductive successes of individuals from a common lineage, very much in the same way
that thermodynamical properties such as pressure and temperature, while not discernible (or
indeed definable) at the level of single molecules (which only exhibit widely varying kinetic
energies), emerge as consistent and important properties when a sufficient number of molecules
are considered. More than its actual value, which should be quite low, the enduring presence of
this correlation over time should be the real indicator of natural selection.
9.4 Calculation of Fitness Transmission
9.4.1 Number of grandchildren as a measure of fitness
The term “fitness” is notoriously ambiguous and can be a significant source of confusion [35,
Chap. 10] (see also chapter 2, section 2.3.2 in the present thesis). In general, it is supposed to
denote the ability of an individual to pass on its genes. This is usually equated with “reproductive
success” in a wide sense. However, this must not be taken to the letter: using direct reproductive
success (that is, number of children) as an estimator of evolutionary fitness is dangerous. For
example, it is possible to imagine genetic traits which would allow an individual to have many
children - but would make those children severely unfit or unviable. Such an adaptation would
not be favoured by natural selection, and would not correspond to the usual notion of fitness.
A common practical measure of an individual’s fitness is its number of grandchildren, rather
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than number of children (see e.g. [85]). To have many grandchildren, an individual must not
only have many children, but these children themselves must also be successful in reproducing;
this corresponds to the intuitive notion of fitness as ability to pass on one’s genes. We will
use the number of grandchildren as a measure of individual fitness. Therefore, to measure
fitness transmission, we measure the statistical correlation between the number of grandchildren
(NOGC) of an individual, and that of its children.
9.4.2 Fitness correlation as a local measure
Fitness correlation should be used as a local measure in time. That is, rather than calculating
fitness transmission in bulk over the entire genealogical record, it is preferable to divide the
record in time periods, or “slices”, and calculate fitness transmission independently for each
period. This is done by only considering individuals born within this time period for the “child”
data set of each period (the parents of these individuals are then collected in the “parents” data
set, independently of their time of birth).
Clearly this method has the advantage of allowing for a more precise analysis: we can track
periods of selective activity over time, identify periods of stronger and weaker selection, and
potentially locate important selective events over the history of the population. But, perhaps
more importantly, this also allows us to track the persistence and endurance of the correlation.
As we said earlier, the fitness transmission signal created by natural selection is likely to be low:
the enduring persistence of this signal, rather than its absolute value, should be the important
defining criterion for the presence of natural selection.
Importantly, this does not mean that the data itself should be strictly local to the time
period. For example, reproductive success for a given individual may be collected over its entire
history. The time-slicing only applies to the individuals included in each local data set for
calculation (in the “child” section of the data set), rather than the underlying data itself.
9.4.3 Comparing what is comparable
As usual when calculating statistical correlations, care should be taken in only comparing what is
comparable: conflating data from widely different distributions may result in artificial, spurious
correlations. Selective conditions may change widely over the course of an evolutionary run, even
with a fixed fitness function. This may wreak havoc on undiscerning evaluations of statistical
correlation. For example, if strict ranking is used, surviving and reproducing entails dislodging
a previous survivor; but as evolution proceeds towards an optimum, and new champions are
increasingly well-adapted, it becomes increasingly difficult (and thus rare) for new individuals
to dislodge previous champions. This means that the children’s fitness will tend to go down
(because more of them disappear without a descent) and the parent’s fitness will tend to go up
(because they remain in the population longer) over time. This alone is sufficient to create a
strong, negative correlation between the fitnesses of parents and children over the whole process:
earlier parents would have a moderate number of grandchildren, each with a good chance to
reproduce; while later parents would accumulate enormous numbers of grandchildren, which
would have comparatively low reproductive success.
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To avoid this, we must ensure that we only consider quantities (that is, fitnesses) obtained
under similar conditions. Collating data from widely different times would violate the require-
ment for a ‘fair comparison’. To this end, the periods over which reproductive successes are
measured should start at the same point in time, so that we can ensure that they are obtained
over equivalent conditions. In practice, this means that when we compare the NOGC of an indi-
vidual X and its parent, we should only consider the grandchildren of the parent that were born
after X (or, if applicable, after X’s maturity). This ensures a “fair game” between the parent
and the child: both scores will be obtained under similar circumstances, and results obtained
by the parents in earlier (possibly harsher or milder) circumstances will not spoil the data.
9.4.4 Necessary normalisations
Unfortunately, the choice of using NOGC as a measure of fitness introduces an obvious problem:
the NOGC of an individual and that of its children are clearly not independent quantities. Saying
that A has many grandchildren is saying that A’s children have many children, and therefore,
out of this fact alone, are likely to have many grandchildren themselves, even with random
reproduction. This problem can be easily addressed by normalisation to make the considered
values independent. To do this, we do not use the raw NOGC for the parents; rather, for every
parent-child pair, we consider the parent’s NOGC minus the number of children of this particular
child. This modified NOGC is an estimation of the parent’s fitness that is not biased by this
particular child’s own success, and thus any correlation represents a true correlation in fitness.
Another, less significant problem is that, in general, the population of interest will be finite.
The consequence is that the reproductive successes of individuals living during the same period
of time are not independent: any child for a given individual is one less opportunity for another
individual to have a child. Even with random mating and reproduction, if one individual happens
to have more children than average, then any other randomly picked individual is mechanically
more likely to have fewer children than average. In other words, limited population introduces
a slight negative correlation between the modified NOGC of parents and children. This effect
is much less important than the previous one, but may be noticeable, especially with small
populations. A simple solution to this problem is to normalise the modified NOGC of the
parent: for every parent-child pair (Pi, Ci) from the slice, we divide the modified NOGC of Pi
by the total sum of all grandchildren of all other parents within the slice - minus Ci’s children.
The resulting proportion is independent of this child’s own success.
Those normalisations are made necessary by the fact that the quantities under scrutiny are
not independent. They would become unnecessary if, instead of evaluating fitness transmission
from parents to children, we attempted to calculate it between grandparents and grandchildren.
The problem, of course, is that any signal would be much weaker due to the increased indirection
- often to the point of being drowned in noise.
9.4.5 Calculation method for fitness transmission
Where does this leave us? From all these considerations, we can deduce the following calculation
method for fitness transmission:
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• Divide the entire genealogic record into discrete periods of time. If the system is genera-
tional, generations may be used as time periods.
• For every time period within the genealogic record, perform the following operations:
1. For every individual Ci born during this time period, find its parent Pi (which may
be born at any time before Ci, not necessarily during this time period) and store
the resulting parent-child pair (Pi, Ci). Note that any given individual may occur in
several pairs.
2. For every stored parent-child pair (Pi, Ci), retrieve their respective total number of
grandchildren (NOGC) N(Pi) and N(Ci), born during or after (not before) this time
period.
3. Elimination of dependency: for every pair (Pi, Ci), subtract the number of children
of Ci from the N(Pi), resulting in the new value N ′(Pi).
4. Normalisation: for every parent Pi in the set of parent-children pairs for this time
period, divide N ′(Pi) by the sum of all grandchildren of all other parents Pj 6=i -
carefully excluding Ci and its descendants from the count. This results in a final
value N ′′(Pi)
5. Calculate the statistical correlation between the N ′′(Pi) and the N(Ci) variables over
all parent-child pair for this time period, using the standard Pearson formula:
Corr(X,Y ) =
∑N
i=1(xi − X¯)(yi − Y¯ )
(N − 1)σXσY
The resulting value Corr(N ′′(Pi), N(Ci)), for every time period, is our estimator for the
intensity of fitness transmission during that time period.
9.5 Experiments
9.5.1 Experimental settings
Our purpose in this section is to set up a couple of experiments in order to determine whether
fitness transmission is indeed a reliable indicator of Darwinian evolution. To do this, we will
use simple evolutionary systems with predictable dynamics, in which the presence or absence of
evolution can be easily controlled. We will apply our calculation method to these systems and
determine whether the presence or absence of Darwinian evolution was successfully detected.
To perform our experiments, we used genetic algorithms involving a population of 1000
individuals, over 100 generations. We considered two optimisation problems: the Rosenbrock
function 100(x2 − y2)2 + (1 − x)2 (using genomes of 2 × 12 bits) and a very simple OneMax
problem over 20 bits. The Rosenbrock function is a commonly used test function in the field
of optimisation. The purpose of the simple OneMax problem is to examine the behaviour of
different algorithms on very easy problems, when the the global optimum is discovered quickly.
In our algorithms, at each generation, a new population is created either by applying bit-
wise mutation to a parent selected from the previous generation, or (with 66% probability) by
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applying one-point crossover between two parents, and then applying bitwise mutation to the
resulting offspring. The probability of mutating (flipping) each bit is the reciprocal of the total
number of bits in the genome, rounded to the closest higher percent; thus, on average, each
genome should undergo about one mutation. As explained below, we tested different methods
of selection and replacement.
In a normal genetic algorithm, Darwinian evolution can be expected to occur. As a point of
comparison, we need to compare a “neutral” version of the genetic algorithm, which preserves
as many features of the algorithm as possible, while effectively removing Darwinian evolution.
We could simply use a normal genetic algorithm with random selection, similar to the shadow
systems used for the Bedau-Packard measures. However, in this case, the absence of fitness
transmission is a rather obvious result which hardly requires experimental verification. Can we
find a more challenging test case?
We chose to use genetic algorithms with uncorrelated landscapes, in which every new individ-
ual was attributed a random genotype (and therefore a random phenotype) at birth, regardless
of the genetic make-up of its parents. This is different from purely random selection in that
selection still occurs, and is still based on fitness; however the randomness of the reproductive
process turns the problem into a random search on a random landscape, thus preventing any
meaningful evolution: no innovation can propagate throughout the population. Fitness-affecting
traits are still present, but not heritable. A satisfactory measure of evolutionary activity should
be able to detect the absence of real evolution and return a zero value for this situation. Note
that, as discussed in section 9.2.3, Bedau-Packard statistics produce a positive signal when faced
with such a system.
9.5.2 A simple genetic algorithm
We first describe the calculation of fitness transmission in a standard genetic algorithm, quite
similar to the original model proposed by Holland [82], except that we use tournament selection
rather than roulette wheel selection. In this algorithm, each new individual is created by selecting
parents from the previous generation (using tournament selection), and generating offspring as
previously described. The process is iterated until the new population is filled.
Figure 9.2 shows the results of these calculations, applied to the “fossil record” generated
by our simple genetic algorithm. This figures shows the results for the Rosenbrock function
optimisation problem with 20 bits, both with normal reproduction and with reproduction based
on random phenotypes. The top graph shows the results of 5 different run for each of these
reproduction methods, while the bottom graph shows average curves over 50 runs. Figure 9.3
shows the same data for the OneMax problem. In the normal selection case, the correlation be-
tween the number of children of parents and children is distinctly positive (especially at the very
beginning at the run) and stabilises to a positive plateau. The enduring positive value indicates
that the population is constantly and actively maintained in the vicinity of the global optimum
(which is reached quite early in the OneMax problem) through active evolutionary forces. Even
though the optimum has been reached, mutation constantly disperses the population, and Dar-
winian evolution constantly drives it back. Stabilising selection results in a positive value for
differential fitness transmission.
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Figure 9.2: Rosenbrock function, non-overlapping generations, 5 different runs (top) and average
of 50 different runs with standard deviation at each point (bottom).
In the case of random genotypes, as expected, no meaningful fitness transmission occurs.
9.5.3 Removing mutation
It is easy to show that the enduring presence of fitness transmission in this case is caused by
mutation. If we set the mutation rate to zero (see figure 9.4), then the population converges
totally: all individuals end up sharing the exact same genome, and diversity disappears. From
this point on, all individuals having exactly the same genotype, reproduction patterns become
effectively random. The result is that evolutionary activity, as indicated by fitness transmission,
quickly goes to zero (with noise oscillations) after an initial phase of high activity: Natural
selection exerts no active force upon the system, because the population has basically frozen and
no genetic variation exists to drive evolution. This illustrates the capacity of fitness transmission
to distinguish between active stabilising selection on the one hand, and passive stillness caused by
absence of genetic variation on the other (though this ability breaks down in extreme situations,
as discussed in section 9.6.)
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Figure 9.3: OneMax function, non-overlapping generations, 5 runs (top) and average of 50 runs
(bottom).
9.5.4 Removing selective gradient among parents
Here we try to make the problem more challenging problem by reducing the scope of selection.
To do this, we modify our algorithm as follows: at every generation, a small set of survivors
is selected from the population through strict ranking selection, and the parents for the next
generation are then randomly selected from among this set of survivors. Offspring are created
using previously mentioned methods (60% crossover, mutation, etc.)
The effect of this modification is to effectively remove any selective gradient among parents.
This is because the only effect of selection is to decide which individuals become parents in the
first place. Once individuals have been selected as parents, their number of children is random,
and as a result is not affected by natural selection. In particular, note that if we had tried to
evaluate fitness by the number of children alone, then no fitness transmission could be detected:
no correlation can exist between the number of children of parents and children, simply because
all parents have a random number of children. However, as shown in figures 9.6 and 9.5, our
measure for fitness transmission is able to detect the signal created by this more indirect form
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Figure 9.4: OneMax function, non-overlapping generations, without mutation, 5 runs (top) and
averages of 50 runs (bottom).
of natural selection.
Note that in the case of the Rosenbrock problem, the resulting values are very low. We
use two significance test to confirm our interpretation of the graphical result. First, we want to
confirm that the expected fitness transmission is indeed non-zero for the selective case in the long
term (we arbitrarily define “long term” as “after cycle 30”). To do this, for each of the 50 runs,
we calculate the average value of fitness transmission from cycle 30 onwards. Out of the resulting
50 values, we find that 46 are above zero, while only 4 are under zero. A binomial distribution
calculation indicates that under the null hypothesis of equal probability of being under or over
zero, the probability p of obtaining at most 4 successes out of 46 trials is enormously low (on
the order of 10−10).
Second, we want to confirm that the values of fitness transmission for the selective process
are indeed superior to those for the non-selective process. To do this, we calculate the average
value of fitness transmission from cycle 30 onwards, for all 50 runs of both the selective and non-
selective process. We then perform a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test between the two samples.
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We obtain a significance value of p < 2 ∗ 10−6.
Figure 9.5: Rosenbrock function, non-overlapping generations with ranking-based survival and
random parent selection, 5 runs (top) and averages over 50 runs (bottom). The initially high
signal goes to a very low, but still noticeably non-zero value.
9.6 Limitations of fitness transmission
9.6.1 Extreme stabilising selection
We have seen how fitness transmission can be used to detect the presence and activity of natural
selection, even when this activity consists in maintaining the population around a local optimum
(stabilising selection). However, it must be pointed out that this last property does not hold
in the extreme case when stabilising selection is absolute - that is, when only those individuals
exactly at the optimum are able to reproduce, with no significant difference in reproductive suc-
cess among them, and individuals which deviate in any way from the optimum cannot reproduce
at all.
In this case, it is clear that no fitness transmission occurs: there is no heritable characteristic
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Figure 9.6: OneMax function, non-overlapping generations with ranking-based survival and
random parent selection, 5 runs (top) and averages over 50 runs (bottom).
that can alter an individual’s reproductive success, except by destroying it entirely. Fitter par-
ents do not have fitter children. The only feature that can alter reproductive success (mutation
away from the optimum) actually eliminates it altogether, and therefore is not transmissible4.
In this situation, stabilising selection has the effect of effectively freezing the reproducing pop-
ulation, and therefore becomes invisible to fitness transmission. In fact, it is impossible to
distinguish such a situation from purely random selection without accessing the genetic record
(or an indirect proxy, such as the record of fitness function evaluations for artificial systems.)
9.6.2 General limitations of genealogic analysis
More generally, there are pathological situations in which genealogic methods cannot be used
to detect natural selection. Such a situation occurs when all individuals present at any given
4Notice the difference with the situation evoked in section 9.5.4, in which, despite the fact that all parents for
a generation had equal chances at reproduction, they could pass on genes that could influence the probability
that their own descendants would also be selected as parents.
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time share the exact same genealogic tree - in other words, when there is never more than one
lineage in the population.
Genealogic analysis basically consists in comparing the relative growth of various lineages.
This implies that there should actually be several lineages within the population, otherwise no
comparison is possible. However, we may imagine a system in which all individuals present at
any time within the population share the same entire genealogic tree. In this case, there is
only ever one single lineage present at any time within the population, and no comparison is
possible. For example, consider a non-overlapping generational system, such that all individuals
from every new generations have exactly the same parents from the previous generation: at
every generation, two individuals are chosen to serve as parents for the next generation, and
all the individuals from the new generation are children of both of those selected parents. In
this case, Darwinian evolution may certainly occur, but genealogic analysis will not be able to
detect whether the selection of parents is adaptive or random. This is because all individuals
will always share the exact same set of parents, grandparents, and so on.
We believe that this situation is sufficiently exotic to preserve the usefulness of genealogical
analysis. At any rate such situations can be easily detected in any system for which a genealogical
record exists.
9.7 What Fitness Transmission measures, and what it doesn’t
Having proposed differential fitness transmission as a signature for Darwinian evolution, it is
important to make it clear what exactly this signature reveals and what it doesn’t, in order to
avoid confusion.
Fitness transmission is not a measure of performance or optimisation. This is readily seen
from the fact that even random search can produce some amount of optimisation, even though
no evolutionary activity or fitness transmission is present. Conversely, we saw that for some
algorithms, fitness transmission can remain positive even after the global optimum has been
reached, as long as Darwinian forces keep acting on the population.
Fitness transmission is not a measure of inventiveness, creativity or novelty. Whether or
not the newly created individuals are novel or not is not considered: only their fitness (and the
correlation between their fitness and their parents’ and children’s fitness) is taken into account.
Again, this is seen from the fact that positive fitness transmission is compatible with the fact that
the population is being maintained around a single optimum, where no adaptively significant
innovation is introduced.
A more subtle aspect of fitness transmission is that it detects natural selection in general,
including natural selection bearing on non-genetic traits. Any kind of heritable trait that affect
reproductive success (genetic, epigenetic, cultural, etc.) will be detected by fitness transmission.
If the objective is to detect biological natural selection only, then fitness transmission should
not be used alone.
Fitness transmission is simply the answer to this question: “all other things being equal, is it
true that individuals from a common lineage will tend (ever so slightly) to have similar fitness?”
Since nothing is assumed about the nature of fitness, except for its basic observational property
(reproductive success), we can attempt the following, general statement: fitness transmission
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simply measures the presence or absence of some force which actively favours some lineages at
the expense of others (over at least two generations). We believe that in general, this constitutes
a good signature of Darwinian evolution by the operation of natural selection on heritable
characteristics.
9.8 Conclusion
We have shown that differential fitness transmission is a useful signature of Darwinian evolu-
tion, which can be detected in genealogical records by using simple statistics. We believe that
this signature may be more suitable for this purpose than previously suggested methods for
detecting evolution. We have applied these statistics to the genealogical records generated by
real evolutionary algorithms, demonstrating their capacity to detect the presence or absence of
adaptive evolution. In chapter 10 we will apply this measure to a much more complex system,
namely a “virtual world” in which virtual creatures evolve freely.
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Chapter 10
Evosphere: Emergence of natural
selection and Darwinian evolution
among free-living artificial creatures
Wherefore he made the world in the form of a globe, round as from a lathe, having its
extremes in every direction equidistant from the centre, the most perfect and the most
like itself of all figures; for he considered that the like is infinitely fairer than the unlike.
Plato, Timaeus.
10.1 Introduction: evolution unbound
In previous chapters we have used our platform to implement and study various algorithms. Our
discussion was very much oriented towards performance, optimisation and efficiency: we sought
to obtain “good” individuals, where “good” is understood to relate to a given task specified a
priori (locomotion, box-grabbing, combat, etc.) In fact, we devoted much time to the definition
of useful measurements of performance, both for individuals or for algorithms.
However, it has long been argued that evolution as it occurs in nature is fundamentally
different from the most common type of evolutionary process encountered in artificial evolution
- namely, selection based on human-defined fitness functions. There is much speculation that
the use of a pre-defined fitness function constrains the evolutionary process into a predictable
pathway, thereby curtailing the creativity of evolution as it occurs in nature. In this line of rea-
soning, evolution based on human-defined fitness functions is sometimes equated to the process
of artificial selection, as applied by human breeders and farmers to crops and animals in order to
favour certain desirable characteristics; this is contrasted with “real” natural selection, which is
bound neither by our selfish interests nor by our lack of insight or imagination. The conclusion
is that only “free”, unguided natural selection can produce the dazzling amount of complexity
and diversity evident in nature. For example, Ray [147] writes:
I suggest that the most likely way to achieve complexity increase in digital evolution
is through evolution by natural selection in an ecological community. No attempt
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should be made to provide fitness functions, or artificial selection, to guide evolution
towards useful products. Rather, evolution should be free to explore the possibilities
without the burden of human “guidance”.
Traditionally we have managed evolution through manipulating selective forces. In
this new approach, our role is to create the conditions for complexity increase, rather
than trying to guide it through artificial selection.
Ray prudently points out that “this is an interesting scientific challenge, as the conditions
that generate complexity increase are unknown.”
In a similar vein, Channon [28] writes (emphasis original):
In the context of evolutionary emergence, any artificial selection system used consti-
tutes just one of the parts of a system. Artificial selection can only select for that
which is specified to. Therefore anything that emerges during evolution must be due
to another aspect of selection, which must in turn be due to the innate dynamics of
the system - natural selection.
Packard [137] has attempted to make this distinction more explicit, by introducing the
concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic adaptation (emphasis original):
A common approach in modelling evolutionary processes is to regard a member of a
population as fit or unfit according to how it is evaluated by a fitness function. The
fitness function is a map that assigns a real number (the fitness) to every possible
member of the population, and it is generally specified as an a priori feature of the
model. . . I will call any adaptive dynamics that uses such an a priori fitness function
extrinsic adaptation. . .
The biosphere does not appear to have any a priori fitness function defined on a space
of possible organisms; in fact, one of the most amazing features of biological evolution
is that the biosphere evolves automatically, with each organism (or population of an
organism) adapting to an environment made up of both external natural features
and all other organisms it interacts with. . . I will call adaptation that occurs as a
result of a population of subsystems changing in response to interactions between
them (without an a priori fitness function) intrinsic adaptation.
10.1.1 Explicit and implicit fitness functions
There may be an objection to this view. In any evolutionary simulation, it is necessary that
the human programmer define how survival and reproduction occur: there must be rules to
determine who lives and who reproduce, otherwise no evolution could occur at all. But a set of
rules that determine which individuals survive and reproduce (or not) is precisely what we call
a fitness function. This being so, how could we build a system “without any fitness function”?
The issue is resolved by making a distinction between explicit and implicit fitness function.
It is true that the programmer must define the rules that determine when and how an individual
dies, or reproduce, or is born. Together, these processes define the explicit fitness function -
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the narrow specification of which conditions will mechanically cause death, or reproduction, or
birth. However, this under-determines the question of which individuals will turn out to actually
fulfil these narrow conditions. This is decided by the dynamics of the process, which occur as
a (potentially unpredictable) result of the rules of the system. The important point is that, if
the fulfilment of these conditions is somehow dependent on heritable characteristics, then these
characteristics (which are not directly involved in the explicit fitness function) will become the
target of adaptive evolution.
For example, imagine that the rule for reproduction is simply that any individual that reaches
a certain energy level is allowed to produce one offspring. This is clearly a fitness function.
However, it does not determine how such a level of energy may be reached. This depends on
the mechanics of the system, which may (or may not) be highly complex and unpredictable.
Thus, out of the interaction between the narrow, explicit fitness function, the genetic rep-
resentation (what is under genetic control) and the dynamics of the system, an implicit fitness
function may spontaneously emerge, that may not be immediately predictable from the explicit
rules of the system.
10.1.2 Different types of implicit fitness functions
However, even if an implicit fitness function does emerge that is not directly specified in the
explicit fitness function, it is perfectly possible that this function will turn out to be utterly
boring and static. If such a thing happens, then all we have done is indirectly recreating a fixed
(possibly multimodal) fitness function, that the system will duly optimise. To carry on with
the previous example, suppose that the only way for an individual to gain energy is simply to
move around and cover as much ground as possible, or to be located in a certain portion of the
environment. If this is so (and assuming that motion is affected by hereditary characteristics),
then the implicit fitness function reduces to “move very fast” or “go to that place and stay there”.
In this case, there is not much difference between the implicit and explicit fitness function; both
will be defined a priori, creating a fixed fitness landscape that will be determined even before
the experiment starts.
However, things are different when coevolution is introduced in the fitness landscape; that is,
when the survival and reproduction of individuals is linked to the interactions between their own
heritable characteristics, and those of other individuals. If it is so, then the fitness landscape
becomes self-generated : it arises spontaneously from the interactions between individuals, and
changes over time as individuals themselves change through evolution and thereby offer new
adaptive opportunities for other individuals. In other words, when the system is coevolutionary,
the population constantly generates its own implicit fitness functions.
However, even in this case, it is perfectly possible that this emerging, self-generated fitness
landscape turn out to be entirely unimodal and predictable: the coevolutionary process may
well turn out to possess one global optimum, towards which evolution will converge. In fact, in
the context of coevolutionary optimisation, this is precisely what we want: for example, if we
want to design a chess player through coevolution, we use coevolution as a substitute for a (non-
existent) fitness function that would capture the essence of “good play”. We are not interested
in mutual adaptation or ecological effects - in fact, these are seen as a nuisance that harms
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progress in terms of general abilities. Indeed, much of this thesis has concentrated precisely on
defining unambiguous, a priori scales of “goodness”- and on ensuring that algorithms actually
follow those scales, instead of getting trapped in endless mutual adaptations.
But in the context of artificial ecologies, it might be preferable to observe dynamic fitness
landscapes, in which various implicit fitness function would continuously emerge in response
to each other. That is, the evolving lineages would enter into a constant cascade of innova-
tions, adaptations and counter-adaptations, perpetually generating (and filling) new niches and
thereby offering new opportunities for others. Such processes, which are readily apparent in na-
ture, seem to capture the intent of the authors quoted above. Through such a process, artificial
evolution might attempt to imitate nature’s ability to generate “endless forms most beautiful”
from “simple beginnings”.
Note that we are not simply talking about dynamism and multimodality in themselves. It is
of course easy to generate multi-modality and dynamic fitness function through entirely external
means, simply by adjusting and altering the parameters of the simulation over time, so that the
fitness optima vary over time. However, the really interesting case is when the dynamism and
multi-modality of the implicit fitness function is a direct result of internal evolutionary effects -
that is, when new fitness landscape emerge in response to each other through coevolution itself.
10.1.3 Summary and classification
To sum things up, the distinction between “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” adaptation cannot be
summarised as the (impossible) absence of any fitness function. Rather, this distinction hinges
on the following parameters:
1. Whether the implicit function is fixed a priori, or self-generated; the latter occurs if there
is coevolution within the system.
2. Whether the implicit fitness function is fixed and unimodal, or dynamic and massively
multi-modal.
3. Whether the dynamism and multi-modality of the implicit fitness function is determined
by entirely external factors, or whether they are also internally generated by the system,
in that implicit fitness function constantly emerge in response to each other.
This discussion suggests a natural classification of evolutionary environments, according to
their degree of evolutionary “creativity”.
• Level 0: The implicit fitness function is entirely defined a priori. Coevolutionary effects
play no significant role in the fitness landscape.
• Level 1: The fitness landscape is self-generated, being affected by coevolutionary effects,
but results in a single, stable implicit fitness function. If several peaks exist, or if the
implicit fitness function(s) change(s) over time, this is due to entirely external, “climatic”
variations in the parameters of the environment.1
1To distinguish between levels 0 and 1, a simple test suggests itself: let us alter the system so that, at any
time, only one individual is subject to evolution (that is, the evolving genome is expressed by only one individual
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– Level 1b: Similar to Level 1, but the implicit fitness function that emerges is unpre-
dictable and can vary from run to run.
• Level 2: The fitness landscape is affected by coevolutionary effects, and results in several
implicit fitness functions that do emerge in response to each other. This process goes on
for a finite period of time, after which the system settles in a fixed equilibrium in which
no novel implicit fitness function appears. This may include constant cycling through
previously found fitness function. In short, the total number of implicit fitness function
generated (and optimised) by the system is bounded over time.
– Level 2b: Similar to Level 2, but the implicit fitness functions that emerge are un-
predictable and can vary from run to run.
• Level 3: The fitness landscape is coevolutionary and the system constantly generate new
implicit fitness functions which emerge in response to each other. No equilibrium is found,
and novel fitness functions are constantly being generated. This corresponds to a situation
of truly “open-ended evolution”.
10.2 Objectives
Several open evolutionary systems have been described. Tierra [146, 148], Polyworld [197], and
Geb [28, 27] are well-known examples (see Appendix B). However, these systems generally use
immaterial entities, devoid of a tangible “body” through which they could physically interact
with their environment and neighbours. By contrast, in the present chapter we seek to produce
an intrinsic adaptation environment that is based on embodied individuals, endowed with re-
alistic physical morphologies. In fact, we intend to make physical interactions the very basis
of evolution. Previous implementations of evolution among physically realistic individuals have
been centred on explicit fitness functions or head-to-head coevolution, perhaps most famously
in Sims [163, 162]. In the case of Framsticks (described in Appendix B), despite the physical
realism of the system, interactions between individuals are entirely non-physical; for example,
“fighting” is implemented simply as a comparison between energy levels, such that the individual
with the highest energy level “wins”.2
The objectives of the present chapter can therefore be summarised as follows:
• Creating an environment in which a population of free-living creatures physically interact
with each other.
• Initiating a process of spontaneous natural selection and Darwinian evolution in this en-
vironment, without any explicit fitness function.
within the system) while the rest of the population is composed of fixed individuals. If the results of evolution
are the same in this altered system as in the original system, then it is clear that the trajectory of the system is
not dependent on coevolutionary effects.
2See the “Deathmatch tutorial” by W. de Back and M. Komosinski, apparently not formally published but
available on the website of the University of Utrecht Virtual Life Lab.
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• Demonstrating the occurrence of Darwinian evolution, not just by visual inspection, but
more formally by using the method previously described in chapter 9 - namely, Fitness
Transmission.
By applying Fitness Transmission to our system, we expect to detect the onset of natural
selection and Darwinian evolution (should they occur), but we also seek to illustrate the appli-
cation of Fitness Transmission to a “real” system (as opposed to the toy models used in chapter
9).
10.3 Evosphere: An open environment for free-living creatures
10.3.1 The “micro-planet” environment
Because our environment is expected to contain many free-living creatures, we would like it to
be open, that is, without boundaries. The imposition of barriers could introduce unpredictable
effects into the dynamics of the system. While certain systems (such as Polyworld) choose to
embrace the existence and effects of such barriers, others (such as Geb) solve the problem by
using a “toroidal” 2D environment where the top connects with the bottom and the left with
the right.
In a 3D environment, the simplest structure that dispenses with boundaries is obviously the
sphere. We therefore choose to implement our environment in the form of a sphere, or “micro-
planet”. Creatures dwell on the surface of this planet, which is sufficiently large to allow for free
movement of each creature.
10.3.2 Interaction: physical damage
The creatures themselves are similar to those presented in chapter 5. The main mode of inter-
action between creatures (besides sensors) is through physical contact, and the damage that it
may create. When two creatures come into contact, they may suffer damage, in a way similar to
that described in chapter 5; however, damage is now proportional to the absolute speed of each
contacting limb towards the other. In this way, at any point of contact between two creatures,
one or both contacting limbs may actually suffer damage.
Let us call both contacting limbs L1 and L2. Since there is contact, L1 and L2 inter-penetrate
by a very small amount P (the sign of which is unimportant). We first run an additional step of
simulation by allowing L1 to pursue its own motion for one step, while L2 is fixed. This results
in a new penetration depth P12. We then restore their initial positions and do the opposite,
allowing L2 to move for one step while L1 is kept fixed. This results in another penetration
depth P21. The damage suffered by L1 is proportional to P21 − P , while the damage suffered
by L2 is proportional to P12 − P . If any of these values is negative, the corresponding limb
suffers no damage at all, because it implies that the other limb was moving “away” at the time
of contact.
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10.3.3 Energy and death
Every new creature is born with a certain amount of “energy” E0, which is a constant of
the system. At every timestep, this energy is being decreased by a (small) amount δEtime.
Additionally, energy is also lost through physical damage: if a creature suffers damage D, its
energy is decreased by an amount δEdamage proportional to D. The parameters are chosen in
such a way that physical contact is much more damaging than the passage of time.
When a creature’s energy falls to zero or under zero, it is removed from the simulation and
immediately replaced with a new creature: the population size is therefore constant. How the
new creature is generated depends on the manner in which the removed creature met its end.
10.3.4 Reproduction
At any timestep, if a creature’s energy becomes nil or negative, there are two possibilities: either
the creature has suffered damage in this very timestep, which has contributed to its demise; or
it has not suffered any damage in this timestep, and therefore the annihilation of its energy
is solely the result of δEtime. In the first case, it has been “killed”. In the latter case, it has
simply “died”. Of course, a dying creature may well have suffered extensive damage in previous
timesteps, but this is not relevant: only the very last timestep of the creature is considered.
If a creature dies “peacefully”, that is, without having suffered any damage in this timestep,
then the new creature that replaces it is generated by selecting two parents at random from the
population, and applying one of the previously mentioned genetic operators (mutation, genetic
crossover, grafting; see chapter 4 and Appendix A) to one or both of the parents as suitable.
On the other hand, if a creature has been “killed”, it is replaced with a mutated clone of
its killer, that is, of the creature that delivered the fatal blow. In the unlikely case that two or
more creatures have inflicted damage upon the dying creature during the same timestep, the
one that inflicted the highest damage is deemed the “killer”.
There is the question of how to insert the new creature into the ongoing simulation, while
minimising disturbances. We simply “drop” the new creature, from a fixed height, over a random
point of the sphere. In addition, each new creature is granted an initial “grace delay” during
which it cannot suffer or inflict damage. This delay is long enough to cover the fall to the ground
and a short period beyond.
10.3.5 Consequences of the rules
From these rules we can infer certain properties of the system:
1. The initial amount of energy E0 sets a maximum lifetime (equal to E0/δEtime) that no
creature can exceed. This maximum is that of a creature that does not undergo any
contact. Any action taken by the creature can only reduce this lifetime (through physical
damage), or leave it unaffected. In particular, in the early stages when damage will be
infrequent, it is expected that many poor creatures will reach the maximum lifetime -
simply by standing still and not having any contacting neighbour.
2. A creature can favour its own reproduction in two ways: by killing others, or (to a lesser
extent) by avoiding damage better than others. In the first case, it can generate clones. In
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the second case, it will have more chances than others to be selected as a random parent
for dying creatures.
3. Due to the manner in which damage is apportioned, any contact is risky. When making
contact with another creature, if the other creature’s limb is coming towards you, you will
suffer damage.
4. A creature that inflicts much damage upon another will only benefit if this damage is
deadly. If the creature goes on to live for just another timestep, and then dies, the
aggressor will not benefit.3
5. Even in the earliest stages of evolution, a small degree of damage will be inflicted due
to semi-random contact. As a consequence, a small portion of deaths will be caused by
killings.
10.4 Results
10.4.1 Emergence of natural selection and evolution
Natural selection and evolution consistently arise in the system, as observed both by visual
inspection of creatures and by numerical evaluation of fitness transmission.
The system generated a wide range of morphologies.4 Though some broad categories may
be found (“worms”, two-armed “crawlers”, etc.), some creatures were altogether quite bizarre in
their construction. Figure 10.2 shows four pairs of creatures evolved from four different worlds.
The majority of behaviours were purely motile behaviours and did not make use of sensor
input: these creatures evolved efficient movements for “hitting without being hit.” However,
some creatures did include sensory input, including contact sensors and detection of other in-
dividuals. For example, the “crested” creature in the top-right corner of Figure 10.2 uses a
y-sensor in its head limb (see chapter 4) to approach the closest other creature in a “swirling”
motion (the creature moves by undulation).
In general, the dominant strategies were variants of a “roaming” behaviour: move fast in an
undulating manner to hit whatever comes close.
10.4.2 Fitness transmission analysis
Figure 10.3 shows a graph of fitness transmission as a function of time. A genealogic record of
the system is divided into periods of 20000 timesteps (a rather arbitrary value corresponding to
3Actually, the aggressor does benefit marginally, because the weakened creature dying sooner provides another
opportunity for reproduction of random parents, in which the aggressive creature has a small probability of being
chosen as a parent. However, this “benefit” is enjoyed by all creatures alive at the time, since parents for the new
creature are randomly chosen among all the living population. On the other hand, the risk induced by damaging
the dying creature were taken solely by the aggressor itself. Consequently, theory indicates (and experiments
confirm) that this benefit does not create a positive selection for aggression; another, more focused benefit (in
this case, cloning-by-killing) is necessary.
4All creatures described in this chapter had either the highest or second-highest number of children of all
creatures alive at the time of observation. In open evolution, maximum number of children is the closest ap-
proximation to the notion of “champion” that exists in experiments based on fitness function or head-to-head
coevolution.
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Figure 10.1: Evosphere, as seen from “space”.
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Figure 10.2: Four pairs of creatures from various runs.
twice the maximum possible lifetime of a creature). The graph in this figure provides the fitness
transmission calculated for each of these periods, as well as a rolling average over 5 successive
values.
As indicated by this graph, the system usually goes through an early phase of very low
or absent fitness transmission, denoting low or non-existent natural selection. In this phase,
creatures are so ill-adapted that any damage they inflict or suffer arises mostly through chance
rather than because of their characteristics. However, certain characteristics can be faintly
advantageous, such as temporary motion as opposed to absolute immobility (depending on the
presence of close neighbours).
This phases ends with the appearance of persistent, oscillating motion. As discussed in
chapter 4, persistent motion requires oscillating neural activation and therefore specific con-
nection patterns. Oscillating limbs are highly advantageous for two reasons. First, they allow
the creature to displace itself on the surface of the world, rather than remaining in its initial
location. Second, constant motion of limbs implies constant possibility of inflicting damage
upon other creatures. Once this innovation is introduced in the system, natural selection has
something substantial to operate on (that is, fitness-impacting heritable characteristics), and
Darwinian evolution begins in earnest. This is reflected in a sudden increase in the value of
fitness transmission. Roaming behaviours quickly emerge, and thrive.
As an additional confirmation of the validity of fitness transmission analysis, we provide the
number of killings per period of time (where the division in periods is identical to that used
for fitness transmission). The onset of high fitness transmission occurs precisely at the time
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Figure 10.3: Fitness transmission as a function of time, together with a rolling average over 5
values. An initial inactive phase suddenly gives way to a phase of consistently positive activity.
Figure 10.4: Number of kills within the population of the same run as in Figure 10.3. A sudden
rise in the number of kills coincides with the onset of positive fitness transmission.
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when the number of killings starts to increase significantly, indicating that new capacities are
spreading throughout the population.
10.4.3 Panmictic models and diversity
While the previous experiments demonstrated the onset of adaptive evolution, the end result of
this evolution tends to be predictable and uniform: large individuals equipped with oscillating
limbs, roaming over the sphere and hitting anything they can. Also, while there is variability
between runs, each run tends to converge towards one superior morphology, leaving little room
for diversity. Thus our system (as it stands) seems to fall in class 1, according to the classification
discussed above.
We note, however, that the rules for reproduction and replacement are not really favourable
to diversity: we used a panmictic model, in which everyone can mate with everyone. Once a
dominant strategy emerges, it can easily take over the population. Thus we ask the following
question: is predictability of outcome a fundamental aspect of Evosphere, or is it simply an
effect of panmictic reproduction? To answer this question, we eliminate the panmictic aspect of
the system by introducing species, that is, reproductively isolated populations.
10.5 Coevolution between species
10.5.1 Species implementation
We want to implement species in such a way as to enforce genetic separation, but also leaving
evolution as free as possible. In particular, we want species numbers to fluctuate over time,
according to their respective success - to the point of going extinct if such is their fate.
To do this, we set a fixed number of species Ns. Each creature belongs to a certain species.
If a creature dies (without being killed), it is replaced by a new creature from a randomly
picked species. Two parents from this species are randomly selected, and the genetic operators
mentioned above are applied. The resulting new creature is included in the same species as its
parents. On the other hand, if a creature is killed, it is replaced by a mutated clone of its killer.
The new creature (the mutated clone) is included in the same species as the killer. Thus species
can increase and decrease through deaths and replacements.
If a species’ population falls to 3 individuals, then this species is deemed extinct. Its re-
maining creature are removed, and the freed slots in the population are attributed to the largest
species. The largest species is then split into two separate species, of equal size. One of these to
daughter groups continues the split species, while the other replaces the extinct species. Thus,
as each extinction creates a split, the number of species is kept constant.
10.5.2 Results
As in the panmictic model, the first behaviour to emerge is consistently a “roaming” behaviour:
creatures that use oscillating limbs to move fast and hit at close-by creatures. Discovery of these
behaviours is the key event that generates active natural selection, as indicated by the fitness
transmission graph (compare Figure 10.7 and Figure 10.6).
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Figure 10.5: From top to bottom: population sizes, average volume, and number of kills inflicted
for two species A and B. The x-axis (time dimension) is graded in “cycles”, where each cycle
corresponds to 5000 timesteps. Notice the initial indistinct period, followed by a division between
a larger, active species and a smaller, passive species. Notice the diminution in volume of (active)
species A around cycle 500: this is due to the invention of a highly successful “worm” form,
which is smaller in volume than previous killer morphologies.
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This behaviour then consistently triggers an evolutionary response from other species, namely
miniaturisation: competing species tend to get smaller in volume. The advantage of miniatur-
isation is obvious: the smaller you are, the lower the chance of getting hit by roamers. When
the number of roamers is high enough, small creatures can obtain a strong survival advantage,
which leads to increased reproductive success as long-lived individuals have more opportunities
to be chosen as parents.
Figures 10.5-10.6 depict the population size, the number of kills inflicted, and average crea-
ture size for runs involving two or three species, as a function of time. In these pictures, the
x-axis corresponds to “cycles”, where each cycles covers 5000 timesteps. While the dynamics of
these runs vary, certain common features a readily seen: after a short initial period, one species
reaches an efficient (roaming) behaviour, resulting in a high number of kills and population
increase. The other species shrink rapidly, not only in numbers, but also in average size. In the
end a steady state emerge, in which one species has specialised as “active” roamers, reproducing
mostly through kills, while the others specialise in miniaturisation and reproduce “passively”
through replacement of deaths. As indicated in the figures, extinction events may also occur.
The “miniature” species seem to have much more variance in volume than the active species,
which is expected given their smaller population sizes.
The division between active (killing), large, numerous species and passive (non-killing), small
species was consistently observed. Furthermore, the system seems to favour the presence of only
one active species. After extinction events, when the largest species (which is invariably the
active one) is split into two groups, only one of these groups remains active, while the other is
forced into a passive lifestyle.
The behaviour of the active species generally relies on the use of one or more undulating
limbs to achieve locomotion. This can be used in several ways. One option is to emphasise
locomotion, in order to cover as much ground as possible. Species following this strategy tend to
evolve slim morphologies with very efficient motile behaviour. This strategy often culminates in
streamlined, high-speed “worms”. Another possibility is to emphasise damage dealt on contact.
These species develop morphologies that travel less efficiently, but maximise the probability and
intensity of damage when colliding with other individuals.
The presence of different strategies, which emerge in response to each other (rather than
being immediate adaptations to external parameters of the system) indicate that the system lies
in class 2 of our classification.
10.6 Conclusion
We have described an open environment, Evosphere, in which free-living creatures interact freely.
Reproduction can occur either by killing and cloning, or simply by staying alive long enough to
be chosen as a parent for replacement of dying creatures that were not directly killed.
This environment is successful in generating natural selection and adaptive evolution. This
adaptation consists in the discovery and refinement of efficient behaviours. Adaptive evolution
is observed both by visual inspection of creatures, and by fitness transmission calculations. The
correlation between the onset of morphological evolution and of positive fitness transmission
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Figure 10.6: From top to bottom: population sizes, average volume, and number of kills inflicted
for three species A, B and C. The gradation and general features are similar to those in Figure
10.5. The apparent exchange in positions between species A and B soon after 200 cycles is due
to an extinction event: soon after species A discovers a working killing behaviour, species B goes
extinct. Species A is split in two and one of the resulting groups is affected to replace species
B. This group proves more successful and confines its sister group (still labelled “species A”) to
a passive, miniature lifestyle.
126
Figure 10.7: Fitness transmission for the run depicted in Figure 10.6. The onset of positive
fitness transmission coincides closely with the increases in numbers of kills and population size
divergence.
constitutes additional confirmation (on an actual complex system rather than on toy models)
that fitness transmission is a usable signature of active natural selection.
Furthermore, when restrictions on mating are imposed through the introduction of species,
evolutionary “responses” are observed, in that one species evolves in adaptation to another one’s
evolutionary changes. Thus evolving species in this system are in principle capable of creating
and altering each other’s fitness landscape. While the behaviours observed so far remain simple,
this is an encouraging indication of this system’s potential for future investigations.
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Chapter 11
Conclusion: The Road to
Everywhere
This work was motivated by a double recognition. First, we acknowledged the prodigious power
of evolution in creating complex adaptive designs, and the obvious appeal of using this power
for human interests. Second, we took note (as did many authors) of a discrepancy between the
expectations placed on artificial evolution, and what could be inferred from the mechanism of
evolution itself.
This discrepancy was particularly acute concerning the notion of progress in evolution and
coevolution. This applied equally to the concept of progress in an “engineering” sense of per-
formance, or in the more abstract sense of increase in complexity. In both cases, the problem
was not so much one of false beliefs or incorrect reasoning, but rather stemmed from confusion
about terms and implicit assumptions that were somehow not clearly enunciated.
Accordingly, much of our work consisted in conceptual clarification. By giving full attention
to apparently innocuous details, we were able to fend off much unnecessary confusion and tackle
certain lingering disputes (e.g. regarding complexity.) Building upon this, we proposed several
methods to address the challenges posed by artificial evolution and coevolution. To illustrate
these methods, we also produced a complex experimental system, introducing several firsts
along the way (first complete replication of Sims’ results; first implementation of evolving both
morphology and behaviour of 3D creatures for physical combat; first evolutionary environment
based on free-living 3D creatures interacting physically.)
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarised as follows:
1. Coevolution, superiority and progress
In chapter 3 we investigated the notions of performance, superiority and progress in co-
evolution. We pointed out that the notions of superiority and progress in coevolution were
necessarily based on a given superiority criterion and on a given set of reference opponents.
Depending on the implicit set of opponents considered, several notions of superiority and
progress can be identified, namely: local, historical and global. Local superiority implies
superiority when comparing respective performances against current opponents; histor-
ical superiority implies superiority when comparing performances against all previously
encountered opponents; and global superiority implies superiority when comparing perfor-
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mances against all possible opponents. Each of these notions of superiority, when applied
between newer and older individuals within an evolutionary process, result in a correspond-
ing notion of progress. We contended that much confusion about coevolution stems from a
confusion between local, historical and global progress. Local progress is immediately ex-
pected under natural selection; historical progress can be enforced by various algorithmic
means, such as the use of an archive; global progress corresponds to the implicit objective
of practitioners of coevolution, but cannot be reduced to any of the previous ones.
Comparing our concepts with the recent work of Ficici [53, 54], we found much common
ground. However, we pointed out the difficulties posed by monotonic solution concepts,
and that practitioners might not necessarily discard intuitive solution concepts (such as
best scoring strategy, i.e. global superiority using the average score criterion) and adopt
monotonic solution concepts instead.
2. Evolution and Complexity: in chapter 8, we addressed the question of whether or not an
“arrow of complexity” [12] exists in evolution. We drew from recent evolutionary research
(especially from McShea [117, 119]) to avoid common misunderstandings and identify
implicit assumptions that may have hampered previous discussion. We argued at length,
based on arguments from logic and from evidence, that the clear increase in the maximum
of complexity in the course of biological evolution was most adequately explained as a
passive trend, whereby a complexity-neutral evolutionary process constantly branches out
into many directions and thus mechanically pushes the upper envelope of complexity.
Noticing that such a passive trend was in no way trivial (especially considering how much
artificial evolution seems to be biased against a continuous increase in complexity), we
tried to formulate a set of abstract conditions necessary for such a continuous trend to
occur.
3. Analysing coevolution: in chapter 6 we described several tools and methods to track the
performance of coevolutionary algorithms over time, building upon previous work, and
making use of our improved understanding of coevolutionary progress. Coarse-grained
Master Tournaments (expanding on work by Cliff & Miller [32] and Nolfi & Floreano [133])
were introduced as a method to observe historical progress. Cross-validation of runs was
proposed as a way to introduce a component of global progress in the evaluation, suggesting
that full cross-validation of many runs (if computationally feasible) would offer a reliable
estimation of global progress. Finally, we described how equal-effort comparisons could
be performed between coevolutionary runs from various algorithms, in order to compare
their relative performance over time.
In Chapter 7, we illustrated the use of equal-effort comparisons to give a firm answer to a
simple question: in the (modified) LEO algorithm, how many interactions per evaluation
are optimal, and what is the advantage of using a sliding archive? Our answer was that the
advantage of adding more competitions per evaluation plateaued quickly, with a maximum
between 3 and 4; and that sliding archives provided a small, but noticeable advantage in
the long run, though this was at the cost of a performance hit in the short term.
4. Fitness transmission, a signature of Darwinian evolution: in chapter 9, we introduced
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Fitness Transmission as a statistical signature of Darwinian evolution that can be com-
puted from genealogical records. We illustrated the use of this measure on several simple
evolutionary experiments, showing that it reliably detected the presence of Darwinian evo-
lution. Perhaps equally importantly, we pointed out restrictions in the usability of Bedau
& Packard’s evolutionary activity statistics [11] for this purpose.
5. Fighting creatures and Evosphere: our experimental system, as described in chapter 4, was
based on an extension of Sims’ “virtual creatures” system (apparently the first complete
reimplementation and extension of Sims’ model). In chapter 5, we expanded our exper-
imental system, by introducing physical combat between creatures. We pointed out the
difficulties posed by Newtonian physics, and addressed these by a small non-Newtonian
alteration of physical behaviour. To our knowledge, this is the first example of the evolu-
tion of actual physical (i.e. contact-based) combat between autonomous 3D agents, where
both morphology and behaviour are under full evolutionary control.
In chapter 10 we built upon this system to create an open environment, called Evosphere,
in which free-living creatures interact, fight, and evolve freely, without any explicit fitness
function. We observed that this system not only gave rise to actual evolution, but could
also accommodate reciprocal evolution between species. While creatures remained concep-
tually simple, this is an encouraging sign about the potential of this platform for further
investigation.
We wrapped up our discussion by applying fitness transmission to detect the onset of
natural selection and adaptive evolution within this virtual world. Fitness transmission
measures were in accordance with several other indicators of evolutionary activity, provid-
ing further confirmation of the validity of this statistic to detect the presence of Darwinian
evolution.
More generally, if this thesis has a central message, it is that the first and foremost outcome
of evolution is diversity. While “arrows” may emerge on the course of evolution, evolution
itself follows no overarching arrow. Evolution does not predictably move along from point A
to point B, even less so to some apocalyptic “omega point”. Rather, it constantly flourishes
into a profusion of branches, opening a spectacular multitude of paths, continuously exploring
its immediate vicinity. Every living creature is a trailblazer; every birth is a crossroad. Most
branches either die out or immediately fold back into their stem; but some endure, which is
to say that they themselves become new stems in their own right, and from them many new
crossroads in turn emerge, slowly and patiently projecting the unbounded space of the possible
onto the almost equally enormous space of the useful. Deeply pluralistic, implacable to those
who fail, but infinitely tolerant as to the means to succeed, evolution is, in effect, a road to
everywhere - or at least, everywhere worth being at.
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Appendix A
Details of the software platform
A.1 Creature morphology
In the following sections we provide a broad description of our system, stressing both similarities
and differences with Sims’ model. In order to facilitate comparisons, our description deliberately
follows the same organisation as Sims [163], section by section. Note that many of the basic
features described in these sections can also be found in our previous paper [123].
As in Sims’ model, the creatures are branching structures composed of rigid 3D blocks. The
blocks (or “limbs”) are connected to their parent limb by a hinge joint - except for the first,
“root” limb which has no parent. The genetic specification of a creature is given as a graph of
nodes. Each of these nodes contain morphologic and neural information about one limb. Each
node is responsible for storing the description of its limb’s physical connection with its parent
node’s limb, removing the need for connections to carry their own information, as is the case in
Sims’ model.
The morphologic information in each genetic node specifies the dimensions of the limb (i.e.
width, length and height), the orientation of this limb with regard to its parent (in the form of
two parameters indicating polar angles with the xz and the xy planes, i.e. longitude and latitude,
in the frame of reference of the parent limb; these two parameters are discrete multiples of pi/8),
the axial direction of the hinge joint which may be either horizontal or vertical (i.e. aligned
either with the y or with the z axis of the limb), and a boolean flag for reflection which governs
symmetric replication along the xz plane of its parent (see section on Genome Expression). A
limb also contains neural information, as described in the next section.
A.2 Creature control and neural organisation
Our creatures are controlled by neural networks. As in Sims’ model, each limb contains a set
of neurons. Genetic information about a given neuron specifies the activation function for this
neuron, a threshold/bias parameter θ taken in the [−1, 1] range, and connection information. The
activation function may be either a sigmoid ( 1
1+exp−(σ+θ) ) or the hyperbolic tangent tanh(σ+ θ)
where σ is the weighted sum of inputs (the difference between sigmoid and tanh is that the first
has values in [0, 1] while the latter has values in [−1, 1]). Connection information specifies, for












Figure A.1: Organisation of a fictional creature pictured in the bottom-right corner. Limb 0 has no
sensor (S) or actuator (A). Limb 1 is reflected into two symmetric limbs 1a and 1b, which share the same
morphologic and neural information.
this connection) and a weight in the [−1, 1] range. Neurons can only be connected with other
neurons from adjacent limbs, or from the root limb. Each neuron may receive a variable number
of connections, up to a maximum value (3 in the present experiments).
The most important difference with Sims’ model lies in the choice of standard neurons with
traditional activation functions, in contrast to Sims’ large set of functions (including arithmetic
operations and oscillators). An important consequence of this simpler set of functions is that
there is no trivial way for evolution to generate oscillators or other cyclic forms of behaviour,
which are necessary for any sustained locomotion to take place. Such behaviours have to emerge
out of the interaction between several neurons, assembled together under the guidance of evo-
lution. A more practical consequence is that in our model, each neuron may have an arbitrary
number of inputs (up to a maximum value), by contrast to Sims’ neurons which had a fixed
number of inputs, dependent on their function.
A.2.1 Sensors and actuators
Sensor neurons and actuator neurons are handled specially. In these experiments two types
of sensors are used: proprioceptors and external sensors. Proprioceptive neurons measure the
current angle formed by the hinge joint to which this neuron’s limb is attached, scaled within
the [−1, 1] range. External sensors come in two types, which measure the x-distance of the limb
containing the sensor to either the trunk of an opponent, or to an inert box. An x-distance is
the distance between the centre of mass of the limb and the centre of mass of the object, along
the x-axis of the frame of reference of the limb in which the sensor exists (i.e. the x component,
in the frame of reference of this limb, of the vector joining the centre of this limb to that of
the detected object). The outputs of external sensors are squashed through a tanh function.
Actuator neurons command the movement of limbs, that is, the desired angular velocity around
their joint. Their inputs are defined similarly as other neurons, but their activation function
is always a scaled hyperbolic tangent of the form MaxSpeed ∗ tanh(σ), where MaxSpeed is a
system constant. In our model, sensor neurons do not receive any connection from any other
neuron, and no neuron may receive a connection from an actuator neuron. Sensors and actuators
are, respectively, pure sources and pure sinks of data.
A difference with Sims’ model is that an actuator does not specify a force or a torque,
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but a desired angular velocity. The physics simulator implements a motor at each joint, which
will constantly attempt to reach the desired speed, with the constraint that the total torque it
exerts cannot be larger than a specified maximum. This maximum is a system constant. This
mechanism corresponds to a very simple model of servomotors.
Each limb has exactly one actuator and one proprioceptor. It may have other neurons,
including external sensors, within a maximum number (in the current experiments the maximum
number of neurons for each limb in addition to the actuator and the proprioceptor is 2). Note
that while each limb has a sensor and an actuator, there is no requirement that they should
receive or send connections from or to other neurons: connections are established in a random
manner and no connection toward these special neurons is explicitly enforced. Thus each limb
is free to use its sensor and actuator, or not, depending on how its network evolves. This is
equivalent to Sims’ model.
A.3 Expression of the Genome: the Developmental System
When a creature is to be generated from its genotype, a simple developmental system trans-
lates the genotype into a corresponding phenotype, and may introduce additional complexity
if the genetic information dictates it. Our system uses developmental features similar to those
introduced by Sims (bilateral symmetry and segmental replication). To fully exploit these fea-
tures, we introduce control flags which enforce fine-grained control of the neural connections in
replicated limbs. We also introduce a new mutation operator, recursion unrolling, which allows
developmental replications to be transcribed back into the genome.
A developmental system corresponds to the introduction of a bias in the search space: while
the total number of different individuals accessible with a given N-bits genome is obviously
bounded by 2N in any case, using a developmental system will allow the system to obtain
different (usually more complex) creatures, at the expense of making others impossible. Quite
often raw, declarative genomes describe a compact search space of very similar creatures, and
the developmental system has the effect of “stretching” the search space, creating a globally
wider, but sparser, range of possibilities. Developmental systems must of course be chosen with
care so that the newly obtainable individuals can be expected to perform globally better than
the “sacrificed” ones. A common feature of developmental systems is a stress on modularity
and replication, with the expectation that non-linear interactions between similar elements may
bring interesting behaviours with minimal additional information; Hornby and Pollack [83], for
example, provide noticeable examples of modularity introduced by a developmental system1.
A.3.1 Reflection
Symmetry in our model is implemented somewhat differently than in Sims’. In our model, each
genetic node (corresponding to a limb) may possess a “reflection” flag, which means that when
this node is read and the corresponding limb attached to its parent, a symmetric copy of this
limb will also be created. Any further sub-limbs will similarly be duplicated in a symmetric
1Developmental systems in artificial evolution have been used for a relatively long time, but rigorous analysis
of their effects and implications has only recently started to attract interest. Stanley and Miikkulainen [172]
provide an enlightening review and discussion of developmental systems in artificial evolution.
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fashion, which leads to the appearance of bilaterally symmetric branches. Our present design
allows for only one type of symmetry, namely symmetry along the parent’s xz plane. When a
given limb is randomly generated, its reflection flag is set with probability Pref .
Symmetric replication introduces information flow issues. When a limb is duplicated by
reflection, all genetic information is duplicated in the process, including neural information.
A consequence of this duplication is that a given limb cannot distinguish information it sends
to, or receives from, either of its symmetric sub-limbs. Because neurons from both symmetric
sub-limbs share the same connection information, they will receive identical connections (and
information) from the same neurons in the parent. Similarly, any connection that the sub-limbs
send to the parent will point to the same neuron in the parent, and information from both sub-
limbs will be merged at that point. Thus, although both limbs may behave in different manners
due to their separate inner neural networks (which may react independently to different sensor
information), they will not be able to send distinct information to the parent, or to receive
distinct information from it. Sims does not mention this problem, or document his solution to
it, in his papers.
We address this problem in the following way: every connection has a special Reftype flag,
which can take one of three values: Original, Symmetric, or Both. When a connection (as
specified by the genome) originates from a neuron that exists in a reflected limb, then the actual
connection in the resulting creature will be connected either to the original version of the limb,
or to its symmetric copy, or to both, depending on the value of its Reftype flag. If Reftype is
‘Both’, then this connection will carry the average of the outputs of the two neurons.
Similarly, if neurons from the two instances of a reflected limb carry a connection originating
from their common ancestral limb, the Reftype flag is used to determine the actual wiring, that
is, whether only the original instance, or the symmetric copy, or both, will receive input from
the parent limb.
A.3.2 Segmentation
In Sims’ model, a loop in the genetic graph corresponds to a set of limbs which is repeated
a certain number of times. Connections between limbs specify a recursive limit, which is the
maximum number of times this connection should be followed when in a recursive cycle. Some
connections may also be marked as “terminal”, meaning that they will only be applied when the
recursive limit is reached, thus allowing for specific “tailing” structures at the end of repeated
sequences. This, in essence, is a simple and effective model of segmentation, that is, the repe-
tition of homologous modules arranged sequentially, as apparent in many animals (vertebrates,
arthropods, anellidae, etc.).
We import this feature in our model, with the restriction that only self-loops are allowed:
a loop can only exist between a node and itself. No other loops within the graph can exist.
This allows for bio-inspired segmentation (repetition of similar segments), while preventing the
appearance of extravagant body plans (such as, say, a human body in which the thumb would
contain a “loop” to the thorax).
Segmentation brings in the same information flow issues as were discussed above about
symmetry. Imagine that a certain node has a recursive loop to itself, inducing its replication
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into similar segments. How can we allow for communication between segments ? In the genome,
the information about a connection specifies the genetic node (and the neuron within this node)
from which this connection originates. But when a connection refers to the same node as the one
within which it exists, and the node is recursively replicated, we must decide which instance of
the node is actually referred to (so that connections could occur within the same limb, between
one limb and its recursive predecessor, or between one limb and its recursive successor).
We address this issue in the same manner as with symmetry. Each connection also carries
a Rectype flag, commanding its behaviour under recursion, which can take any of three values:
Dad, Son, or Same. If a connection for a given neuron originates from the same genetic node
as that in which the neuron exists, and this neuron is recursively duplicated, then the value
of Rectype determine the actual wiring of this connection: the value ‘Dad’ indicates that this
connection should go from one instance to its predecessor in the recursion (so obviously it will
not exist in the first, ‘original’ instance); the value ‘Son’ indicates that this connection should
go from one instance to its successor in the recursion (so it will not exist in the last, ‘terminal’
instance). The value ‘Same’ indicates that this connection should be understood to originate
from the same instance and will therefore be present in all instances.
A.3.3 Recursion Unrolling
A common source of novelty in Nature is the duplication-exaptation process: one part is du-
plicated in two, originally identical elements, then the features of these elements diverge and
assume different roles. The versatility of arthropod appendages is a striking example of these
mechanisms. Our system allows for similar duplication-exaptation patterns indirectly, through
a mutation operator called recursion unrolling: a recursive cycle (one genetic node which spec-
ifies its own recursive replication during development) is unrolled in the genome, that is, it is
developed as it would be in a final body, and the resulting limbs are transcribed back into as
many new, independent genetic nodes. Originally these new nodes are almost identical (except
for neural connections within themselves and between each other, which depend on the flags de-
scribed in the previous section), but from now on they can evolve independently. This method
may be in opposition with the central dogma of genetics (information flows from the genotype to
the phenotype), but is not Lamarckian: it is a macro-mutation which occurs randomly, without
using selective information, thus respecting the Darwinian mechanism of ‘blind’ mutations. This
mechanism is not present in Sims’ system.
A.4 Creature evolution
A.4.1 Genetic operators
We use three genetic operators, similar to those used by Sims, plus one addition.
Crossover is performed by simply aligning the genetic nodes of both parents in two rows,
then building a new list of genetic nodes by concatenating the left part of one parent with the
right part of the other.
Grafting corresponds to the removal of a branch (i.e. a limb and all its sub-limbs), and its
replacement by a branch taken from another individual. Connectivity information is adapted
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and maintained: the neurons of the trunk establish the same connections with the new branch
as they had with the old one, and similarly the new branch has the same connection with its
new trunk as it had with its previous trunk.
Picking corresponds to simply taking a branch from a given individual and copying it in
the genome of another individual, without removing any material. This is our only addition
to Sims’ genetic operators, but it seems to have an impact on the continuous appearance of
complex features.
Mutation occurs by modifying each parameter of the genome with a certain probability
Pmut. The mutation operator proceeds in a sequential manner. First, with probability Pmut, a
random limb may be deleted from the genome (with the restriction that no creature may have
less than two limbs). Then a new randomly generated limb (with randomly generated neural
information) may be created. Then, a recursive cycle may be unrolled (if there is a recursion
in the genome). Then each slot in the neural array may be “flipped” (i.e. empty slots are
filled with a new neuron with randomly assigned connections, existing neurons are deleted).
Each interneuron may be turned into a sensor, and vice versa (proprioceptors and actuators
are fixed for all creatures). Each sensor neuron can change types (i.e. from sensing the box to
sensing the opponent and vice versa). Then, the threshold value of each existing neuron may be
modified through Gaussian perturbation (standard deviation 0.4) within the [−1, 1] torus. The
output function may be changed. Each connection of every existing neuron may be “flipped”,
i.e. created (and randomly assigned) if it is unassigned, or deleted otherwise. The weight
of each existing connection may then be modified through Gaussian perturbation (standard
deviation 0.4) within the [−1, 1] torus. The source of each connection (i.e. the neuron from
which it originates) may be randomly reassigned. Finally, with probability Pmut, morphological
information for each node is mutated. Morphological mutation performs one randomly selected
operation out of seven possibilities: reassigning a given limb to a different “ancestor” limb (which
amounts to moving a whole branch along the organism), randomly assigning a new length, width
or height to the limb, modifying either of its orientation angles (possible orientations are discrete
multiples of pi/4; mutation occurs by choosing a new value within the range [−pi/2, pi/2] around
the current value), switching the orientation of its joint (horizontal or vertical), and flipping its
“reflection” flag. Again, each of these modifications is applied with probability Pmut for each
parameter.
A.5 Stability of physics simulation
The basic purpose of a physics simulator is to integrate the differential equations of Newtonian
mechanics. Occasionally the system will find itself in a situation when integration errors will
accumulate rather than vanish, leading to a dramatic disruption of realistic behaviour (bodies
gaining energy, unbounded acceleration, explosion of joints, etc.) As noticed by many authors,
including Sims [163], evolution will gladly exploit any such non-physical behaviour to its profit.
More recently Chaumont and colleagues [29] describe how the inaccuracies of the simulator (the
same as ours) require extensive tweaking of the simulation and fitness function.
However, after a lengthy trial-and-error process incurring much parameter-tuning, code-
tweaking, and teeth-gnashing, we eventually stumbled upon non-obvious values for certain sim-
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ulation parameters that result into satisfying stability. Since then, we did not observe any
troublesome case of non-physical behaviour exploited by evolution to its advantage: the system
is consistently stable and realistic. The values of these parameters (namely the CFM and ERP
parameters of the ODE simulator) are given in Table A.1.
A.6 Simulation parameters
Any complex simulation involves many parameters, some of which have a critical impact on the
results of the simulation. Table A.1 summarises the values we chose for various parameters of
our program. Most of these parameters were educated guesses which proved satisfactory. In
particular, the scaling factors shown in activation function result from an attempt at obtaining
well-behaved function shapes (e.g. with regard to steepness of the non-linearity), considering
that outputs and weights were all within the [−1; 1] range. Some of these parameters, however,
(especially the parameters related to the ODE physics engine) were arrived at through a long
process of parameter tuning. This is particularly the case for the ERP and CFM parameters.
We hope that these figures may prove useful for other researchers, especially those interested in





























Pref (see text, sec-
tion A.3)
0.1-0.25








speed at each joint
4 rad / s
Actual mass of a
limb of dimensions
(x, y, z)
0.8 ∗ tanh(x ∗ y ∗ z)
Physics engine pa-
rameters
Step size 0.01 s
ERP 0.015
CFM 0.01
Table A.1: Simulation constants
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Appendix B
Artificial evolution - from bits to
worlds
We are like dwarfs sitting on the shoulders of giants, so that we can see more than they,
and things at a greater distance, not by virtue of any sharpness of sight on our part, or
any physical distinction, but because we are carried high and raised up by their giant
size.
Bernard of Chartres, quoted by John of Salisbury, Metalogicon
B.1 Evolving software objects
Evolutionary computation, that is, the idea that software objects could undergo evolution just
as biological objects do, is not a recent idea. Von Neumann’s self-replicating organism, based
on a cellular automaton, is the first explicit instance of this concept. What differentiates this
complex organism from more trivial self-replicating automata (such as a 2-state automaton that
would simply propagate a given state) is precisely the capacity to evolve. In Von Neumann’s
view, the difference between trivial and non-trivial replication was the capacity to produce an
offspring more complex than its parent : a non-trivial reproducing machine should be able
to construct any arbitrarily complex machine, and self-replication is only a particular case of
this ability. This property is what makes evolution possible, and what ultimately differentiates
trivial, non-living reproduction - which occurs frequently in mineral objects - from actual life
(see [114] for an enlightening discussion of this fact, and how it was somewhat overlooked by
subsequent efforts in self-replicating automata).
Besides the works of Von Neumann, the idea of using artificial evolution to solve actual
problems can be traced back to the 50s. A rich and fascinating account of early experiments in
evolutionary computation has been compiled by [59].
B.1.1 Genetic Algorithms
We begin our survey with the particular model that has more or less become the standard model
of evolutionary computation, namely the Genetic Algorithm introduced by Holland [82] (a much
more readable introduction is provided by Mitchell [128]).
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The genetic algorithm operates on strings of bits that can be evaluated by a given “fit-
ness function”. From the viewpoint of the algorithm, this fitness function is the complete,
self-contained definition of the problem. Starting with random strings, each string is evaluated
according to this function. Some of the fitter strings are then selected for survival and repro-
duction. Genetic operators such as crossover (recombination of two parents into one offspring)
and mutation (random modification of some bits in a string) are applied. Then the cycle starts
again with the new population.
The genetic algorithm was more than a simple engineering trick. It came with a thorough
mathematical analysis which broke with several preconceptions of evolutionary dynamics, mostly
by asserting the preeminence of recombination over mutation. In the genetic algorithm, or at
least in the original analysis found in [82] and [65], crossover is the major evolutionary force,
and mutation is regarded as a secondary (although essential) tool whose main role is to maintain
some degree of diversity within the population. This affirmation is formally expressed by the
Schema Theorem, which relies on the notion of schemas.
A schema is a sequence of characters which can be either 1, 0 or a “don’t care” symbol
(#). Thus the schema 100# represents both 1001 and 1000. 1001 and 1000 are two instances
of the 100# schema. What the Schema theorem says is that at each timestep, the number
of instances of a given schema increases geometrically with the relative fitness of its current
instances (“relative” with regard to the average fitness of the population). In other words,
schemas which appear to provide above-average fitness will grow exponentially in the population
(minus two terms that account for the disruption of a schema by mutation and recombination).
[82, 65].
The Schema theorem provides insight into the mechanism of evolution under recombina-
tion. It shows that the genetic algorithm exponentially allocates more tries to schemas which,
according to their observed instances, seem to be beneficial. “Evolution mixes things up, and
things that look good get mixed (geometrically) more often” - this is the message of the Schema
theorem1. Holland was able to show that such a policy was, in a sense, optimal in terms of
profit maximisation.
From this analysis, it follows that crossover-based artificial evolution, just like its natural
counterpart, is not a global optimiser. It is a rather greedy algorithm, that constantly tries to
perform a very specific kind of local optimisation: by exploiting current information in order
to maximise the expected profit at each step, the overall result is that genetic algorithm really
optimise the expectancy of accumulated fitness over the whole history of the process. This was
precisely the objective of Holland, who was more interested in lifelong adaptation than in global
function optimisation.
However it must be kept in mind that evolution does not physically operates on abstract
schemas : it operates on individuals, based on full genotypes. In full genotypes, several schemas
are present and interfere with each other. Together with the fact that populations are finite,
this introduces a strong sampling effect on the evaluation of any schema: the observed fitness
of a schema (as observed over all its currently available instances) may differ strongly from its
real, “static” fitness (as defined over the whole set of all possible instances). Of course, this is
1Note that the Schema theorem really provides a lower bound : it does not describe how new schemas are
created by the system, only how these schemas are exploited
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Figure B.1: The R1 function, one of the Royal Road functions described in [62]. The fitness of
a string is the total sum of the fitness of all building blocks (s1 to s8) that are represented in
this string. For example, R1(1111111100..0) = 8, and R1(1111111100..0011111111) = 16. The
maximum possible fitness is achieved by the string sopt = 1111. . . 1 (image reproduced from
[62]).
even more true if the fitness of a schema has a strong variance over all its particular instances.
Another problem is that of collateral convergence: instances of a good schema may quickly
swamp the population, thus biasing the estimation of other schemas. The problems of high
variance and collateral convergence have been described and explained in [74].
The latter problem has been made more evident by the Royal Road functions (see figure B.1)
introduced by Forrest and Mitchell [62]. At first sight, these functions seem to be well-suited for
GA optimisation, because explicit building blocks exist, and all of them contribute to reaching
the global optimum. However, the GA was found to perform poorly on these functions: as soon
as strings containing a superior schema were discovered, they proliferated and virtually elimi-
nated their competitors, even though these competitors contained other useful schemas which
were necessary to obtain a global optimum. This led the algorithm to premature convergence
toward suboptimal solutions. This phenomenon of premature convergence, common in greedy
algorithms, was described as a hitch-hiking phenomenon: “bad” components were “hitch-hiking”
on good ones, and relied on the performance of these good components to propagate themselves
through the population, eliminating better alleles that belonged to less-favoured individuals.
The problem of fitness variance within a schema is directly linked to the problem of epistasis,
that is, the fact that the effect of a given gene may depend significantly on other genes. For
almost any non-trivial problem (and even for quite a lot of trivial ones), some degree of epistatic
interaction between genes is expected. As an example, in a function optimisation process, having
a 1 or a 0 in a given locus may not bring the same benefit depending on the value of the rest
of the string (e.g. if the current string is just below the optimum, changing the lowest-order
bit from 0 to 1 will increase fitness; but if it is just over the optimum, the same transformation
will decrease it). However, by averaging schema evaluation over many instances, the genetic
algorithm manages to overcome most situations of moderate epistasis.
But when epistasis comes to dominate the evaluation function, it becomes impossible to
evaluate the fitness contribution of a given schema; in fact, in such a situation, the notion
of schema fitness becomes meaningless. The presence or the absence of a given schema may
bring no recognisable information in terms of fitness contribution, because epistatic interactions
garble any correlation that might be observed : completely epistatic fitness landscapes are
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essentially random. In such a situation, the genetic algorithm, being constantly misled, has
very limited chances of success (Kauffman [95] provides a systematic discussion of “tunable”
epistatic fitness landscapes known as the NK-landscapes, described by genomes of N genes in
which the fitness contribution of a given gene is randomly modified by the value of K other
genes; Kauffman showed that in such landscapes, as soon as K > 2, the fitness landscape
becomes highly irregular).
On the other hand, it should be noted that no search algorithm can cope much better with
such conditions. The “No Free Lunch” theorems for searching algorithms [193], which state that
no search algorithm performs better than any other over the set of all possible functions in a
given space (including random exhaustive search), is precisely based on the fact that the vast
majority of possible functions are uncorrelated. The No Free Lunch theorems simply formalise
the intuitive idea that a searching method can only perform better than random search by
exploiting certain kinds of regularities. The Schema theorem indicates that recombination-based
evolution exploits regularities based on schemas.
This discussion does not diminish the fact that genetic algorithms have been successfully
used as optimisers, and that their domain of application can still grow (e.g. [30], or a panorama
in [128]). Their attractiveness owes much to their conceptual simplicity and to their agnosticism
regarding domain knowledge : as long as the problem can be expressed in a fitness function, the
genetic algorithm can be applied with reasonable chances of success. Then again, this means
that the design of the fitness function (and of the bitstring encoding method) becomes the real
problem to solve for human engineers.
B.1.2 Genetic Programming
Genetic programming [99] essentially uses the same ideas as the genetic algorithm, but gener-
ates programs instead of simple bit strings. More precisely, it usually operates on tree-shaped
programs written in a functional language. This idea has two immediate advantages : First,
it eliminates issues related to the necessarily variable length of individuals (programs of fixed
length are usually not suitable). Second, by their very structure, functional programs are nat-
urally decomposed into autonomous elements; branches of program trees can be swapped as
whole, self-contained functions.
This immediate modularity would be more difficult to obtain by crossing sequential, im-
perative programs. Of course, one can note that in nature the DNA program is purely linear,
but the problem is different : in nature, crossover usually occurs among very similar programs.
Furthermore, the natural “computer” through which DNA is interpreted has little in common
with artificial computers. In artificial evolution, GP seems to have no major competitor for the
generation of programs.
An interesting side-effect of free code growth in GP is the fact that over time, average program
size tends to grow almost continuously throughout the evolutionary process. This phenomenon
is known as “bloat”, and is seen as an annoyance which must be fought, usually by adding a size
penalty in the fitness function. This bloat can be seen as a natural consequence of the fact that
while code size has a lower bound (i.e. the empty tree), it has no upper bound; more precisely,
for most problems, given any program of size N, there is an infinity of programs of size superior
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to N which have exactly the same effect, and thus the same fitness. [102]2
B.1.3 Evolutionary Strategies
Other evolutionary methods simply do not rely on crossover at all. Indeed, historically, mutation-
based methods were the first algorithms to be thought of. This has long been the case of
evolutionary strategies [159] although recombination operators have since been included in these
as well. In contrast to genetic algorithm, evolutionary strategies operate directly on vectors of
real values, and create new individuals by mutating some or all values within the ancestor
by a random (usually Gaussian) amount. The variance of this mutation is actually a genetic
parameter, so each individual has its own mutation rate. Thus mutation rates are expected to
evolve together with the population.
Classical ES use either the (M + L) method (populations consist of M individuals; after
L offspring are created, the M best of the L +M individuals available will be chosen for the
next population) or the (M,L) scheme (only the L offspring are considered for choosing the M
parents within the next population - of course, L > M). If one includes recombination, which
may come in many flavours too (especially if it applies to parameters of the algorithm, such as
variances, etc.), evolutionary strategies offer a wide range of possibilities for evolving real-valued
parameters.
B.2 Neural Networks
The idea to create an artificial intelligence by directly simulating cerebral processes actually
predates digital computers : McCulloch & Pitts’ model of an artificial neuron was published
in 1943. This “formal neuron” is essentially a 0/1 threshold function operating on a linear
combination of 0/1 inputs : inputs are combined into a weighted sum, and if that sum exceeds
a threshold, the neuron’s output is 1 - otherwise it is 0. This model is of course an extreme
simplification of real neurons, if only because no time considerations are included (real neurons
seem to communicate by frequency of impulses rather than by amplitude of signal). Yet this
very simplicity made it extremely attractive for simulation processes. A readable introduction
to neural networks (centred on a pattern recognition viewpoint) is provided by Bishop. [13]
The first neural network was actually not really a network : Rosenblatt’s Perceptron was
simply a collection of McCulloch & Pitts neurons. For a classification problem involving N
possible categories, the network consisted of N such formal neurons, each of them assessing
whether the input fell into the category it represented. However, in their book “Perceptrons”
[127], Minsky and Papert, describing the system and its underlying theory in (rather excruciat-
ing) detail, exposed important limitations. In particular, they showed that because a perceptron
can only classify linearly separable problem (a linear equation of variables is the equation of a
2This idea can be put in parallel with the controversy about the inevitability of complexification in natural
evolution [71, 194].
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Figure B.2: The formal neuron described by McCulloch and Pitts. Input values are multiplied
by weights and summed. A threshold on the resulting value provides the output of the neuron.
Figure B.3: The multi-layer perceptron (MLP) model. Note that there may be more than one
intermediary (“hidden”) layer.
hyperplane), it cannot solve the XOR problem or the parity problem. They considered the pos-
sibility of multi-layer perceptrons, but did not seem to think that they would bring any major
advantage.
Proving that perceptrons are simply unable to solve even the XOR problem had a devas-
tating effect on neural network research altogether. Neural networks only re-emerged when a
practical way to use multi-layer perceptrons (MLP) was found. Contrarily to their single-layer
predecessors, multi-layer perceptrons are not limited to linearly separable problems. In fact,
neural networks with one or more hidden layer are universal function approximators. [176]
The most widely used algorithm for MLP learning is the gradient backpropagation method.
Like Rosenblatt’s method, it essentially follows the idea of slightly modifying weights that con-
tribute to incorrect behaviour, in a direction inversely proportional to their perceived error. The
idea is to calculate, for every training pattern and every weight wi,j in the network, the quantity
dE / dwi,j , where E is a quadratic error. The method was apparently introduced independently
by several authors, but is mostly associated with Rumelhart and McClelland [156].
However, this algorithm can oscillate and even diverge if the error-correction rate is too
large. On the other hand, if this rate is too low, learning will be painfully slow. In rugged
error landscapes, choosing the right parameter may be a problem. Some adaptive methods that
modify the learning rate can be used. Other problems include the fact that backpropagation
may get stuck into local minima of the error function and that it is at any rate a long learning
process, which requires many presentations of the training set. Another possible inconvenience
is that it is usually quite difficult to understand a neural network, to extract a model of the data
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from it, as opposed to, say, decision trees.
B.3 Evolving controllers for autonomous agents
Evolutionary methods seem well-suited to the generation of controllers for autonomous agents3:
after all, biological agents were produced by an evolutionary algorithm. It is clear that for such
a task, the core of the problem lies not only in the choice of a particular evolutionary method,
but also in the choice of an adequate representation for the controller.
B.3.1 Control Pattern Generators
A simple way to control a limb in an agent’s body is to specify an activation pattern in the
form of oscillating values. These values are then applied to the actuators that they control,
resulting in oscillating movements. The role of the controller is to provide an adequate pattern
with regard to the task at hand (usually a locomotive task). This method, which may seem a
bit artificial at first glance, is in fact deeply rooted in animal neurobiology, from which the term
Central Pattern Generator (CPG) originates.
For example, Ijspeert and colleagues [88] have used biological models to evolve such CPG
for a swimming lamprey. The lamprey is composed of many segments, each containing a few
intercoupled neurons. These neurons can produce an individual oscillation pattern in a single
segment. Interconnected segments are capable of synchronising their oscillation in a coordinated
wave movement. Proprioceptive information (i.e. input from the body state) allows the lamprey
to maintain its movement in the face of a disturbed environment (contrary currents, etc.) The
authors successfully evolved neural connections for an artificial lamprey. Using the same frame-
work, the same author took a bold evolutionary leap over the whole Pisces group, and stepped
directly from the lamprey to the salamander; while keeping lamprey-like swimming abilities in
water, they evolved controllers for quadruped locomotion on land. [87]
Complex oscillating patterns may also be generated more directly by simply specifying a set
of Fourier components. In such a model, evolving the CPG amounts to evolving sets of numeric
parameters for a Fourier series which describes a periodic activation pattern. A bias ensures that
low-frequency components are favoured. This elegant approach, described by Arnold [7], was
applied to simple locomotive tasks for 3D articulated organisms (quite similar to Sims [163], see
below) and generated a wide range of interesting behaviours, from clumsy creeping to frog-like
leaps-and-bounds.
B.3.2 Classifier Systems
Classifier systems were introduced by Holland [82, 81] as a framework to apply the adaptive
properties of the genetic algorithm to the production of autonomous behaviours. The Schema
theorem emphasised the adaptive aspect of the GA, especially with regard to the maximisation
of cumulated reward, which corresponds to what one might expect from a living organism
3Here the word “agent” is to be taken in the most general sense of “something that acts”, which corresponds to
its etymology. It only implies that the considered agent must perform some kind of action in a given environment.
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throughout its life. Therefore it seemed natural enough to exploit these properties in an adaptive
system, instead of simple function optimisation.
A classifier system is essentially a set of rules, each rule being composed of a condition part
and an action part. They are encoded in binary strings, with the addition of a special “don’t
care” character (#). External conditions (the environment) are described by binary strings.
The internal state of the agent is a set of “messages” (also encoded as binary strings) resulting
from previous rule executions. When the condition part of a given rule matches (parts of) this
input, the action part of this rule is executed. The action part of a rule may lead to an effective
action from the animat, but it may also trigger the release of a “message”, which is added to
the message list; thus a rule may influence the execution of other rules.
The rules constantly evolve under a genetic algorithm, which generate new rules and elim-
inates old, unsuccessful ones. The fitness of a given rule is a measure of its expected pay-off,
as estimated from the correlation between rewards and the activity pattern of this rule. When
the agent receives a reward, the expected pay-off of rules that have been activated are modified.
Equipped with such a controller, an adaptive system is expected to adapt to a given environment
and to learn from its interactions with it.
The first problem is to know how each rule should be rewarded when chains of rules lead to
the obtention of a reward. Clearly if we only reward rules that were active when the reward was
received, we will not adequately estimate the value of rules that were activated in the past and
played a role in the obtention of this reward. Such a system would not be able to make sequential
plans (first do this, then do that, and finally do this): only rules that lead to the immediate
acquisition of a reward would be elected by the system. Obviously such a system would easily
be confused in any moderately complex environment. This is a typical credit sharing problem,
as occurs frequently in collective action models.
The first model maintained quite an elaborate set of statistics for each rule, mainly concerned
with the frequency of use and the delay between application and reward obtention. Expected
pay-off were only modified when an external reward was issued, and this modification occurred
for each rule that had been active since the last reward obtention, according to these statistics.
A simpler system called “bucket brigade” algorithm was later introduced, in which the
expected pay-off is replaced by a strength value. When a rule is activated it must transfer
a part of its current strength to all the rules that led to its executions. When a reward is
issued, the strengths of rules that are currently active are increased. Thus, over a large number
of iterations, efficient rules will be reinforced, and rules that led to their execution will also
be indirectly reinforced by the bucket brigade system of strength transfer: chains of efficient
rules, indicating sequential behaviours, will spontaneously emerge (Wilson [190] provides a clear
description of the standard classifier system).
A problem with this method is that establishing reliable chains of rules may require a lot
of evaluations [192]. Another problem is that if a given action provides very high pay-off, the
population might be overtaken by similar classifiers all exploiting this high pay-off. A solution to
this problem is to share the reward between all active classifiers, instead of attributing the whole
of it to each classifier. But then the strength value, produced by aggregating received pay-offs
over all cases where the rule was active (which may correspond to very different conditions) looses
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representativity. Other solutions restrict the application of the genetic algorithm to groups of
rules that match the same set of conditions; thus no takeover may occur.
It is also possible to change the evaluation process by determining the genetic fitness, not
by the expected pay-off, but by the accuracy of this predicted pay-off : unreliable, overgeneral
classifiers would then be penalised. This is the rationale behind XCS, introduced by Wilson
[191]. XCS aims at obtaining a complete, accurate mapping from inputs and actions to payoff,
while using maximally general classifiers (thus offering a minimal, complete description of the
environment).
B.3.3 Evolving neural networks
Applying evolutionary algorithms to the generation of neural networks seems a straightforward
idea. In theory, the flexibility of evolutionary algorithms (which require only a fitness function a
an indicator of progress) might make it possible to overcome the limitations of backpropagation
training, especially when it comes to complex, recurrent architectures.
However applying evolutionary algorithms to neural networks is not without problems -
especially with regard to the crossover operator. Parameters in a neural networks are highly
intricate and interdependent, so crossing two efficient networks is prone to produce a poorer
offspring (this interdependence of parameters in a genetic representation is known as epistasis
and is the plague of evolutionary algorithms).
On the other hand, two neural networks that correspond to equivalent architectures can
be very dissimilar, just because similar neurons occur in different orders in the two networks;
this may cause problems for recombination operators (e.g. applying crossover between two
differently-ordered networks loses some of the nodes and duplicates some of the others). This
is essentially the permutation problem, also known as the “competing convention” problem.
Admittedly, this problem has been found to be less severe than expected [77]. Still, it has
prompted a number of authors to abandon crossover altogether, and to rely exclusively on
mutation-based operators. An impressive survey of the application of evolutionary techniques
to neural networks can be found in Yao [198] (who also favour mutation-only evolution).
Another way to proceed is to cooperatively coevolve neurons in a network. This method has
been applied in several ways by collaborators of Miikkulainen, e.g. [66], [131].
A way to preserve structures in the evolution of neural network, especially when the archi-
tectures are to be evolved together with the weight, is to allow recombination only between
equivalent nodes. One can note that if all networks start from similar, elementary networks,
then any differing structure must come from a mutation (either the addition, or the removal of
one of several nodes). In this context, equivalent nodes are nodes that correspond to different
version of the same original node. One way to detect this is that, every time a node is created
by a mutation, it should be tagged with a unique ID (e.g. a simple sequential number), and
all its descendants that carry this node should keep this tag. This way it will be possible to
recombine only similar nodes. This is, in essence, the idea behind NEAT, or Neuro-Evolution
of Augmenting Topologies. [171]
This tagging idea does not only provide a way to control crossover; it also allows one to
compare two networks and to determine their degree of “parenthood”, i.e. their genealogical
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closeness, thus providing an objective way to classify individuals into species (which NEAT does).
It might also make it possible to trace evolutionary progress by determining which additions
proved more beneficial (those that are frequent in the current gene pool) and which weren’t (the
“holes” in the distribution of ID numbers).
B.4 Generative Encodings
A neural network (or indeed any complex system) of significant size can depend on a very large
number of parameters. If each parameter is to be encoded directly within the genotype, the
resulting search space can quickly become intractable for evolutionary methods. As an example,
in the case of a fully recurrent neural network of N nodes, in theory N*N connections should be
stored. This makes evolution impractical for more than a few tens of nodes.
One way to overcome this problem is to use genetic encodings, that is, genotypes that do
not directly and explicitly describe each and every parameter of the system, but rather provide
a “recipe” that is to be interpreted according to pre-defined rules. Thus, depending on the
encoding method, systems of arbitrary complexity can be evolved with genotypes of reasonable
size.
It is important, however, to keep in mind the trade-off that such methods imply. Whatever
the way we use them, N bits of information can only describe 2N different configurations. Using
a complex developmental scheme can allow us to reach complex structures, but will not increase
the number of different structures that can be reach. This means that, while generative encodings
push the envelope of possible solutions, they also reduce the density of possible solutions within
that envelope : the subset of solutions that can be reach is wider, but more sparse.
This is very reasonable if one considers that not all possible configurations are desirable, or
that only some types of configurations should be sought after. For example, generative encodings
allow one to introduce constraints and symmetries into a system. However, if the set of reachable
solutions becomes to sparse, the encoding may become “brittle” : a small modification in the
genotype leads to unpredictably large modifications of the phenotype, thus making evolution
more difficult.
B.4.1 Cellular Encoding
A popular generative encoding for neural networks is cellular encoding (CE, see [75]). In CE,
networks are represented as graphs of cells, each cell having a number of input and output
weighted links. Cells develop and divide following instructions contained in grammar trees.
These trees are the genotype of an individual, and can be evolved by standard GP methods.
The developmental process is represented in Figure B.4. Each cell has a complete copy
of the instruction trees. In these trees, division instructions are branching points from which
two sub-trees stem. When a cell encounters a dividing instruction, it performs the specified
division (several division operators exist, which differ in the repartition of input and output
links from the mother cell to the child cells) and each of its child cells follow a different sub-tree.
Other instructions may involve modification of weights or links. It has been shown that CE can
theoretically produce any graph of nodes. A parametric “recursion” instruction allows a cell
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Figure B.4: Application of cellular encoding (image from [75]). The instruction tree is on the
left, the corresponding network is on the right. In the first picture, the SEQ instruction has
already been executed, leading to a sequential division (two cells connected in sequence). Each
new cell follows a different path on the rest of the tree. Cell a encounters a PAR instruction,
leading to a parallel division (two unconnected cells), leading to the division of a into a and c.
Each cell follows a different sub-tree, and both of them read an END instruction, which stops
their division process. Cell b first finds a SEQ instruction, prompting a sequential division. This
results in the creation of cell d, sequentially connected to b. From there on, b will undergo a
parallel division; its child will find an END instruction, while b will read the INCBIAS instruction
(which will increase the bias of its output function) before ending development. Cell d will read
a VAL- instruction which will decrease the value of the current link (the link currently pointed
to by the link pointer; this pointer can be modified by instructions in the tree) before ending its
development.
to start back to the top of the tree a given number of times, thus creating similar sub-graphs.
This instruction, among others, allow CE to produce modular networks in a natural way. This
orientation toward modularity is a distinctive feature of CE. The emblematic experiment for CE
was its success in evolving hexapod locomotion from scratch ([75]), in which the modularity of
the system allowed it to discover (and exploit) useful symmetries. CE has also been reported
to evolve successful networks for difficult non-markovian (i.e. history-dependent) problems such
as double pole balancing ([76]).
CE has been used and adapted a number of times. A possible modification is to apply
operators to edges instead of nodes, thus correcting the (somewhat clumsy) CE mechanism for
edge handling. This is the main idea behind Edge Encoding ([108]), which also modifies the
order of execution of a tree (depth-first instead of breadth-first) to ensure a greater repeatability
of a sub-tree’s results, thus making the process more resistant to genetic recombination.
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B.4.2 L-Systems
L-Systems [144] are grammatical substitution systems whose original aim was to model the
development of trees and plants as simply as possible. An L-system is composed of two-parts
substitution rules, in which the left part (the “predecessor”) specifies what should be replaced,
and the right part (the “successor”) specifies what it should be replaced with.
L-Systems may provide a “branching” mechanism. In a standard grammar, a string is
replaced by a sequential set of strings. But in L-Systems, replacing elements need not be
sequential. Some (or all) of them can “branch off” the replaced section. In practise, this
means that after “branching” parts of the replacement have been added, subsequent part of the
replacement will be added immediately after the point from which the branching part stemmed.
This geometric addition allows L-Systems to describe complex tree-like shapes with very little
information.
L-Systems can also be made contextual (the left part of each rule contains fragments that
are not meant to be replaced, but simply indicate that the replacement should only happen
where these fragments occur) or parametric (elements in the system are given a parameter,
replacement rule depend on this parameter and may change it in their replacing part).
L-Systems offer a simple and elegant method for generating complex, recursive structures out
of very compact rules. While they were not originally designed to be evolved, these properties
make them highly interesting for evolutionary experiments (e.g. [90]). However, as we will see
below in a specific application, their high expressivity may come at the price of a excessive
brittleness and irregularity in the fitness landscape.
Kitano [96] was first to use L-systems for evolving neural network (a critical description can
be found in [161]). Boers and Kuiper [15] used contextual L-Systems to generate complex feed-
forward neural networks, which were then trained with backpropagation. The alphabet used for
the encoding described groups of nodes as well as “skip” values, that specified to which group
the output of a given group should be “projected”. This alphabet was translated to bit strings
in order to apply evolutionary operators, then translated back as rewriting rules for evaluation.
This method allowed them to evolve networks that solve simple problems (e.g. XOR), and
apparently more complex separation problems. [16]
In this perspective, the evolutionary process (together with the developmental method) is
seen as a support for backpropagation : it is supposed to find better architectures for a class of
problems, that is, architectures that allow backpropagation to learn better and faster. Archi-
tectures described in these experiments are usually fairly simple, but simplification was actually
one of the goals.
L-Systems and CE are two methods that rely on the application of rewriting rules to generate
complex neural networks. It is not difficult to see where their main difference resides : in L-
Systems, at each timestep, all rule are applied to all nodes in the graph. Contextualisation
may refine the target for a given L-System rule, but then finding the right context for rules
becomes an additional problem for evolution to solve. In CE, by contrast, each instruction is to
be executed by one single cell - the one that reads it. CE only allows for a rather crude control
of global structure (pure recursion) at the benefit of a finer control of local modifications. L-




Besides grammar-based approaches, other types of generative encoding rely on more biological
metaphors, oriented toward cell chemistry and chemical neuron growth methods. The neurons
is such approaches are physical, situated objects that interact with their environment. The final
network emerges out of interactive process between various parts of the system. Such models
can get to a very low level of description, including the growth of axons and the geographical
location of the neurons.
In a series of experiments, Nolfi and Parisi [132] developed a descriptive model in which
neurons are specified by their position in a 2D map, together with the length and the angle
of their branching patterns. After the genotype has been read, neurons are located on the
plane and their axons begin to grow, branching off sub-axons at angles and lengths specified
in the genotype. Axons that reach another neuron establish a connection. After the process is
complete, non-functional axons and unconnected nodes are removed and the resulting network
is evaluated. Cangelosi [25] extends this model by allowing cells to divide : rewriting rules are
applied to an original egg-cell. The rules also incorporate information about the location and
the growth parameters of the daughter cells. Those models were applied to the evolution of a
simple animat. Learning and development can also be incorporated. [132]
An even lower-level experiment can be found in the experiments performed by Jakobi [91].
In this rather uncompromising model, genomes code for actual “proteins” that affect not only
the behaviour of the cell, but also the expression of other genes, thus giving rise to a complete
genetic regulatory network.Some proteins can navigate between cell, thus providing inter-cellular
communication. Depending on the quantities of protein present in a cell at a given time, this
cell can divide, move, or differentiate into a neuron. When this latter stage is reach, axons begin
to grow from the cell.
Both axon growth and cell movement respond to particular gradients in the combination
of signal proteins in their environment. The original breaking of symmetry is provided by a
extra-cellular sources that emit specific signal proteins. The model is applied to the evolution of
a simple robot (following Jakobi’s own “minimal simulation” method [92]) that moves forward
in a curve pathway without hitting the walls. The author makes interesting remarks on how this
model, despite its complexity, can evolve symmetries quite effortlessly, simply by not responding
to specific, symmetry-breaking signals.
These growing processes may be modelled more abstractly. For example, in GasNets [86],
each neuron specifies its connection by defining “branching zones”, which correspond to portions
of a circular area in a 2D plane. Any other neuron that falls within this area (as defined by
the radius, the opening angle and the orientation of the area) is connected to the originating
neuron. Alternatively, direct position coordinates may be specified, such that any neuron within
a given radius from the specified position will be connected to. Neurons can then alter each
other’s transition functions through the diffusion of a “gaseous” transmitter which diffuses from
each neuron (in analogy to a similar process in animal brains).
Many more biologically-inspired models are possible, differing mainly by their degree of fi-
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delity in the reproduction of currently known biological processes. For example, gene regulation
and genomic networks, through which some genes influence the expression of others, are an
important feature of biological organisms. Because these effects determine the process of devel-
opment, they are an important component of evolution. Several possibilities exist for modelling
these mechanisms, some of them will be described later in the following sections.
B.5 Evolving embodied agents
The challenge of evolving the morphology of an agent together with its control architecture has
attracted significant research; yet it seems that virtually all of them share at least a few common
points:
• The control architecture of choice is usually a neural network. Rule-based controls (e.g.
classifier systems) or oscillating patterns (such as the CPG evolved by Ijspeert and col-
leagues [88] for the control of a salamander) do not fare well with unpredictable morpholo-
gies.
• A generative, indirect developmental system is almost always chosen. Specifying each and
every part of the morphology, together with each of its parameter, is not common. A first
reason for this is that generative encodings lead to immediate symmetries that result in
more interesting or “natural” appearances. Another reason is that since Nature itself uses
generative encodings anyway, doing the same may lead to interesting models of biological
development. The proportion of each motivation vary according to the kind of experiment
considered.
Stanley and Miikkulainen provide a remarkable survey of developmental systems for evolving
controllers and morphologies simultaneously. [172]
B.5.1 Dellaert and Beer’s abstract morphogenesis
Dellaert and Beer [44, 45] describe a developmental model which idealises biological processes
in a very straightforward way. Organisms are represented by groups of single 2D squares or
vertical rectangles. When a cell divides, it is simply cut in width (for rectangles) or in height
(for squares). Thus after 2 divisions a square cell gives rise to 4 square cells, with each grandchild
cell’s side length being half that of the original cell. At each division, the complete genome is
transmitted to child cells.
In this model, the genome encodes a Random Boolean Network (RBN - see section B.8.1
for details). At each timestep, the RBN is allowed to run until it reaches a stable state. Then,
depending on the value of a special “division” node in the network, the cell decides whether or
not to divide. If it does, the current state of its RBN is transmitted to its child cells along with
the genome. The RBN can also use information from neighbouring cells (presented as an OR
combination of the state vectors of their RBNs, plus some limited spatial information in the
form of special bits indicating whether or not the cell lies on the median axis, or on a border).
At the end of development, cells can be tagged as neurons, actuators or interneurons depending
on their state, thus giving rise to small neural networks within the organism.
152
Figure B.5: Division and differentiation of rectangular cells according to the state of their RBN
in Dellaert and Beer’s model (from [45]).
The model has first been tested for simple geometric features, in order to demonstrate its
capacity to produce organisms that exhibit some degree of physical complexity. It has also
been successfully applied to the evolution of a curve-following animat. Its suitability for more
complex tasks would depend pretty much on the possibility to add actual physical properties to
the organisms (e.g. muscle cells).
B.5.2 Bongard’s “Artificial Ontogeny”
Although they were not introduced as such, the experiments made by Bongard and colleagues
[18] consist essentially in taking the previous model a big step further toward both physical
embodiment and biological plausibility. The purpose of these experiments was clearly to investi-
gate the mechanisms of natural embryogeny and their application to the generation of complex,
modular agents. Instead of a 2D, fixed-size organisms, this model works with 3D organisms
composed of spheres, each having its own size and position. More importantly, instead of mod-
elling genetic regulatory dynamics by RBNs, it uses a quantitative, asynchronous, spatial genetic
regulation model called “Artificial Ontogeny”.
In this model, genomes are strings of real values, and the beginning of each gene is indicated
by a value corresponding to a “promotor site” (since all values below a given threshold are
regarded as promotor sites, it seems to be quite possible for genes on a genome to overlap). The
values that follow the promotor site indicate the type of gene product that this gene produces if it
is expressed, the gene product that regulate this gene’s expression (and whether this regulation is
positive or negative), and the range of this product’s concentration to which the gene responds.
It also indicate from which “diffusion site” its own gene product should diffuse within the
organism.
A “diffusion site” of a unit is one of its 6 geometrical poles (N, S, E, W, plus “forward” and
“backward”). If a gene is to be expressed, it is injected into the unit at the specified diffusion site,
with a genetically specified concentration, as long as the gene is active. At each timestep, a decay
parameter reduces the concentration of every product by a fixed amount. Gene product can
diffuse between neighbouring diffusion sites at a given rate, and between units at a significantly
lower rate.
Two specific gene products regulate the growth of each unit, respectively activating and
repressing it (no size diminution is possible). When a unit exceeds a given size, it simply splits,
and the new unit is attached to it at the diffusion site that has the maximal concentration
of growth enhancer product. The two units are joined centre-to-centre by a rigid link, and a
rotational joint is created at the centre of the new unit.
By contrast to this degree of biological realism in the generation of the organism’s morphol-
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Figure B.6: Four organism created by “artificial ontogeny” (from [18]). Colours indicate the
presence or absence of motor / sensor neurons (dark cells have no neurons at all). Note the
presence of relatively structured appendages.
ogy, a much more abstract method is used for the generation of the neural system : it is simply
Cellular Encoding, in which the various instructions to be executed by the current neuron and
synapse are indicated by several specific gene products. When a unit splits, all the neurons at
the corresponding diffusion site are moved to the opposing diffusion site of the new unit, but
keep their connections intact, which allows for the migration of neurons and the maintaining
of long-range connections in the organism. Neurons can be sensor or motor. At each timestep,
within each unit, the activities of all motor neurons are averaged and the result is seen as a
target angle (in the [−pi/2;pi/2] range) for the cell’s rotational joint.
The model was applied to simple physical tasks such as block-pushing. The analysis of the
organisms produced indicates that some degree of modularity was achieved by the system, in
the form of genes that had similar activation patterns (thus probably responding to the same
“master” gene) and giving rise, under some conditions, to similar appendages.
More recently, Bongard and colleagues have explored new directions in the joint evolution of
morphology and behaviour. They created a system in which real robots engaged in continuous
self-modelling and simulation (generating models of themselves, testing these in internal simula-
tion, and evaluating the results by comparing with reality in an evolutionary algorithm among
models). This allows the robot to recover from random damage: “when a leg part is removed,
[the robot] adapts the self-models, leading to the generation of alternative gaits.” [17]
B.5.3 The Brandeis Lab
This remarkable degree of fidelity to biological processes gives a striking contrast with the
experiments described in [83], in which the use of neural networks seem to be the only concession
to biological plausibility. Creatures in this model are composed of rigid bars, possibly equipped
with motor joints. The specification of the animat is given by a series of instruction that are
followed by a LOGO-like “turtle”, such as “add a bar, turn left N degrees, add a joint”, plus the
ability to “branch off” and come back to branching point later (note that this is very similar to
the kind of descriptive language used in original L-Systems).
The controlling neural network is built in parallel with the morphology : the genomes consists
of both morphological and neural instruction. Each time a new joint is created, a new output
neuron is attached to is. The neural construction language is based on Edge Encoding. The
resulting creature is then evaluated on a simple locomotive task in a simple 3D physics simulator.
After testing a standard genetic algorithm based on direct encoding, the authors decided
to use a generative encoding - namely, a parametric L-System. In this case, the additional
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complexity allowed by the generative led to a striking increase in efficiency. This may be related
to the fact that with such simple structural elements, no efficient behaviour can emerge unless
a large number of elements are present, which is only possible with a generative encoding. The
organisms created with parametric L-Systems exposed a high degree of modularity and inner
symmetry.
A related project, coming from the same laboratory, is the GOLEM system described in
[107]. In this experiment, simple animats composed of extensible and joints are evolved in a
3D simulator. The model in itself is quite simple: the controller is a fully connected neural
network, some bars may be associated with an actuator neuron (in which case they are seen as
retractable) and the whole organism is directly represented by a string of parameters. No input
to the neural network is possible.
The originality of the experiment comes from the fact that the evolved creatures were actually
built, not by hand, but by a “3D-printing” system. The neural network was implemented by a
micro-controller and actuators were constructed as sliding motors in the specified bars.
B.6 Sims’ virtual creatures
B.6.1 The system
We will now introduce the works of Karl Sims, which we intend to discuss more thoroughly than
other systems. These experiments have had a deep influence on the field of artificial life as a
whole, and many of the works that we have related so far (in fact, all those that came after it)
mention it as an inspirational source.
Sims’ experiments [163, 162] deal with articulated creatures composed of 3D rigid block.
These blocks are arranged in a tree-like hierarchy, that is, each block (or “limb”) stem from
another “parent” limb (except of course for the first, “root” limb). Thus all creatures are or-
ganised as trees of limbs. These creatures are controlled by a special kind of neural network in
which neurons compute functions of their weighted inputs (e.g. summation, product, trigono-
metric... or even a simple sigmoid function, in which case the neuron behaves like a standard
McCulloch-Pitts neuron).
Each limb has its own local network, which may be linked to other networks from adjacent
limbs. In addition, creatures have a “central” network which is not associated to any limb, and
can be linked to any network in the creature. Joints between two limbs are associated with
actuators. An actuator takes one weighted input from a given neuron or sensor, and applies
a corresponding torque to the limbs it controls. This torque is scaled by a maximum value
proportional to the maximal cross section area of these limbs, thus scaling differently from their
mass (which scales with volumes). Similarly, various kinds of sensors are implemented, which
include contact sensors, proprioceptive sensors returning the current value of each degree of
freedom of each joint within the organism, or “photo-sensors” which indicate the direction of a
given global light source.
The genotype of these organisms is not a direct tree-like representation, but a graph of nodes
(see Figure B.7). Each node correspond to a limb. The difference between graphs and trees is
the presence of loops. When a node has a recursive link to itself, similar copies of these nodes
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Figure B.7: Sims’ Creatures are represented by directional graphs. Each vertex in the graph
corresponds to a limb. Edges correspond to articulations between a limb and a sub-limb, and
contain information about the placement, resizing and orientation of the sub-limb. A cycle in
the graph can be followed several times, giving rise to recursive structures (from [163]).
branch off each other. Because connections also contain information in the form of parameters
(scaling, angle, etc..), these recursive sub-parts need not be exactly identical. Similarly, if the
recursive link does not point toward the node itself, but toward an ancestor nodes, similar (but
usually not identical) sub-trees will be created, branching off each other. Two nodes may be
joined by more than one link, each with possibly different information, which means that one
limb can have many similar sub-trees branching from it.
This mapping between genotype and phenotype is quite different from what we have seen
so far. It naturally produces modularity and symmetry, as generative encodings do; but it also
keeps a fine-grained control of the phenotype, by ensuring that each part of the organism is fully
specified, just as in direct encoding. The language of the system still deals with actual body
parts, not abstract terms in a developmental grammar, thus keeping a link between genetic and
morphological complexity. The balance between complexity and modularity on one hand, and
control and efficiency on the other, is undoubtedly one of the strong points of the model.
The genetic algorithm used consists, at each generation, in selecting a given proportion of
the organisms and mating them in order to replace the discarded ones with offspring. Mutation
can affect either the structure of the graph or the value of some parameters. Recombination my
occur either by grafting (simply taking connecting a node from one parent to a node in another
and removing all newly unconnected nodes) or by graph crossover : graphs are aligned and the
offspring is copied, node by node, from one of the parents, switching between both parent once
or more in the process. One can easily imagine applications of historical marking (see NEAT,
above) to this model.
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The model was first applied to simple locomotive tasks [163], either on a plane (walking /
creeping), or in a liquid space (swimming), as well as on a source following experiment. Efficient
organisms were discovered, exhibiting a wide range of behaviours (e.g. snakes, bipeds, paddlers)
and complexities. The strikingly natural appearance of these organisms owes much to the natural
symmetries of the generative system.
Interesting difficulties were encountered. For example, choosing a “good” fitness function,
even for simple locomotive tasks, was not as trivial as one might think. Simply evaluating
organisms after the distance they covered led to the emergence of “opportunistic” behaviour
e.g. producing a sharp initial thrust, then stop moving altogether. Although clearly sub-
optimal, these behaviours quickly dominated the population and led to premature convergence.
A turn-around was to give a stronger weight to the distance covered near the end of evaluation
time.
Another difficulty came from the fact that any physical simulator is bound to be imperfect.
In some situations, the simulation may become unstable : “fictional” forces begin to appear,
and the body parts seem to undergo incorrect and incoherent movements. These instabilities
were more often than not exploited by evolution, resulting in creatures that exhibited fast, but
completely non-realistic motion.
B.6.2 Coevolution and the LEO algorithm
In another set of experiments, creatures were evaluated in a competitive setting, in which two
animats competed for the “control” of an inert block. At the end of the evaluation period, the
creature closest to the block was the winner. Since individuals are evaluated after the outcome
of their interactions with other, evolving individuals, this is a case of coevolution.
As we saw in chapter 3, coevolution immediately poses the problem of how to evaluate
individuals reliably and efficiently. Sims discusses several methods, among which the division
of the population in two species (such that competition occurs only between individuals from
another species), or the possibility of pitting all individuals against the best individual from the
previous generation. Sims eventually settled on a combination of these two.
The resulting algorithm consists in dividing the population between two species A and B.
Each creature from each species is then evaluated by competing against the current best from
the other species. More precisely, at every generation, each individual from population A is
pitted against the current champion of population B. The resulting score is used as a fitness
value for selection and reproduction among individuals from population A; it is also used to
choose a new champion for population A (the individual from A which obtained the best score
against the current champion of B). Then the same process is applied to population B, using
the new champion of population A for evaluation, etc.
This algorithm has since been called the Last Elite Opponent (LEO) algorithm by Cliff and
Miller [32].
The system generated a wide variety of behaviours, some of which are shown in Figure B.8.
Some creatures jab their opponents away from the cube before dragging it closer (b, d, e), some
pin down their opponent (b). Some were capable of following the cube after they (or their
opponent) displaced it (f). Some two-armed creatures flap the cube away with an arm and
157
Figure B.8: Creatures evolved by Sims in a coevolutionary experiment (from [162]). See text
for details.
catch it from the other. Some simply caught the cube and away with them (m). The population
dynamics in the two species of each run exhibited various behaviours as well.
These experiments have had a rich legacy (see Section 4.1.2 in Chap. 4 of this thesis). Of all
the projects discussed so far, they are probably the one that come closest to the intuitive notion
of “artificial life”. The evocative morphology of these creatures, and the immediate realism of
their behaviour, bears an uncanny resemblance to biological organisms that can hardly be found
in any other experiment in the field. Once again, it is clear that even though the realism of
the physical simulator plays an important role in making the organisms “look real”, the genetic
language is what really makes them “look alive”. The division in trees or chains of sub-modules
comes directly from the remarkably efficient use of generative encoding.
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B.7 Artificial Worlds
Most of the experiments discussed so far essentially rely on purely artificial selection. Coevo-
lutionary experiments are the simplest way to implement a more natural, possibly open-ended
form of evolution. Yet it is reasonable to think that much richer dynamics can emerge from more
complex environments in which many individuals (instead of just two) interact, especially if the
reproduction process becomes a part of these interactions (instead of being enforced separately
in the algorithm).
However, the simulation of full populations is computationally more demanding than simple
individual-based experiments. Not only the sheer number of individuals, but the potentially
complex nature of their interactions can impose significant computational costs that may increase
dramatically as the size of the population grows (e.g. if each agent must know the position of
each other, or even of the closest one, this imposes N2 −N calculations).
Thus the first simulations of these kind applied to abstract worlds and abstract organisms,
instead of physical, embodied agents. However, a few decades of continuous application of
Moore’s law4 have made it possible to build up increasingly complex simulation, including 3D,
physically realistic, situated organisms.
B.7.1 Abstract Ecologies
In Conrad and Pattee’s system [33] (cited by Fogel [59]), a one-dimensional discrete world
harbours abstract organisms which consist of extremely simple instructions. Organisms must
collect resources (under the form of items called “chips”) in order to reproduce and repair
themselves. At each timestep, an individual executes its current instruction, which may result
in trying to seize the resources present at that place, trading resources with other individuals,
or mating. Asexual reproduction occurs as soon as an individual has accumulated enough
resources. Some results were produced, indicating adaptation of some sort, but the crudeness
of the system (and, more particularly, the very limited control that organisms had over their
destiny) made further evolution difficult. However, as the authors noticed, this study “indicated
the feasibility and usefulness of this synthetic approach as a source of new ideas and information
about fundamental problems in evolutionary biology.”
It is difficult not to notice the similarities of this early model with Echo, the more recent
artificial ecology model designed by Holland (as described in [84, 128]). In Echo, the world
is a two-dimensional grid. Each agent is defined by a genome, which encodes an external
appearance (composed of alphabetic strings called “tags”) and a set of internal conditional
rules (which determine the activation of pre-defined behaviours, according to the tags of other
agents). Agents also have a reservoir, in which they can accumulate resources; these resources
are represented as alphabetic characters, just like the rules and the tags of agents.
As in Conrad and Pattee’s model, asexual reproduction occurs when an agent has acquired
enough resources to replicate itself; resources can be acquired either from the environment, or
from trading with other agents; and agents can reproduce sexually if they choose to. However,
they can also fight each other, and move randomly on the grid when they fail to acquire any re-
4“The number of transistors in an integrated chip doubles every year.” [130]
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source. The system can be tailored in various way to study its ecological dynamics. Comparisons
with natural systems are also possible, although somewhat risky (see [84] for an example).
B.7.2 Ackley and Littman: Evolutionary Reinforcement Learning
The model described by Ackley and Littman [1] is an attempt at modelling the interactions of
between lifetime learning and evolution. The world (called AL) is a 2D grid inhabited by agents,
trees, food, and predators. Food grows geometrically. Carnivores reproduce when sufficiently
nourished, and may die of starvation. They are controlled by hand-coded rules that do not
change throughout the simulation. Trees provide shelter from predators for only 1 agent at
a time. Agents can eat food and dead agents, be eaten by predators, and die of starvation.
Their inputs indicate the quantity and proximity of each other entity (agent, predator, food...)
in each of the cardinal direction, plus internal information (health). Both evolutionary and
reinforcement learning are used for the agents. The interplay between lifelong and evolutionary
learning was prominently featured in the authors’ discussion, illustrating both advantages and
drawbacks of the combination.
B.7.3 Evolving competing programs - Tierra
Competing programs in virtual computers have been implemented for decades, usually as games.
An example is Core Wars [46], for which evolutionary experiments have been run. However, the
most famous evolutionary experiments on machine code organisms is indisputably the Tierra
system [146].
Tierra is essentially a virtual computer, in which small self-replicating programs are executed
by the virtual processor. Programs are stored in a sequential access memory and are composed
of various machine-code instructions. The system operates in multitasking mode between all
programs. The processor executes the current instruction (as indicated by an instruction pointer
IP), then increases the local program’s IP, so that it will read and execute the next instruction
when its execution is resumed; Note, however, that some branching and jumping instructions
can modify the IP directly, allowing the execution flow to jump to other sequences of instruction
(possibly out of the program’s code). After each operation, the CPU switches to the next
program in the queue.
While branching operations such as CALL and RET operate as their classical assembly
language counterparts, the JMP instruction works in a specific manner : each JMP instruction
is followed by a series of NOP0 and NOP1 (no-operation) instructions, that work as a pattern
to be matched by the jumping process. The processor will then look forward (or backward)
in memory until it finds the complement of that series. For example, if the JMP instruction
is followed by, say, NOP0 NOP0 NOP1 NOP0, the processor will look forward until it finds
the sequence NOP1 NOP1 NOP0 NOP1. This “addressing by template” mode was designed
to mimic the interactions of cells through proteins that match specific receptors on the cells’
surface.
Another feature of Tierra is that it avoids numeric arguments altogether: a numeric register
(the equivalent of the CX register) holds the results of arithmetic operations and can be operated
upon by bit-flipping and shifting. If a numeric value is needed, the same instructions can create
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any given integer in this register. Thus each bit in the genome actually codes for an instruction,
and the total alphabet of the system is limited to the instruction set.
Programs with which the Tierra system is seeded are delineated by specific sequences of
NOPs. So are the reproducing loop, and the copying procedure it uses. Programs can write
either inside their own memory zone, or on a section of memory that they explicitly allocated
with a specific ALLOC instruction. After they have copied their own code in such a memory
zone, a DIVIDE instruction removes their writing privileges to that zone and creates a new IP
for the newly created program. In order to prevent memory overflow, a destructive mechanism
(the “reaper”) stores programs in a LILO queue (new programs enter the bottom of the queue)
and destroys the program at the top of the queue every time memory occupation becomes too
high.
Genetic change occurs by “cosmic ray” mutation - that is, about 1 bit in the memory is flipped
for every 10000 instruction executions. Mutation can also occur while copying instructions, at
a higher rate (1/25000 to 1/1000). The result of operations can also be altered by +/- 1 at low
frequency.
The results are, at first sight, impressive. The first distinct species to appear are parasites,
smaller pieces of code that cannot reproduce by themselves, but use the copying code from other
organisms to do so. Being smaller, they enjoy a comparative advantage because they can be
copied more quickly. However, because they need hosts to replicate them, they cannot eliminate
them completely, and the population enters a Lotka-Volterra cycle. Some hosts can defeat these
parasites, which leads to their disappearance.
Later on, cleverer hosts become hyper-parasites, by ensuring that, when a parasite’s IP
points to their replicating code, it ends up copying not the parasite itself, but the hyper-parasite
- and never returns. After the parasites have gone extinct, these hyper-parasites (which are
able to reproduce on their own) evolve social characteristics - i.e. their reproduction begins to
depend on the presence of similar organisms next to them. Ray argues this by the fact that
high genetic uniformity in neighbouring organisms supports such “social” behaviours, especially
in the presence of a selective advantage brought by their shorter size. Ineluctably, such be-
haviour (passing instruction pointers around for replicating each other) is eventually exploited
by “cheaters”, which never return the IP that get through them. Other results in Tierra include
the appearance of various optimisers, along with cases of code mixing that indicate a crude,
spontaneous (and unfortunately unstable) form of recombination.
Unfortunately, Channon [28] downplayed these results somewhat, by showing that some of
them could be obtained quite easily. While Ray had documented how the first parasites evolved
out of a single bit-flip mutation, the fact that hyper-parasites could appear with just one more
mutation made their complexity more doubtful (at least from an evolutionary viewpoint).
Still, Tierra remains an interesting experiment which is still under development. Multi-
threading has been introduced in an attempt to model multi-cellular organisms [148]. Similarly,
a network adaptation of Tierra has been developed in order to examine the system’s adaptive
capacities in heterogeneous environments. Unfortunately, published results have been scarce.
The main source of documentation for Tierra and the ongoing results (if any) is Ray’s website.
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Figure B.9: One of the more efficient swimmers evolved by Ventrella (from [179]).
B.7.4 Ventrella’s Swimmers
Ventrella’s swimmers [179] is among the first examples of an artificial world in which organisms
are physically modelled, and interact physically with their environment. These swimmers are
2D coloured figures composed of interconnected line segments. The morphology is constrained
(one to four limbs emanating from a single “head” node, two to four segments in each limb,
all segments have same lengths). Organisms are controlled by oscillating motors, governed by
a set of parameters in the genotypes. These parameters include amplitude, frequency, shifts in
phase or amplitude between successive limbs and segments, plus a few parameters that are used
when changing direction. Thus, while the decision part of the controller is fixed, the response
(locomotion and direction change) depends entirely on genetic parameters.
Movements and reproduction consume energy; additionally, a small amount of energy is lost
at every time step, even if no action is taken. Energy can be restored by eating food bits,
which multiply at a fixed rate in the environment. A swimmer’s field of view covers 360 degrees,
allowing it to detect other swimmers or food from any direction (within a maximal radius).
A swimmer can detect the relative orientation of a food bit, or of another swimmer, as well
as colour information on other swimmers. At any time, the behaviour of a given swimmer is
dictated by a fixed, non-evolving finite states automaton. The possible states correspond to the
search and pursuit of food and mates, as well as eating and mating if food or mates are reached.
Mating occurs when a mating organism is sufficiently close to the partner it sought. The
offspring’s genotype (a string of 17 floating point values within the [0.0; 1.0] range) is created by
n-point crossover and mutation of the parents’ genomes. Repetitive reproduction between two
swimmers is possible as long as they have enough energy. Both parents (even if one of them
did not seek reproduction) contribute a fixed amount of their energies to their offspring. If an
agent’s energy fall under a “hunger” threshold, it will stop seeking mates and start looking for
food instead. If it falls under 0, or if the agent has reach its maximal life span, the agent dies
and disappears.
Sexual preference plays an important role in this simulation. Each swimmer has a head
colour, a colour shift parameter (which controls colour gradient between successive segments),
and a “favourite colour” for potential mates. A swimmer will only choose mates that have their
favourite colour, or a closely related one. The amount (not the percentage) of this colour (and
of its close derivatives) will be the criterion of choice among several potential mates.
Experiments with this model lead to the emergence of several genetically-related groups (as
indicated by their colour), developing increasingly efficient locomotion skills. Sexual selection
may also lead to a “peacock tail” effect, in that some organisms prefer to invest in sexual
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attractiveness (by displaying as many colours as possible, which entails having many limbs) at
the detriment of efficiency [180].
This model can undoubtedly be seen as a successful application of natural selection in an
artificial world. The Darwinian metaphor (survival of the fittest in an environment with strictly
limited resources) applies in full. Even though only a few behaviour were possible, the actual
realisation of these behaviours by each organism was completely dependent on evolution, which
came up with various solutions. A limitation of this work is that the control architecture was
fixed, thus restricting the range of possible strategies. Nevertheless, this represents a choice in the
balance between simplicity and completeness which, in this model, provided highly interesting
dynamics.
B.7.5 Polyworld
Polyworld [197] is a flat environment in which simulated organisms reproduce sexually, fight
and kill and eat (either food items, or other dead organisms’ bodies). Organisms have a fixed
repertoire of behaviours (move, turn, attack, eat, mate, plus the possibility of controlling the
brightness of a part of their bodies) which are controlled by neural networks with Hebbian
learning synapses. Neural networks are divided into connected groups in order to reduce the
number of genetic parameters (which still remains very large). Vision is implemented in a one-
dimensional way : the visual input is provided by extracting the strip of pixel just above the
ground in front of the organism.
Mating simply occurs when two spatially overlapping individuals both have their “mating”
neuron activated. An offspring is generated (through crossover and mutation) if the maximum
number of organisms has not been reached, and (depending on a simulation parameter) if the
genetic difference between both parents is not too high. Parents transmit a part of their energy
to their offspring. An organism can fight another one if they overlap. The power of the attack is
determined by the activity of the “fighting” neuron and the organism’s strength, size and current
energy level, and is deduced from the attacked organism’s energy. The level of excitement of the
“fighting” and “mating” neurons are indicated in the blue and red components of its current
colour (the green component is equivalent to the organism’s ID number).
Note that all actions, including locomotion, induce a consumption of energy proportional
to their intensity. Energy is also consumed continuously in proportion to an organism’s size,
strength and neural activity. Thus being big and strong is a competitive advantage in terms of
fighting, but leads to a higher energy consumption. Energy can be replenished by consuming
patches of food that grow naturally, or by eating carcasses of dead animals, allowing for various
possible strategies. A distinction exists between health and food energy (the former being related
to fights, both being replenished by food).An organism dies when it outlives its life span, or when
any of its energy levels drops under 0.
Simulations began with an artificial selection method, based on an ad hoc fitness function,
until self-sustaining populations occurred. Experiments led to the emergence of various strate-
gies. The simplest one was simply to run forward, always wanting to eat and to mate, which
worked well in open worlds with sufficient food supply. Organisms turning around in a tight
radius, following edges and barriers (when they were present), or simply staying very close to
163
each other (thus providing abundant resources for both mating and eating to each other) also
appeared, depending on the global parameters of the world. The most complex behaviours
include examples of swarms, i.e. groups of organisms that follow each other.
The fact that any strategy did emerge at all can be seen as a small miracle when one
considers the size of the search space that was imposed upon these creatures. The number of
(8-bits) genes went literally into the thousands. This comes from the size of the neural networks
considered, as well as their genetic. According to the author, “A network of 185 neurons can
be fully specified by just [sic] 2146 genes”. The “just” is a reference to a previous method
based on a full connectivity matrix, implying N2 genes for N neurons, i.e. 200 neurons led to
40000 genes (simulations were run with this model, although no results are mentioned - perhaps
unsurprisingly).
Such a large search space is difficult to scan in a reasonable amount of time, even for evolution.
This may explain the relative simplicity of resulting strategies (indeed, the capacity of reacting
to food or to visual stimuli is described as a “complex, emergent behaviours”). Additionally,
the fact that Hebbian learning was implemented for all synapses makes it difficult to distinguish
the role of evolution in the appearance of these behaviours.
B.7.6 Geb
Imagine that we take the Polyworld experiment and simplify it as drastically as possible, while
still retaining enough features to allow for natural selection. We would probably obtain some-
thing that looks very much like Geb.
Although created independently of Polyworld, Geb [28, 27] also features abstract organisms
with a limited repertoire of behaviours, namely moving (and turning), mating and killing. They
are also controlled by neural networks. However, in contrast to Polyworld, the world has been
thoroughly simplified. First, Geb is a discrete world, both in space in time : the environment is a
2D grid, and time occurs in discrete timesteps. At each timestep, an organism acts accordingly to
the outputs of its neural network. No energy quantities are considered in the system (essentially,
Geb organisms do not eat). The population is naturally limited by the fact that no more
organisms can exists than there are squares in the grid (the standard being a 20 ∗ 20 = 400
squares grid).
Mating and fighting occur in a rather straightforward way. If an organism enters “fighting”
behaviour, then the organism right ahead (Geb organisms have an orientation) is simply killed.
If an organism enters “mating” behaviour, then it reproduces with the organism that stands
right ahead. The offspring is placed on the square that lies just beyond the mating partner,
erasing any organism that might be there. Organisms can also turn (by an angle proportional
to the excitement of corresponding output neurons) and move forward, if the square ahead is
empty. Note that, since the behaviours are abstract and pre-defined, the goal of the organisms
is not to evolve behaviours, but to know how and when to use them.
Genotypes are simply binary-encoded L-Systems [144], that is, recursive grammars suitable
for the generation of trees and graphs. Note that since Geb organisms have no physical property,
the genotype only describes a neural network. Neural networks in Geb are graphs of nodes, in
which each node has a character (i.e. a bitstring). An organism’s genotype is thus a binary string
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Figure B.10: The experimental world in Geb.
that is decomposed into a set of rewriting rules; these rules operate on the nodes’ characters
and connections. A rule matches a node if the predecessor of that rule matches the beginning
of a node’s character, and if no better-matching rule for that character is found. The rules are
encoded according to a somewhat intricate binary language that identifies meaningful segments
by checking whether the next odd-rank bit is 0 (otherwise, a separator has been found).
The resulting networks may be arbitrarily complex, and the character of the final nodes
determines their status : input or output, and in the latter case, what kind of action they
encode (this is determined from the first few bits on their character). Inputs are sensitive to
the excitation of output nodes of other organisms that match their character. This may provide
the basis for some communication between organisms. Reproduction occurs by crossover and
mutation. Crossover offsets the cutting point in the second organism by one (in a randomly
chosen direction) with regard to the first organism. Thus genotypes’ length is expected to vary
smoothly between generations.
Identifiable behaviours reliably emerge. Running forward and killing everything, or doing all
possible actions at a time, initially dominate the population. Consistently, a simple behaviour
consisting in turning in a tight circle while always trying to kill and to reproduce emerges rapidly.
Some basic level of mutual detection occurs by the appearance of a non-action output character
(000) that also appears among the inputs of (some of) these organisms. Some other organisms
use this as an input to turn against these “turners” and kill them.
Identifying any further behaviour by visual inspection is difficult, however. In fact, the
complexity of the neural networks often makes it difficult to analyse the exact behaviour of any
given agent.
B.7.7 Framsticks
Framsticks is an artificial 3D world which defines itself as “a three-dimensional life simulation
project”. Framsticks organisms are composed of articulated, deformable sticks controlled by
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neural networks. These neural networks have sensors for contact, proprioception, spatial ori-
entation and presence of food; actuators may control either “bending” or “rotational” motors
(which are actually two orthogonal axes of rotation). The neurons themselves are standard
McCulloch-Pitts neurons, but with several additional parameters : intensity, sigmoid control
and especially an inertia parameter, which may allow for interesting dynamics at neuron level.
Several encoding systems have been implemented, including direct representation, CE-like
encoding, and an intermediate kind of generative encoding which is highly evocative of Sims’
[98]. The 3D simulation is physically realistic except in the fact that an organism can self-
penetrate (two of its stick may go through each other); however, collisions and contacts between
different agents are taken into account.
The simulation environment is based on an artificial selection model : organisms are chosen
from a pool, placed in the simulator, evaluated according to some human-defined criterion and
then mate according to this fitness. However the system allows for the simultaneous simulation
of several agents within the environment. Together with the simulation of food and energy
consumption by the agents, this leads the author to propose a way to emulate natural selection
: simply evaluate agents according to their life time [97]. An agent that lives longer is allowed
to produce more offspring.
Over time Framsticks has been enriched with various features, including sine wave neurons
and even neurons encoding fuzzy rules [78]. Yet for all the innovations in Framsticks, the
results appear somewhat scarce. Beyond extremely simple crawling creatures, no significant
behaviours have been evolved from scratch by the system. However it should be kept in mind
that Framsticks is a recent work in constant progress. An active community has developed, and
intensive development continues together with further experimentation, which means that, in
contrast to previous experiments, new results can reasonably be expected.
B.8 Appendix
B.8.1 Random Boolean Networks
A RBN is a graph of N nodes (a, b, c... n), each having one boolean output and K boolean
inputs coming from other nodes. At each timestep, the state of a node is determined by a
boolean function of its inputs, that is, of the state of its input nodes at the previous timestep
RBNs were introduced by Kauffman [95] as a tool for modelling genetic regulatory networks,
that is, the interaction of genes in a genome that can influence the expression of each other.
Obviously a synchronous, discrete model such as RBNs may be an extreme simplification of
the asynchronous, quantitative process of genetic regulation. On the other hand, RBNs offer
a wide range of possibilities : N nodes having each K inputs can provide (NK)N ∗ (2(2k))N
different RBNs; for N = 3,K = 2, this gives about 3.106 networks. Besides, RBN dynamics
have been analysed quite in depth: whatever its initial state, an RBN is bound to fall into a
state that was already encountered, thus resulting into a cycle. These cycles are attractors in the
state space, and can be thought of as the global “state” of the whole system after a stabilisation
phase.
In a biological metaphor, this system would be a cell, and each node would correspond to
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a given protein, that would be produced or not depending on the presence or absence of other
proteins. Eventually each cell falls into a given attractor, that corresponds to a particular cycle
of protein production. This particular cycle corresponds to the type of that cell. RBNs seem to
exhibit a surprising stability with regard to mutation, which makes them interesting for evolu-




Is evolution “just a tautology?”
When it comes to proving such obvious things, one will invariably fail to convince.
Montesquieu, L’esprit des lois, Book XXV, Chapter XIII.
The claim that evolution is “just a tautology” is one illustration of how subtle the Darwinian
mechanism is, and how easy it is to thoroughly misunderstand it.
At the suggestion of several correspondents, including Wallace, Darwin attempted to make
his argument more intuitive by replacing the term “natural selection” with Herbert Spencer’s
vivid expression, “survival of the fittest”. Unfortunately, this has led to even more confusion.
It is sometimes argued that the expression “survival of the fittest” (and therefore, it is claimed,
Darwinian evolution in general) is nothing more than a tautology. The reasoning is that if one
takes the term “fit” to mean “endowed with phenotypic characteristics which improve chances
of survival and reproduction” (which is roughly how Spencer understood it), then “survival of
the fittest” can simply be rewritten as “survival of those who are better equipped for surviving
and reproducing.”
Note that this is not exactly a tautology: we might imagine a playful deity that would
consistently favour the poorly adapted, and destroy well-adapted creatures, so that “survival
of the fittest” might actually not occur. However, this is not a very informative statement:
it simply reduces to the statement that the game of Life is not rigged in favour of the poorly
adapted, which is not controversial. Furthermore, the expression does become a tautology if one
uses the most widely accepted definition of “fitness” in modern biology, namely reproductive
success itself (rather than any set of characters conducive to this reproductive success). This
reasoning is sometimes used to claim that Darwin’s entire theory of evolution by natural selection
is fundamentally tautological, and therefore devoid of any explanatory power.
However, the expression “survival of the fittest” (taken on its own and out of context) gives
a very incomplete account of the mechanism of natural selection. The reason is that it does not
mention a key requirement for natural selection, namely the requirement of heritability. It is
true that the phrase “survival of the fittest”, by itself and out of context, is a tautology if fitness
is defined by survival and reproduction. However, natural selection is not just survival of the
fittest. Natural selection is the portion of variation in reproductive success, that is caused by
heritable (phenotypic) characters (see chapter 2.)
If certain heritable characters increase or decrease the chances of survival and reproduction
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of their bearers, then it follows mechanically (by definition of “heritable”) that those charac-
ters that improve survival and reproduction will increase in frequency over generations. This is
precisely what is called “evolution by natural selection.” On the other hand, if the characters
which lead to differential reproductive success are not heritable, then no meaningful evolution
will occur, “survival of the fittest” or not: if improvement in reproductive success is caused by
traits that are not heritable, then there is no reason why these traits should increase in fre-
quency over generations. In other words, natural selection does not simply state that “survivors
survive” or “reproducers reproduce”; rather, it states that “survivors survive, reproduce and
therefore differentially propagate any heritable characters that have affected their survival and
reproductive success.” This statement is not tautological: it hinges on the testable hypothesis




Levels of selection and the gene’s eye
view of evolution
D.1 Levels of selection
D.1.1 Evolution and natural selection occur at many levels
We saw that any population of entities that exhibit variation, multiplication and heredity will
evolve. Organisms are an obvious example of such entities. But quite clearly, entities of this
sort can be found at many levels of observation. For example, it is possible to see entire species
as evolving entities: when a speciation event occurs, “daughter” species inherit many of the
characteristics of their “parent” species. But they may also differ in other respects, and the
differences (which accumulate after the separation) will in turn be transmitted to later species.
So species do exhibit heritable features which can change over time.
Natural selection may also occur at many levels. Any entity that can see its replication
rate affected by inherited features will undergo natural selection. This is clearly not limited to
individuals: tightly bound groups, such as certain insect colonies, may behave in this fashion
[189]. On the other hand, within multi-cellular organisms, natural selection can certainly happen
among individual cells - though it is of course severely curtailed by the machinery of the organism.
In fact, when a group of cells manage to break free from the control process and replicate
“selfishly”, without any regard for the well-being of the organism, they often gain a massive
selective advantage - which is to say, their reproductive success is vastly increased with that of
their more urbane (and therefore less successful) neighbours. The result, of course, is cancer.
At an even lower level, the cases of meiotic drive mentioned above show that selection among
genes can occur quite independently of any organismal interaction.
Natural selection does not just occur at many levels: it occurs at many levels concurrently.
In fact, almost any entity which undergoes variation, multiplication and heredity (that is, any
entity that evolves) will encounter various forms of spontaneously occurring selective pressure.
New entities will find ways to out-replicate each other, simply because the natural environment is
so rich and complex as to offer many opportunities for natural selection to act. The consequence
is that, when a selective force acts at a certain level, we must remember that other selective
forces keep acting at all lower levels.
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D.1.2 Natural selection “at” a certain level
Note that there can be some confusion about whether natural selection occurs at a certain
“level” or another. For example, let us consider again the example of species: if an individual
of a certain species is born with a highly advantageous feature, this feature will spread through
the population, greatly increasing its success; as a result, the species may thrive and branch off
into many successful species; these daughter species, which will inherit the beneficial feature,
will also prove successful - at least as long as the feature itself is beneficial. On the other hand,
related species that do not possess this feature will not share in this success, and may even suffer
from the increased competition. This can certainly be seen as a process of evolution by natural
selection: change in the inherited characteristics of a population of entities (species) caused by
the effect of these characteristics on reproductive success.
However, it is clear that in this case the selective effect on species is entirely indirect : the
increased success of species is merely an arithmetic consequence of the success of individuals,
endowed as they are with a beneficial feature. Crucially, the spread of the differentiating feature
can entirely be explained by interactions and selective advantage at the level of individuals alone.
It does not seem useful to say that selection has occurred “at the level of the species”, when
any selective effect on species is a purely arithmetic artifact of lower-level selection. When can
we say that selection occurs “at” a certain level?
Importantly, the level of selection should not be equated with the level at which the feature
of interest, or the interaction, exists. In this sense, we cannot state that selection occurs (solely)
at the “proximal” level. A feature can have independent selective effects at other levels than
that of its bearer - for example, the sting of a stinger bee has a (positive) effect on the success of
their hives, which is different from the (dramatically negative) effect on its bearer. The former
cannot be reduced to mere arithmetic aggregation of the latter. The widespread occurrence
of the stinger apparatus, so harmful to those that make use of it, can only be explained by
considering the positive effect at the higher level of the hive (and, as we will see, the indirect
effect at the level of the gene that codes for it). Neither should it be simply reduced to a question
of which entity “benefits” from a certain feature - if only because natural selection can have both
beneficial and harmful effects.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to say that natural selection occurs “at” a certain level, if
there is variance in contribution to future generations (caused by heritable phenotypic features)
between entities at that level, that is not merely the aggregation of effects at another level. As
shown by the example of the stinger bee, a single feature can create many selective pressures,
sometimes contradictory, at different levels. The net balance of these contradicting forces will
determine the fate of the feature: propagation or elimination.1
D.1.3 The basis of heredity: the “gene”
In summary, both evolution and natural selection take place at many levels concurrently. How-
ever, in nature, these many levels share one crucial aspect, namely the physical basis of heredity.
In almost all cases of interest, and independently of the level being considered, this basis hap-
pens to be genes, chemically encoded in nucleic acids: genes are the medium through which
1See also Endler. [49, p.23-24]
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heritable features are being transmitted. Whether we consider populations, individuals or (ob-
viously) alleles, we find that the ultimate support of the transmission almost invariably consists
in genetic material. For example, at the population level, when populations or groups split, the
long-term hereditary message is not transmitted through some diffuse, ‘zeitgeist’ mechanism: it
is embedded within the individuals that set out in each group, and in each of them it can be
located in the tangible form of nucleic acids. For almost any evolutionary event, we see that
in last analysis, the differential transmission of inherited features (that is, evolution itself) is
essentially a differential transmission of genes.
Importantly, this account is only valid for a wide acceptation of the word “gene.” In par-
ticular, it is difficult to equate “genes” in this sense with individual alleles, simply because
some characters have a genetic basis which cannot be reduced to alleles. An obvious example
(mentioned with this intent by Sober and Lewontin [166]) is that of heterozygote advantage, in
which having two different alleles at a given locus brings an advantage over homozygotes. While
heterozygosity certainly has a genetic basis, by definition, no single allele can be the genetic
basis for heterozygosity. In fact, the notion of “gene” in this sense is probably most closely
approximated by the term “group of alleles.” 2
Evolutionary explanations seek to find out the circumstances which lead certain particular
features to propagate in a population, and as we saw this phenomenon can occur at many levels.
But if heredity is (almost) always physically embedded in genes, then in order to answer this
question, we must ensure that our answer also includes an answer to its gene-level equivalent,
namely: why, or when, do this particular gene propagate within a population? In other words,
in almost all situations of interest, selection at any level must somehow result in a coherent force
of genic selection. Importantly, this does not mean that natural selection only occurs at the
level of the gene: it is clear that natural selection can exert its primary force at any level. But
to have any real effect, this force must (indirectly) translate into a coherent impulse at the level
of the gene.
It follows that any selective force at a certain level can only be have an effect if it can be
translated into an indirect, but coherent force at lower levels. Genes are only special in that they
happen to occupy the bottom rung of the ladder: since (almost) all heredity is ultimately based
on genes, any form of evolution (and natural selection) must use genes as a ultimate medium.
D.1.4 Gene-level selection: primus inter pares
This simple fact has profound consequences regarding the validity of various selective expla-
nations of evolution. The point is made concisely and efficiently by Dawkins [37] (emphasis
added):
Before the gene-centred view of natural selection became fashionable, people used
to say that if something was good it would happen. This has led some to believe
that the adaptationist approach is an easy game. It’s been said that you can easily
come up with some Darwinian idea to explain anything. As against that, the proper
2In short, a gene “for” a certain character is any piece of genetic material which, when present in an individual’s
genotype, will cause or favour the presence of a certain characteristic, assuming all other relevant factors are in
their “normal” state (see section D.1.5.)
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understanding of Darwinism at the gene level severely limits you to a certain kind of
explanation. It’s not good enough just to say that if something is vaguely advanta-
geous it will evolve. You have to say that it’s good for the genes that made it. That
automatically wipes out great swathes of possible facile explanations.
The most prominent of these “facile explanations” is probably the concept of adaptations
“for the good of the species.” This once-popular notion professed that natural selection could
drive individuals to deliberately restrict their own success for the benefit of the species as a
whole. A refined version of this idea, centring on durable congregations rather than species
in the strict sense, was put forward by Wynne-Edwards under the name “group selection.”
For example, drawing a comparison with human overfishing and the resulting depletion of fish
stocks, Wynne-Edwards contended that animals deliberately limited their own numbers below
what immediate resources could sustain, in order to avoid over-exploitation and future starvation
[196, pp. 5-9].
The problem of such explanations, of course, is that widespread altruism is vulnerable to
the invasion of cheaters, who selfishly enjoy the results of others’ altruism without repaying the
favour themselves. Williams’ critique [188] showed not only that many altruistic behaviours
could be explained simply by direct costs and benefits to the bearers of altruistic genes, but that
the vulnerability of altruistic groups to invasion by cheaters posed enormous problems to the
onset of group selection in general. This illustrates how the gene’s eye view of evolution helps
avoiding the heed of intuitively appealing, but ultimately misleading explanations.
Again, this does not at all imply that group selection cannot happen; rather, it means that
explanations based on group selection (that is, natural selection acting between groups rather
than individuals or gene) must ensure their compatibility with the gene’s eye view: saying that
a feature is “good for the group” is insufficient, it must also be shown to be (indirectly) “good”
for the gene that encodes it. An explanation cannot be accepted until it has be translated
into gene-selection terms, and the balance of all forces acting at the level of the corresponding
genes has been shown to be favourable. This is exactly the path that has been taken recently
by authors such as Sober and D. S. Wilson [167] in their thought-provoking efforts to revive
interest in group-selection approaches.
It is in this sense that the gene’s eye view of evolution can be called primary : because genes
are the ultimate medium of almost all heredity in Nature, it follows that all levels of natural
selection must somehow include gene-level selection. A selective process at a certain level will
only have an evolutionary effect if it somehow creates a selective force at the gene level. Whether
the selective process occurs between groups, or individuals, or genes themselves, if it cannot be
translated into a selective advantage for genes, then it can not influence evolution. This is a
simple fact; but keeping this simple fact in mind may open vast fields of explanatory mechanisms
- some of which are famously described in The Selfish Gene [36]. Forgetting it may lead to gross
errors of logic.
D.1.5 Limitations of the gene’s eye view of evolution
While the gene’s eye view of evolution is in a sense primary, it should not be considered as
absolute: there are limitations to the centrality of the gene in evolution.
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Epistasis and pleiotropy
A widespread, though questionable, objection is that the gene’s eye view is inoperant because
most phenotypic traits result from the complex interactions of many genes, rather than the mere
addition of well-defined contributions from each single gene. The effect of a particular gene on
the phenotype will typically be affected by the effects of other genes, a phenomenon known as
epistasis. This is expressed quite forcefully by Gould [70]:
Richard [Dawkins] has taken [Darwin’s] posture of trying to beat the level of expla-
nation down, and has carried it to its ultimate extreme: it’s not even the organisms
that are struggling, it’s only the genes. The organisms are “vehicles. . . ” The only
active agents in Richard’s worldview are genes. He’s wrong. . . Richard is basically
wrong, because organisms are doing the struggling out there. If organisms could be
described as the additive accumulation of what their genes do, then you could say
that organisms are representing the genes, but they’re not. Organisms have hosts of
emergent characteristics. In other words, genes interact in a nonlinear way. It is the
interaction that defines the organism, and if those interactions, in a technical sense,
are non-additive that is, if you can’t just say that it’s this percent of this gene plus
that percent of that gene then you cannot reduce the interaction to the gene. This
is a technical philosophical point. As soon as you have emergent characteristics due
to non-additive interaction among lower-level entities, then you can’t reduce to the
lower-level entities, because the non-additive features have emerged. These features
don’t exist until you get into the higher level. His argument is wrong.
This objection requires a closer look at the relationship between genes and heritable features.
That genes interact non-linearly is obvious - nobody ever argued that epistasis doesn’t exist.
However, this does not prevent the fact that specific alleles can have specific effects on the
phenotype. The reason is that, when we say that a certain gene “controls” a given phenotypic
trait, what we really mean is that a variation in that particular gene will cause a (predictable)
variation in the trait - assuming that other genes remain in their usual, “wild” state. A certain
allele at this particular locus will cause the appearance of a certain trait, while other alleles
will lead to different traits, with the implicit assumption of a common “genetic background”
against which this variation occurs. Any statement that a certain gene “codes for” a certain
trait implies a silent “all other things being equal” (or at least, “normal”) clause.
Thus, despite non-linear interactions, single-allele differences can have important, predictable
effects over the configuration of the organism. Of course, if they did not, then there could not be
any heritable characteristic, and Darwinian evolution would be impossible in the first place. If,
and only if, these phenotypic effects have an impact on the reproductive success of the organism
(or another entity which contains the same allele), then this allele will be favoured by natural
selection, and the resulting characteristic will propagate throughout the population. The related
argument of pleiotropy, which points out that a single gene can have an effect on many characters
at once, seems equally relative.
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The limits of the gene-centric view
The true limitation of the gene’s eye view of evolution lies elsewhere; in fact, it results from
the very same cause which ensures its power in the first place. As we saw, the importance of
the gene’s eye view derives from the fact that genes are the support of heredity. It immediately
follows that, in those case where genes are not the support of heredity (that is, when important
changes in inherited characteristics occur in a way that is not mediated by genes), then the
gene’s eye view looses relevance.
There are important examples of momentous evolutionary events in the history of Life, which
were not based on genetic changes. Perhaps the most well-known is the endosymbiotic origin
of eukaryotic cells, which resulted from the fusion of free-living prokaryotes[112] into single
organisms. While it is clear that the fusion events themselves led to numerous later genetic
changes, both in the hosts and in the symbionts, and even if we admit that certain genetic
predispositions were necessary for this fusion to take place, this does not alter the fact that the
fusion itself was clearly not a genetic event. Other examples of endosymbiosis (most familiarly
the bacterial “gut flora” in humans) also qualify as examples of evolutionary event not directly
based on genetic change.
Since the present work is very much oriented towards artificial evolution and artificial life,
we must also point out that the primacy of the gene is very much a feature of “life as it is” -
that is, biological life as it exists today in nature. Artificial models need not be constrained by
the mechanisms of natural life. For example, we may imagine an artificial environment in which
individuals reproduce by self- (or mutual-) inspection, rather than relying on an explicit genetic
message.3 In such a world, there is simply no “genes” in any meaningful sense, but evolution
and natural selection can still very well occur.
A different problem arises when the gene-centric view of evolution becomes a philosophical
description, not just of evolution, but of life itself. In this view, life is the process through which
replicators (genes) replicate, and the construction of entities (Dawkins’ “lumbering robots”
[36]) is essentially an interesting side effect. However, these concepts cannot suffice to capture
the essence of life: although they address efficiently one of the fundamental aspects of life
(reproduction and evolution), they do not consider (or rather, explicitly see as irrelevant) the
other fundamental aspect of life, that is, autonomous self-construction and self-organisation.
This latter aspect is at least as important as the former to our concept of “life” - indeed,
approaches to the problem of defining life are commonly classified according to the relative
importance that they attach to each of these two aspects.[155, 31]
This discussion must not be taken as a minimisation of the gene-centric view of evolution.
Rather, it suggests that the gene’s eye view should be seen as an emerging description, deriving
from the organisation of nature, rather than as the philosophical basis of evolution and natural
selection. The gene’s eye view of evolution is a logically sound, enormously useful way to look
at evolution, but reducing the very concept of evolution itself to genes is not desirable. Again,
evolution is about changes in heritable characteristics, which are not synonymous with genes.
The “selfish gene” is the most fruitful way to assess evolutionary problems (and explanations)
3Taylor [173, Chap. 7.2.3] discusses these two modes of reproduction, as well as their respective implications
and impact over the evolutionary process.
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Solution concepts, monotonicity and
progress
In this section we introduce some of Ficici’s results on the question of progress in coevolution, as
summarised in an important recent paper [54] and in his Ph.D. thesis [53]. While the concepts
discussed in the previous sections were developed independently from Ficici, they certainly
benefited from comparison with Ficici’s results.
E.1 Solution concepts
The principal notion introduced by Ficici is that of a solution concept [54]:
Fundamental to all search problems is the notion of a solution concept. Whatever
properties our problem domain may possess, and however we embed that domain
into a search space, we require a solution concept to indicate which locations in the
search space - if any - constitute solutions to our problem. A solution concept thus
partitions a search space into two classes: Solutions and non-solutions. Typically,
the two classes are distinguished in a systematic way - by some number of measurable
properties that are present or absent in class members. . .When we apply a particular
solution concept to a search space, we obtain a particular search problem.
Thus defining a solution concept is equivalent to stating what exactly we are looking for,
before starting to look for it. To quote Ficici, “while this point may seem obvious, years of
coevolutionary practice indicate otherwise.” [53, Conclusion]. Solution concepts discussed by
Ficici include the conventional concept of the Best Scoring Strategy (BSS), Pareto-dominance
and the Nash equilibrium, among others.
E.2 Preference relations: a set-theoretic definition of superior-
ity
Once a solution concept is formulated, it is possible to define a preference relation between two
individuals A and B in the following way: essentially, we prefer an individual A to an individual
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B if any set of known opponents in which B is a solution (i.e. corresponds to the solution
concept when only this particular set is considered) is a sub-set of a set in which A is a solution.
For example, for the simple solution concept of “numerical maximum,” B=10 is a solution in
all sets of integers that include 10 and numbers lower than 10. A=12 is a solution in all sets
of integers that include 12 and numbers lower than 12. Every set in which B is a solution is a
subset of a set in which A is a solution - as can be trivially shown by simply adding A to any
such set. Therefore, we prefer A over B.1
One hardly needs to emphasise the elegance of the system: instead of defining a superior-
ity relation, we just “plug in” a given solution concept, and a (global) superiority relation is
automatically provided by elementary set theory.
E.3 Monotonicity: when historical progress is equivalent to global
progress
An important point of Ficici’s formalism is that set theoretic considerations allow for the deriva-
tion of powerful results. In particular, Ficici investigates the capacities of search processes which
do not discard any information. Let us imagine a search process endowed with an archive, such
that every individual encountered by the process so far is kept in the archive indefinitely. At
every step, we pick a new individual from the search space (according to some unspecified heuris-
tic), incorporate it into our population, and determine the “champions” of the new population
- i.e. those that correspond to the solution concept for this new population - if any. In our
terminology it is clear that such a process follows a pattern of perfect historical progress: the
new champion is, by definition, superior to its predecessor against the entire history of previous
opponents.
At this point Ficici introduces the notion of monotonicity. A solution concept can be mono-
tonic or non-monotonic. Monotonicity, for a given solution concept, means that for any three
sets S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ S3, if A is a solution in S1 and S3, then A is also a solution in S2. If it is possible
that an individual A is solution of two sets S1 and S3 such that S1 ⊂ S3, but not of a set S2
where S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ S3, then the solution concept is called non-monotonic.
Monotonicity means that if no information is discarded, the new solutions found by the
evolutionary process will never contradict the preference relation described above: old solutions
will never be preferred to new ones. Once we have found a new solution, we can be certain
that no previously discarded solution will end up being preferred to this new solution, even
after new information is added: no matter how much new information we gain, no previously
replaced solution will ever be “rehabilitated”. Thus a monotonic solution concept implies that
“the quality of the result returned by a search heuristic (assuming that it does not discard
information) will also increase monotonically over time.” [54]
Using our terminology, a monotonic solution concept is superiority criterion for which his-
torical progress implies global progress: whenever a current champion is replaced by a new
one (based on historical superiority), we can be certain that the new champion is also glob-
1The terminology here is a simplification of Ficici’s. We believe the meaning is appropriately conveyed for the
purpose of our discussion. Also note that Ficici’s discussion apply to single-population coevolution, but is easily
extended to inter-species coevolution.
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ally superior to the previous one: we have a guarantee that the current champion is not just
historically superior, but globally superior to all previous champions. Thus, with a monotonic
solution concept, a process that follows a strict historical progress concept will also mechanically
observe strict global progress. In fact, this property (of equivalence between historical progress
and global progress) can be seen as an alternate definition of monotonicity.2
But what if the solution concept is non-monotonic ? In that case, even with perfect informa-
tion, a constant historical progress (solutions which are consistently superior to their predecessors
in competing with the set of all previously encountered opponents) will not mechanically lead
to global progress; even after thousands of iterations, we will have no guarantee that our current
champion is globally superior to previously encountered champions. With a non-monotonic so-
lution concept, no amount of information or algorithmic cunning can make absolutely sure that
evolution will not need to backtrack.
E.4 Monotonic solution concepts
Ficici’s major achievement is not only to have put together a consistent theoretical framework
for coevolution, but also to have demonstrated the monotonicity (or lack thereof) of several
solution concepts. For example, Ficici demonstrates (with a simple counter-example) that the
“conventional” solution concept of maximum expected score, or “best scoring strategy,” is non-
monotonic. However, the solution concept of Nash equilibria (as described in section 3.4.3) is
monotonic. These results, as well as others obtained by Ficici, are undoubtedly of paramount
importance for the understanding of coevolution.
While Ficici does not explicitly distinguish between global and historical superiority, these
notions can be applied to his work: the preference relation is global in nature (because it is
to be estimated over the whole search space), while the complete-information process is clearly
historical; the concept of monotonicity provides a link between the two. However this leads
Ficici to assert that monotonicity is a pre-requisite for the existence of an objective scale of
value between individuals:
There exists a common belief that objective metrics of goodness are an ill-conceived
proposition in coevolution (. . . ) We show that this belief does not transfer to algo-
rithms designed around appropriate solution concepts. [53, Chap. I]
The non-monotonicity of [several solution concepts such as best-scoring strategy] is
certainly consistent with the red-queen effect and with the common sentiment that
objective metrics of goodness are difficult to obtain for coevolutionary domains (. . . )
The work we present here shifts the focus of attention away from the game and to
the solution concept; “monotonicity”, which must exist in one sense or another if we
are to have an objective metric of goodness, reveals that difficulty in obtaining an
2Importantly, this only applies to the sequence of solutions. Even with a monotonic solution concept, it is
perfectly possible that a known individual, which is not currently considered a solution, may be regarded as a
solution in the future, as new information is added. However, once it has become a solution, then if it is ever
discarded and replaced with a new solution, it will never become a solution again: monotonicity means that
demoted solutions will never be promoted back to solution status. (Ficici, personal communication)
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objective metric of performance can be due, in no small part, to the solution concept
itself. [53, Chap. IX]
Using our terminology, we can alter this statement. As we have seen, non-monotonous
solution concepts can, and do, exhibit a consistent, global scale of “goodness”: global superiority
provides precisely such a global, intransitive scale of goodness through which any two individuals
can (in theory!) be unambiguously compared, based on any solution concept, and on any fitness
landscape, that we might think of. The problem, of course, is that this global scale, even though
it does exists (and corresponds to the result that we intuitively desire from coevolutionary
optimisation) is not directly observable in the general case: to evaluate global progress reliably,
we would need to have complete knowledge of the results of all possible interactions within the
entire search space, which is clearly unfeasible. Ficici’s major contribution, based on the concept
of monotonicity, is precisely to have determined in which conditions historical progress (which is
readily achievable through the use of an archive) does, or does not, automatically create global
progress.
E.5 Should we use monotonic solution concepts?
We have seen that in coevolution, progress and superiority can only be meaningfully discussed
with regard to a certain set of opponents, and with a well-defined superiority criterion, or so-
lution concept. Ficici has shown that not all solution concepts are equal: some are monotonic,
while others are not. “Monotonic” means that we will never have to backtrack and rehabilitate
a previously discarded champion: if we enforce perfect historical progress, then we have a guar-
antee that newer champions are always, not only historically, but globally superior to previous
champions. Clearly monotonicity is a desirable property. Does it mean that we should discard
non-monotonic solution concepts (including the intuitive, “conventional” Best Scoring Strategy
solution concept) and use monotonic solution concepts by default?
The problem with this proposition is that monotonicity comes at a cost. Ficici demon-
strates the monotonicity of two solution concepts: Nash equilibria and Pareto dominance (under
conditions3). While Nash equilibria appear conceptually simple, they imply the use of mixed
strategies, that is, sets of strategies from which the individual chooses randomly (according to
a certain distribution) at every interaction. This requirement is rather unwieldy from an imple-
mentation viewpoint, especially considering that neither the number of strategies in the set nor
the probability distribution, are fixed. Note that monotonicity is only guaranteed in the case
of exhaustive enumeration of the search space. Exhaustive enumeration of all possible mixed
strategies is clearly more costly than exhaustive enumeration of all possible pure strategies. As
for Pareto dominance, we have already highlighted its specific problems in section 3.4.3.
In addition to these difficulties, it is worth pointing out the intuitive appeal of the Best Scor-
ing Strategy concept (maximisation of expected score against a random opponent), especially
from an optimisation viewpoint. This concept seems to embody the common notion of supe-
riority and progress that coevolutionary optimisation is expected to produce. This is precisely
3The condition for monotonicity of Pareto dominance is that new candidates which appear identical (that is,
obtain identical scores in all currently known dimensions) to those in the current dominance front, should not be
included into the front.[53]
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why Ficici calls it the “conventional” concept. Pareto dominance is intuitive and easily under-
stood, but widespread mutual non-dominance in complex search spaces limits its appeal. Nash
equilibria may not be quite as intuitive, especially considering the need to use mixed strategies.
For example, it seems counter-intuitive for a checkers player to randomly pick a new playing
method at the start of each new game, independently of its opponent. And how much would we
trust a robot that picks a random strategy from its repertoire before performing its task?
Finally, we must keep in mind that even with monotonic solution concepts, steady historical
(and global) progress is only guaranteed if we do not discard any information. This may not be
realistic in practice.
In summary, the drawbacks of the conventional BSS criterion (namely its non-monotonicity)
must be balanced against its advantages. Monotonicity, while desirable, may come at a high
costs, either in terms of computation and intuitiveness (for Nash equilibria) or discriminative
power (for Pareto dominance). In practice, the intuitive appeal of the BSS criterion may over-
come the theoretical cost of non-monotonicity. From a pragmatic perspective, in many cases,
it may well be that the best way to deal with non-monotonicity is simply to accept it as a fact
of life, and try to find algorithms which are as resistant to it as possible, rather than to use
non-conventional solution concepts.
E.6 Summary and conclusion
In coevolution, the concepts of superiority and progress are not as self-evident as in fitness-based
evolution and must be carefully defined. To evaluate the superiority of an individual A over
another individual B, we must define two things:
1. A superiority criterion (maximum expected utility, Pareto dominance, etc.)
2. A common set of opponents over which this criterion will be assessed and compared be-
tween A and B.
In the course of coevolution, different sets of “reference” opponents characterise different no-
tions of progress, namely local progress (superiority of newer individuals over their predecessors,
evaluated against current competitors), historical progress (superiority of newer individuals,
evaluated against all previously encountered competitors) and global progress (superiority of
newer individuals, evaluated against all possible competitors). The first is all that natural se-
lection is concerned with. The second can be brought about by means of an archive or similar
algorithmic devices. The third is the most desirable form of progress in coevolution, but is diffi-
cult to achieve reliably. In particular, it does not mechanically follow from any of the previous
two.
Ficici has shown that, for some solution concepts (a notion closely related to that of superior-
ity criteria), historical progress is demonstrably equivalent to global progress: newer champions
are better than previous ones, not just against previously encountered opponents, but against
the entire search space. However, monotonic solution concepts (such as Nash equilibria and
Pareto non-dominated fronts) carry additional requirements and limitations which may make
them rather unwieldy in practice. The conventional superiority criterion (Best Scoring Strategy,
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or maximum expected score against a random opponent), while non-monotonic, may be seen as




Adami and colleagues [3, 2] have introduced a specific concept called “physical complexity”.
They suggest [2] that this quantity measures “the amount of information that is stored in [a
genome] about [its] environment”. Using this notion of complexity, they claim [3] that “because
natural selection forces genomes to behave as a natural ’Maxwell Demon’, within a fixed en-
vironment, genomic complexity is forced to increase.” However, physical complexity is quite
distinct from the everyday concept of complexity.
Physical complexity (as calculated by equation (4) in [3]) is the total length of the genome
(or some section of interest), minus the sum of the entropies of each locus of this genome or
section within the population. Entropies are calculated simply by observing the distribution of
alleles at this locus, and calculating the standard Shannon entropy of this distribution. The
consequence is that physical complexity is, very precisely, a quantitative measure of convergence
among a population of genomes: it explicitly measures how genetically similar individuals are
within a given population.
One consequence is that it is independent of the specific features of the individuals or the
environment: physical complexity is only concerned with the degree of convergence within the
population, regardless of the environment it has evolved in, or the state it has converged to.
Thus, a fully converged population of 1000-loci genomes will have a physical complexity of 1000,
whether it has converged on the optimum of the OneMax function (a function that returns the
number of ‘ones’ in a sequence of bits) or on an optimal neural network to solve the double-pole
balancing problem. Thus, the assumption that “an organism’s complexity is a reflection of the
physical complexity of its genome” [3] requires caution.
In practice, however, the environment may have an influence over the dynamics of physical
complexity: in a simple environment, with one single, easily reach optimum (say, the OneMax
function), the population is more likely to converge totally than in a more complex environ-
ment in which many optima are present, so physical complexity is likely to be higher in trivial
environments. What’s more, if we consider a complex environment with many optima, then
several dynamics can be observed: the evolving population can cover the entire environment
and simultaneously explore several optima; or it may narrowly concentrate on one single lo-
cal optimum and utterly ignore the rest of the environment. By definition, in the latter case
(concentration on one single optimum) physical complexity will be higher than in the former
case (simultaneous exploration of many optima), precisely because the population will be more
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concentrated. A naive understanding of the term “information about the environment” might
have led to opposite conclusions.
Furthermore, genetic drift, being a cause of diversity loss, will also increase physical com-
plexity. This would imply that random fluctuations qualify as a ‘Maxwell’s demon’. So do
population bottlenecks (i.e. episodes of severe random selection), for the same reason. Thus,
the statement that physical complexity measures how much “information” the population has
accumulated about its environment [3, 2] should not be understood in a standard information-
theoretic sense.
We believe that the expression ‘arrow of complexity’ usually refers to the more common
notions of morphological and functional complexity. However, those quantities of functional
and morphological complexity were explicitly not considered (“skirt[ed]” [3]) by Adami and
colleagues. Accordingly, we do not include this concept in our discussion.
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